Legal Fictions, Literary Narrative, and the Historical Truth: The Jurisprudence of Marriage in the Long Eighteenth Century by Geiser, Suzanna
LEGAL FICTIONS, LITERARY NARRATIVE, AND THE HISTORICAL TRUTH: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Suzanna Geiser 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department 
of English and Comparative Literature. 
Chapel Hill 
2018 
Approved by: 
James Thompson 
Jeanne Moskal 
Thomas Reinert 
John McGowan 
Megan Matchinske
ii 
© 2018 
Suzanna Geiser 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Suzanna Geiser: Legal Fictions, Literary Narrative, and the Historical Truth: The Jurisprudence 
of Marriage in the Long Eighteenth Century 
(Under the direction of James Thompson and Jeanne Moskal) 
 
This dissertation explores the impact of legal and literary fictions about marriage on the 
modern historical consciousness. By reading the early English novel in conjunction with 
contemporary legal texts on marriage—parliamentary acts and debates, case law, marriage 
settlements, and private separation deeds—I demonstrate that eighteenth-century English 
marriage law and practice was constituted through a variety of conflicting legal fictions. I further 
demonstrate that the early novel was preoccupied with how those fictions shaped the lived 
experience of domesticity, particularly for women. The fictional precepts and presumptions 
underwriting emerging contract theory and traditional marriage doctrine at once directed and 
circumscribed (proto)modern developments in marriage, property, and divorce law. Moreover, 
the novel, in its mimetic and ideological capacities, variously worked to expose, advance, and 
revise those fictions, thereby amplifying and altering their historical force. Examining the 
dialectical relationship between legal texts and the novels of Daniel Defoe, Eliza Haywood, 
Samuel Richardson, Frances Burney, Charlotte Smith, Elizabeth Inchbald, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
and Jane Austen, this project challenges traditional conceptions of the law as stable, objective, 
and truth-bearing, and it demonstrates the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to 
historical inquiry. The project also highlights the need for renewed attention to the concept of 
“legal fiction,” including its influence on the modern individual’s perceptions of self and other, 
masculinity and femininity, and legal rights and moral duties.  
iv 
Each chapter explores the legal fictions implicated at a particular stage in the marriage 
contracting process. Chapter one, on marriage formation, focuses on the principles of the then-
emerging theory of contract development. Chapter two, on marital unification, centers on the 
classic legal fiction of “unity of person.” Chapter three, on marital dissolution, addresses the 
foundational assumptions of the indissolubility doctrine, as well as the presumption of “paternal 
right” and the fiction of illegitimacy, filius nullius. Collectively, these chapters chart the entire 
trajectory of marriage, from start to finish.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Eighteenth-century legal commentary often presents a vastly different picture of women’s 
position under the law than that constructed by contemporary literary narrative. For example, in 
his celebrated legal treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69), Sir William 
Blackstone observes that “the female sex” is a “great . . . favourite . . . of the laws of England,” 
and argues that the legal “disabilities” to which a woman is subject upon marriage “are for the 
most part intended for her protection and benefit” (1: 433). Similarly, the anonymous author of 
the legal treatise The Laws Respecting Women (1777) asserts that “England has been stiled the 
Paradise of women,” and connects the fortune of the “softer sex” to the nation’s 
acknowledgement and enforcement of the “the natural rights of mankind” (vi; Preface). In 
contrast, the eponymous heroines of Daniel Defoe’s Roxana (1724) and Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
The Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria (1798) vehemently argue that the law, particularly the law of 
marriage, operates as a mechanism for stripping women of their natural rights. It requires them, 
in Roxana’s words, to “‘giv[e] up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and every-thing, to the Man’” 
(Defoe, Roxana 148) and brings them, in Maria’s terms, to a state of enslavement 
(Wollstonecraft 158-59, 195).1 While these female protagonists are more polemical in their 
assessment of women’s position than most of their literary counterparts, they register the theme 
of legal disadvantage and oppression that pervades the eighteenth-century novel. The 
significance of the legal and literary dissonance on the law’s treatment of women lies in what it 
                                                 
1 Roxana also posits married women as slaves: “the Woman [once married] was indeed, a meer Woman ever after, 
that is to say, a Slave” (Defoe, Roxana 148). 
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suggests about the integrity of the legal- and the literary-historical record and the strength of the 
methodologies through which those records are produced. Indeed, this incongruity elicits broad 
questions about the notion of a “historical real” and about the limits of “truth-bearing” cultural 
artifacts. It also underscores the instability of institutional boundaries: the law’s distinct 
features—its objectivity, rationality, and sovereignty—appearing to confront those of 
literature—its subjectivity, creativity, and cultural sensitivity. Indeed, these two accounts of 
women under the law indicate the law’s susceptibility to the fictive and literature’s accessibility 
to the real.  
This dissertation explores the complicated relationship between eighteenth-century legal 
and literary discourse on the law of marriage. I read primary legal texts implicating marriage 
alongside and against the domestic novel in order to discover how both fields use fiction to 
reveal and to obscure, to preserve and to destroy, and to historicize and romanticize those 
customs and precepts that surrounded the period’s marriage contract. I argue that the 
conversation between law and literature about marriage suggests that the latter often operated to 
both expose and de-fictionalize, disempower, or even rewrite the former. I further argue that the 
deeply imbricated relationship between the two cultures demonstrates the importance of treating 
literary fiction as part of the legal-historical record and for understanding legal fictions as 
significant to literary history, particularly to the novel’s development. Fictions, legal and literary, 
have a jurisprudential function that impacts the cultural consciousness in ways that are profound 
and potentially problematic to the effectuation of a historical real. Thus, a collaborative, 
interdisciplinary effort aimed at discovering and debating the position of fictions in the historical 
record can lead to a more authentic account of legal and literary development. 
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Fiction and the Historical Consciousness 
The term “fiction” is most often used to denote literary narrative: imagined 
representations of real or other worlds or invented accounts of random incidents or important 
events. Yet, “fiction” is also a long-standing legal term of art, one that has been the subject of 
significant, albeit sometimes marginalized, scholarly debate.2 Traditionally, “legal fiction” has 
referred to a statement or assumption made at law and understood to be false, but adopted for 
administrative convenience or to otherwise streamline legal process, doctrine, and judgment. 
Common examples of classic legal fictions include the doctrine of corporate personhood, which 
treats corporations as individuals for the purpose of assigning them legal rights and duties; the 
process of adoption, which treats adopted children as the natural children of their adopted parents 
for inheritance purposes; and the doctrine of attractive nuisance, which treats child trespassers as 
invitees in certain tort cases.3 In his influential book Legal Fictions, Lon Fuller defines the 
classic legal fiction as “either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial 
consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility” (9). Drawing on 
Fuller, Nancy J. Knauer describes “the traditional legal fiction” as “an enabler” –as “a device 
used to facilitate the application of the law to novel legal questions and circumstances” (9). Thus, 
                                                 
2 Louise Harmon observes that the scholarly interest in legal fictions “cooled down” in the late nineteenth century, 
picked up in the early to middle twentieth century, and cooled again after Lon Fuller’s 1967 Legal Fictions (11-16). 
She writes that in the years since the publication of Fuller’s work, “interest in the subject withered and died, and 
virtually fell off the vine” (1). Recently, however, scholars from multiple disciplines have been working to restore 
legal fictions to a place, in Harmon’s words, “on the jurisprudential agenda” (1). Their efforts appear to be 
successful. For example, in an essay featured in the 2015 anthology Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice, Douglas 
Lind observes that “[t]he legal fiction . . .  has risen [in the twenty-first century] from its jurisprudential dormancy” 
(86). 
 
3 There is much debate over the definition of “legal fiction” and over the doctrines, processes, and propositions that 
fall within its scope. Nevertheless, my research suggests that corporate personhood, adoption, and attractive 
nuisance are generally believed to have the traditional constitutive properties. For an overview of this debate, see 
Maksymilian Del Mar, “Introducing Fictions.” Additionally, for a useful discussion of a variety of legal fictions, 
both judicial and statutory, see Gwilliam. 
 
4 
it is often the case, as Fuller’s and Knauer’s examinations suggest, that legal fictions have 
particular utility in times of social, economic, or political change, allowing courts and legislative 
bodies to adapt the law to meet new conditions.  
In addition to Fuller, early twentieth-century legal scholar Roscoe Pound provides a 
useful, and some argue more expansive and auspicious, interpretation of the concept of legal 
fiction.4 In Interpretations of Legal History, Pound characterizes legal fictions as “[c]reative law-
making” designed “to devise new institutions, provide new precepts and find new principles” 
(130). According to Pound, the term “legal fiction” encompasses, in addition to procedural 
inventions, certain interpretive, equitable, and natural law contrivances (130). Indeed, Pound 
argues that legal fictions include rules developed through judicial interpretation and used to fill 
gaps in an existing “rigid code or . . . body of customary law” (131); principles developed in the 
courts of equity and used to avoid legal outcomes that, while technically sound, are not 
particularly fair or just (132-33); and precepts developed out of natural law theory and used to 
“correct[] and supplement[]” the “imperfect,” and sometimes arbitrary, principles of positive law 
(133-34). Unlike Fuller, Pound does not emphasize falsity or consciousness of falsity in his 
description of the legal fiction, but he does stress the potential utility of the device, both from a 
standpoint of administrative convenience and juridical justice.5 
                                                 
4 For a comparison of Pound’s theoretical approach to legal fictions to others’ approaches, see Harmon 11-12 and P. 
Smith 1465n.155. 
 
5 There are numerous nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophies on the concept of legal fiction that are 
significant to current scholarship, including Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law (1861), Hans Vaihinger’s The 
Philosophy of ‘As-If’: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind (1911, trans. 1924), 
and Pierre J.J. Olivier’s Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science (1975). For recent discussions of these 
contributions to legal fiction theory, see Quinn (on Vaihinger); Samuel (on Vaihinger); Del Mar, “Legal Fictions 
and Legal Change” (on Maine and Olivier); and Kiralfy (on Maine). Another contribution of note is Eben Moglen’s 
“Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory.” Of particular interest is Moglen’s explanation of how legal 
presumptions operate as legal fictions, a conflation that some scholars seem to deny (37-38).  
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More recently, some legal and literary scholars have undertaken to expand further the 
conventional framework of the legal fiction by deemphasizing the device’s relationship to legal 
utility and focusing instead on its falsity. In an essay titled “New Legal Fictions,” Peter Smith 
argues for extending the concept to include “ostensibly factual” but “descriptively inaccurate” 
suppositions employed by the courts “as . . . ground[s] for creating a legal rule or modifying, or 
refusing to modify, an existing legal rule” (1441). According to Smith, “new legal fictions” are 
distinguished from classic legal fictions by their broad application as well as by their greater 
tendency toward misrepresentation and judicial opacity. Smith argues that, unlike classic legal 
fictions, which are employed to adjudicate a particular circumstance or to “soften[] . . . the 
effects of legal change” and which are generally acknowledged to be false, new legal fictions are 
often implemented without recognition of their falsity and with the purpose of “justifying [legal] 
doctrine, whether received or newly established” (1470, 1468-70). As one example of many, 
Smith cites the legal rule prohibiting an “ignorance of the law” defense, noting the rule is 
founded on the patently false, but generally uncontested, assumption that individuals are always 
already aware of the totality of their legal rights and duties (1437, 1459-60). Smith also 
highlights as indicative of a new legal fiction the evidentiary rule prohibiting the use of expert 
testimony as a way to rebut eyewitness testimony, finding the rule to reflect the broadly 
accepted, but scientifically-challenged, assumption that “jurors can competently assess the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony” (1439, 1452-55). For Smith, it is imperative that the legal 
field analyze these “ostensibly factual” assumptions for their fictional qualities. With such 
analysis, the fictions’ contemporary juridical value and, in particular, their relationship to 
normative expressions of legal authority, can be deliberated and assessed fully. Moreover, 
6 
Smith’s extension of the term allows for scholars to reevaluate the historical significance of old 
“ostensibly factual,” but now clearly false, legal suppositions.  
This contemporary trend toward establishing a broader conception of legal fiction has 
been the subject of much discussion and debate.  Knauer, for example, argues that twenty-first 
century criticism on the legal fiction has “change[d] the conversation [on fictions] entirely” (6). 
Knauer observes that recent scholarship “has sought to expand the category of legal fictions 
beyond Fuller’s definition” to include legal rules, presumptions, doctrines, and constructions that 
“are either not acknowledged to be false or are not themselves demonstrably false” (5). One 
category of such fictions that Knauer emphasizes arises out of the law and literature field and 
involves what she terms “discredited legal regimes” (27-28). Knauer turns to the 
interdisciplinary work of Christina Accomando on slavery and of Jen Camden and Kathryn Fort 
on colonial land policy (both of which I will discuss in more detail) to argue that scholars have 
extended the concept of legal fiction to institutional systems that, while apparently accepted in 
their historical moment, either “lacked the staying power of moral truth” or simply were “factual 
misstatement[s]” (27, 36). While Knauer is deeply critical of this expansion, her discussion 
highlights the ways in which legal fiction theory has developed out of and diversified from its 
classical roots.6 It is an evolution captured most markedly in the 2015 multi-disciplinary 
anthology Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice. In his introduction to the comprehensive 
edition, co-editor Maksimilyn Del Mar emphasizes the concept’s slipperiness: “multiple . . . are 
the examples offered of so-called paradigmatic or typical fictions, and there as many definitions 
                                                 
6 Knauer is concerned that recasting discredited legal regimes as fictions tends to diminish the historical significance 
of the injustice and ignorance that permeated and emanated out of them (7-8, 26-38). She argues that to “label” 
“violent legal regimes” as fictions threatens to “work[] a denial and remove[] from memory important lessons 
regarding the law and the fragility of the human experience” (8). 
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of fictions as there are apparent functions of them (i.e. jobs they perform or enable) and alleged 
benefits and disbenefits they bring” (“Introducing Fictions,” ix). Moreover, this fluidity of 
meaning and function appears in the anthology’s contributions, some of which employ or defend 
existing conceptual patterns and others of which seek to offer new philosophical frameworks. 
Because of the ambiguity surrounding the constitutive properties of the “legal fiction,” this 
dissertation takes a wide view of the device, attending to legal rules, doctrines, presumptions, 
and systems that contain significant untruths, whether recognized, ignored, or denied, whether 
motivated by the practical or the political, and whether useful in or inimical to the administration 
of justice.  
Rather than enter into the conceptual debate over “legal fiction,” I want to focus on the 
operational debate, which has its roots in eighteenth-century legal philosophy.7 William 
Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham are the historical representatives of the tensions concerning the 
concept’s utility and legitimacy, with Blackstone serving as the model advocate of the legal 
fiction, and Bentham as its exemplary opponent. In Commentaries, Blackstone argues that legal 
fictions are “highly beneficial and useful,” but his contention is based on the assumption that “no 
fiction shall extend to work an injury,” as it is always adopted and employed “to prevent a 
mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result from the general rule of law” (3: 43). 
Blackstone does concede that fictions can, and sometimes do, create a sort of administrative and 
doctrinal “labyrinth”; yet he maintains that these perplexities are the necessary consequence of a 
long-established, deliberate, and complex system of jurisprudence (3: 268). In one of his more 
poetic moments, Blackstone uses medieval imagery to remind skeptics of the inveterate nature of 
                                                 
7 I recognize that for some scholars the conceptual and operational debates are one in the same. In these scholars’ 
minds, how we define legal fiction is crucial for assessing the concept’s value. By taking a broad perspective on the 
term, however, I am able to address, on a larger scale, the socio-cultural impact of legal untruths. 
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the English legal tradition and of the part legal fictions have played in making the law habitable 
for the modern era:  
We inherit an old Gothic castle, erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for a modern 
inhabitant. The moated ramparts, the embattled towers, and the trophied halls, are 
magnificent and venerable, but useless. The inferior apartments, now converted into 
rooms of convenience, are chearful and commodious, though their approaches are 
winding and difficult. (3: 268)  
 
One way to understand Blackstone’s apparent indifference to these “winding and difficult” paths 
is in the context of his belief in the supremacy of natural law and his great confidence in human 
reason. In other words, Blackstone thinks of legal fictions as juridically safe precisely because, in 
his view, any dangers or errors are precluded by the fictions’ subordination to pre-existing, 
universal rules dedicated to the natural rights of man and accessible to all rational actors, 
including those setting, practicing, and interpreting the law.8 His faith in reason is so strong that 
he argues for almost blind adherence to legal tradition. In a section on the sanctity of the 
common law and legal custom, he writes “precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly 
absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a 
deference to former times as not to suppose they acted wholly without consideration” (70; bk. 1, 
ch. 3). This admonition includes, it appears, obsolete fictions or any false presumptions adopted 
to facilitate legal, social, or political change.  
It is Blackstone’s veneration for the “old Gothic castle”—his fidelity to the notion of an 
ideal legal past and present—that drives Bentham’s derision for the “legal fiction.” In A 
Fragment on Government (1776), Bentham attacks Blackstone’s unapologetic reverence for 
English law as a codification of natural law. According to Bentham, natural law is itself a fiction, 
a mere “phrase” that threatens to render incomprehensible—to destabilize—England’s legal 
                                                 
8 See Blackstone 1: 41; and 1: 68-70. 
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system (212-14; ch. iv, sc. 18-19). That system is further rendered unintelligible to laymen by the 
procedural or interpretive legal fiction: it is, he argues, a “pestilential” device that “poisons the 
sense of every instrument it comes near” (113-14n.1; Preface). Yet, Bentham’s concern about 
legal fictions extends beyond their impact on the law’s accessibility. In Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence (1827), Bentham suggests that these administrative mechanisms corrupt the moral 
order and jeopardize society’s “intellectual faculties” (287; bk. 8, ch. 18).9 Indeed, he argues that 
legal fictions transform the “law-book” into “an institute of vice,” the “court of judicature” into 
“a school of vice,” and the citizenry into a mass of imbeciles who equate justice with lies (287; 
bk. 8, ch. 18). For Bentham, fictions are the means by which judges exercise “arbitrary power” 
and lawyers dictate legal outcomes—they are the means, in other words, by which the legal 
profession unfairly and covertly appropriates the terms of justice (287; bk. 8, ch. 18).10 
Although the concept of the legal fiction has remained viable in and valuable to the law 
post-Bentham, it is not without its critics. Scholars in the classic tradition have suggested that the 
device has the potential to confuse and mislead and, in some cases, perpetrate injustice. Fuller, 
for example, concedes that “[a] fiction taken seriously, i.e., ‘believed,’ becomes dangerous and 
loses its utility” (9-10). In this form, it is a deception that acts to impede the law’s practical 
objectives and ethical demands. Hans Vaihinger also argues the concept’s moral challenges, 
especially in regards to marginalized groups: “In legal practice, the employment of fiction may 
lead both to benefits and also to the grossest forms of injustice, as when women were treated as 
if they were minors” (148). Moreover, in an essay that seeks to categorize fictions into static 
                                                 
9 Bentham devotes an entire chapter of Rationale of Judicial Evidence to legal fictions. His distaste for the device is 
perhaps most famously captured in the following: “Fiction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade” (283; 
bk. 8, ch. 18).  
 
10 For an extended discussion of Bentham on legal fictions, see Quinn. 
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(bad) and dynamic (good), John Gwilliam warns that when a fiction becomes too general, too 
rigid, and too fixed within legal thought, it “becomes open to abuse” (459, 468-69). It can be 
applied arbitrarily or unnecessarily and in ways that endanger the law’s principal aim—to ensure 
a just result (Gwilliam 458-69). More recently, Douglas Lind has noted the existence of 
“problematic fiction[s]”—i.e., fictions that “upset settled meanings or truths, work injustice, or 
mask underlying processes of legal reasoning”—and argued for their elimination (100, 84). For 
Lind, the evaluation process is “case-by-case” and, he suggests, requires an examination that 
reaches outside of the law’s institutional walls (84-85). It is not, then, just how the fiction 
influences law and legal meaning, but how it impacts society and socio-cultural truths.  
Another criticism of legal fictions, old and new, is that they have the potential to shape 
and standardize—that they can become instruments for developing and authorizing normative 
behaviors and ideologies. Aviam Soifer argues that the legal fiction, once accepted, “channels 
thought” (often narrowly) and “affect[s] how growth will tilt” both within and outside the legal 
academy (877). It has the capacity, Soifer contends, “to influence or even control how we think 
or refuse to think about basic matters” (877) and to “shroud the tragedy of present reality” (892). 
Echoing Soifer’s argument, Louise Harmon calls for legal scholars to “passionately” re-engage 
with the legal fiction, reminding them that the “[w]ords of law matter” and that “artifice” within 
the language and application of the law can obscure “state power” and, she suggests, appropriate 
the individual experience (70-71). Developing this criticism further, Peter Smith contends that 
legal fictions are troubling precisely because they can operate (intentionally or otherwise) to 
conceal, craft, and convince both at the social and political, as well as legal, levels. He suggests 
that fictions can work covertly to enforce normative standards and structures and to legitimate 
questionable legal doctrine—i.e., doctrine that is “base[d] . . . on false, debatable, or untested 
11 
premises” (1439-1440). Thus, from this critical perspective, legal fictions, at their most shrewdly 
powerful, have the potential to de-stabilize three dominant values in Anglo-American law and 
society—truth, transparency, and justice—and they threaten to alter irrevocably how institutions 
and individuals understand their past, experience their present, and negotiate their future. 
 The challenge that fictions pose to the legal-historical record and to the Anglo-American 
consciousness is revealed in the work of critical legal scholars and critical race theorists. In an 
essay discussing nineteenth-century jurisprudence on Native American sovereignty and property 
rights, Hope Babcock demonstrates how false constructions of race and colonial right have 
become so deeply integrated into the fabric of judicial decisionmaking and legislative policy on 
Indian affairs that, even now, they operate as legal fact. She persuasively argues, “[w]hen courts 
so often repeat legal fictions . . . then factual distortions become institutionalized; a part of . . . 
[legal] jurisprudence that cannot be denied” (819). Camden and Fort, writing on the same body 
of jurisprudence, extend the fictions’ impact to the social collective.11 They argue that racialized 
and ideologically-driven legal falsehoods, such as Chief Justice John Marshall’s characterization 
of indigenous tribes as “‘fierce savages’” (93) and his use of “the mythical narrative of conquest” 
to counter Native American land rights (89), have the potential to “become ‘truth’ to the majority 
society and trickery to the minority group” (86). Moreover, Accomando, whose work focuses on 
legal fictions related to slavery, proves Camden and Fort’s point. By reading the work of Harriet 
Jacobs, Sojourner Truth, and Phyllis Wheatley alongside institutionally-created legal discourse, 
Accomando demonstrates how the law’s ideological “framings of race, gender, and slavery” 
silenced the “legal and political voice[s]” of African Americans, thereby erasing their efforts “to 
                                                 
11 These scholars are interested in the development of the discovery and conquest doctrine, which “claims the first 
European sovereign to ‘discover’ land holds the right to the title to the land and the right to conquer those who live 
there” (Camden and Fort 87). 
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deconstruct slavery and its underlying ideologies” from the dominant historical narrative and the 
prevailing collective memory (9, 4-5, et passim). What these scholars show, then, are that 
institution and individual are highly-mediated entities—their awareness of and sensitivity to 
“self” and “other” is negotiated, at least in part, by the historical embeddedness of the law’s 
fictions.  
Recent criticism on the concept of legal fiction therefore suggests that, while the various 
iterations of the device are often thought to facilitate the reality of legal change or cultural 
progression, they can just as often plaster over apertures in the “real.” They can shape, in 
sometimes troubling ways, how we see ourselves, our relationships, and our social counterparts, 
and they can inaccurately frame our perception of our legal rights and duties, including their 
historical foundations and developments. So, how can we reclaim our subjectivity and our 
historical consciousness from the sometimes corruptive influence of legal fiction? Where can we 
go to recover the voices and experiences that have been silenced or normativized by this 
ostensibly pragmatic device? How can we identify and revise legal constructions that are 
ideologically, rather than practically and rationally, motivated? How do we facilitate “good” 
legal fictions while maintaining cultural truths and developing a system of progressive socio-
legal ethics?    
One solution—and the solution that I investigate in this dissertation—is to turn to literary 
fiction, which in its own representational, critical, and imaginative capacities, can expose some 
of the historical gaps and biases created by legal untruths and re-direct legal and social thought 
toward a more authentic and, often empathic, understanding of the legal subject, the legal actor, 
the legal past, and the legal future. Law and literature scholars long have recognized literature’s 
value to jurisprudential development, ethical professionalism, and legal history. As François Ost 
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has argued, literature can “perform a function of critical subversion” and “a function of founding 
conversion” when placed in conversation with the law: Literature can “reveal [the law’s] fictions 
and effects of trompe-l’oeil, its artifices and theatrical effects,” and in so doing, “produce both a 
critical knowledge of legal constructions and an incentive to re-found the[m] on a deeper 
knowledge of the power of language, as well as on the twists and turns of practical reason” (6-7). 
These functions, as Barbara Villez suggests, can touch both the lay and professional reader. Just 
as literary fiction “participates in the construction of a citizen’s legal culture,” imparting legal 
knowledge and ordering reader attitudes, especially in regard to legal justice (Villez 211-15), it also 
“guide[s]” the legal expert’s theoretical and practical mindset “towards a more integrated [and 
flexible] understanding of law in society” (Villez 217-18). Indeed, in its considerable cultural reach, 
imaginative fiction has the ability to enlighten individuals and institutions about the reality of their 
legal world and to transform how they approach the rights and duties of all who inhabit that world 
along with them.   
The idea that literature provides an ethical framework for assessing and administering the law 
is suggested in the interdisciplinary work of Robin West and Martha Nussbaum. For West, literary 
narrative, with its diverse representations of “human nature,” challenges those “moral beliefs” that 
are “held by dominant sectors of society” and prioritized at law (7-8). It also, she contends, 
destabilizes the argument “that the law is just because its precepts and procedures reflect the moral 
commitments and ideals of the community” (9). In West’s accounting, literature can help us to create 
an empathetic and experiential knowledge base—a more compassionate and heterogeneous 
understanding of human nature—from which we can then revisit those principles and practices 
whereby the law claims and enacts its often too prescriptive “moral authority” (9, 6-10). Martha 
Alison LaCroix and Martha Nussbaum, similarly argue the instructive and emotive value of literature 
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to the law. In their view, literary narrative reveals the law’s constraints and injustices; it expresses the 
complexity of the lives impacted by legal convention and prescription; it imagines proactive 
responses for the lawfully marginalized; and, for Nussbaum in particular, it cultivates the reader’s 
capacity for sympathetic identification and for good—i.e., emotionally- and rationally-informed—
judgment.12 In other words, literature re-places the law within its immediate or historical socio-
cultural context and thereby encourages a critical investigation into its expansive “moral” power. It 
further facilitates an ethically- and rationally-minded public response to institutional expressions of 
that power.   
Literature also promotes a thicker understanding of legal history, including the enduring 
power of the law’s fictions. Accomando’s work on slavery and its resistance demonstrates the 
historical reach of legal fictions, as well as the necessity of employing extra-legal texts to 
produce a careful, authoritative legal historical record. Drawing on the work of Angela Harris, 
Accomando argues that in order to get to the truth of African American slavery and resistance, it 
is necessary to dispel the notion of the law as a “single,” “unified” and “‘neutral voice’” (11).  
Accomando contends that it is only by integrating “multiple voices and shifting perspectives” 
into the “official” legal record (as first suggested by Harris) that it becomes possible “to 
destabilize the seemingly neutral language of law and policy” and to authenticate (more fully) 
legal history (11). Accomando herself creates multi-vocality in the legal record on slavery by 
reading primary legal texts implicating the institution “alongside and against” a range of external 
materials, including “poetry, oratory, slave narrative, and . . . legal critiques by former slaves” 
(4). By attending to the dialogue between law and literature on slavery—by privileging “multiple 
                                                 
12 Nussbaum and LaCroix suggest each of these values in their introduction to an interdisciplinary anthology on 
representations of gender and law in the British novel (3-11). Nussbaum’s theory on the relationship among 
literature, “rational emotions,” and judgment can be found in her innovative book Poetic Justice. 
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consciousness”—Accomando highlights the law’s silences, ironies, contradictions, and 
prerogatives, ultimately reconstituting the traditional historical narrative of African American 
oppression under the law as one of African American agency—of protest, defiance, and 
rebellion. This practice of incorporating a variety of discourse, especially the literary, is, I would 
argue, useful in any historical endeavor that seeks a comprehensive understanding of legal 
culture, including the life of its (un)acknowledged fictions.  
Imaginary fiction’s potential to engage with the real, and to establish or re-shape cultural 
norms, is, of course, central to traditional literary studies and, in particular, scholarship on the 
novel form. Novel theorists and historians often connect its representational and visionary 
qualities to the commencement of the modern age and the development of the modern individual. 
For example, Ian Watt, in his groundbreaking The Rise of the Novel, argues that the early novel 
was conceived as a forum for examining and mediating the “truth” of contemporary “human 
experience” (13). According to Watt, novelistic narrative represents and, in its depiction of the 
social, evaluates the emerging conditions of individual free will, autonomy, and equality. Jane 
Spencer, in The Rise of the Woman Novelist: From Aphra Behn to Jane Austen, implicitly 
extends Watt’s thesis to early domestic fiction authored by women. Spencer argues that these 
authors seized the opportunity to describe the private space of domesticity and the female 
experience within it, as well as to propagate and critique the “new ideology of femininity” by 
which that space was coming to be defined (viii-xi). In Desire and Domestic Fiction, Nancy 
Armstrong also considers the significance of novels written by or for women. She posits the 
novel as a powerful ideological medium, one that constructed the modern, middle-class domestic 
sphere, the sexual relationships by which that sphere has been defined historically, and the 
feminine ideal which gives the space political authority (4-5, 8-10). Then, in How Novels Think, 
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Armstrong eclipses the provocative argument of her earlier work to argue that the novel created 
the individual, or the modern subject (7).   
James Thompson, in Models of Value, moves outside of the confines of the domestic 
sphere and considers how the novel form represents and responds to the developing “crisis in the 
notion of value” engendered by the rise of a modern capitalist economy (2, 2-3). According to 
Thompson, the novel works dialectically with contemporary political economy to solve the crisis 
by locating financial value in the public, and romantic or affective value in the private, sphere 
(23-24, 185-86).  In a similar manner, Liz Bellamy, in Commerce, Morality and the Eighteenth-
Century Novel, reads C18 economic and ethical writing alongside the eighteenth-century novel 
in order to understand the early novel’s participation in the capitalist-induced competition 
between private and public conceptions of morality. Bellamy argues that “[t]he mid-eighteenth-
century novel can . . . be seen as an embodiment of the ethical tensions that conditioned the 
period” (7), while the novelistic discourse that followed can be understood as an attempt to 
resolve those tensions by separating the private from the public (184). Michael McKeon, in 
Origins of the English Novel, also points to early modern anxieties, “epistemological and social,” 
as critical to the novel’s modern development. For McKeon, the novel both “reflects” and seeks 
to “resolve” concerns about narrative “truth” and individual “virtue” in a moment of great social 
and economic change (20-22). Thus, it is these and other literary responses to modernity—in the 
form of solutions, challenges, and adaptations—that novel scholars demonstrate gave the early 
novel its cultural and political force and that contributed not only to the construction of the 
modern self but also to the instantiation of the “liberal” Western state, both its public and private 
spheres. 
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 Literary scholars have also examined, however tangentially, the law’s relationship to the 
novel’s development and to the form’s position as a modern production. Wolfram Schmidgen, 
for instance, has looked to natural law philosophy (e.g., Locke’s Two Treatises) and legal treatise 
writing (e.g., Blackstone’s Commentaries) to demonstrate that eighteenth-century subjectivity 
was inextricably linked to material property, and to argue that the period’s novel reiterates that 
link and England’s continued investment in “communal forms” (1). Nancy Johnson also has 
considered the early novel’s investment in the relationship between individual and material 
circumstance. Focusing on the Jacobin novel’s engagement with social contract theory, Johnson 
argues that the literature takes up the Enlightenment philosophy’s central problem: that it admits 
as contracting subjects only those who can show themselves capable of self-governance by virtue 
of their status as property owners under the law (104-52). Finally, Sue Chaplin has considered 
how the eighteenth-century novel interested in “constructions of bourgeois femininity” operates, 
in part, as a response to (or in conjunction with) conflicting and equivocal notions of the female 
as legal subject (40)13; while John Zomchick has investigated how the period’s novel uses legal 
precepts to help create a “juridical subject,” one who abandons his or her fragmentary nature to, 
as the law envisions, become “internally coherent and self-regulating” (2, 1-31). Yet, there has 
been little consideration of how literary imaginings work in accord with and in opposition to 
legal untruths, and what this tenuous and often vexed exchange suggests about the novel’s 
position within literary history—how the novel developed as a response to the law’s construction 
of itself and its history as rational, objective, and just.14 
                                                 
13 Chaplin is particularly interested in how these novels invoke the sublime and the trope of sensibility as they work 
through women’s legal subjectivity pre- and post-marriage (30-40). 
 
14 There is a very small body of literary scholarship that examines the relationship between literary and legal fiction; 
however, this work tends to focus on specific authors or particular fictions, rather than the novel form and the 
concept of legal fiction. See, for example, Trish Ferguson’s work on legal fictions in Thomas Hardy’s ouevre.  For a 
more theoretical discussion the two devices, see Kertzer, who examines how justice is constructed and complicated 
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Thus, this dissertation investigates the dialectical relationship between novelistic fiction 
and legal fiction, both of which are connected in significant ways to the modern era and both of 
which are crucial to understanding the English and American historical outlooks. The project 
proceeds by understanding the discipline from which each fictive endeavour derives as operating 
both in conjunction with and in opposition to the other. In Reading for the Law, Christine 
Krueger convincingly argues for a “multidisciplinary ‘historical narrative jurisprudence,’” or an 
approach to law and literature that “replace[s] an ahistorical opposition between [the two 
disciplines] with a history of their interdependency, and their embeddedness in print culture” (2). 
According to Krueger, this approach “strengthens” the position of narrative legal theorists who 
have consistently argued “for the transformative powers of stories” (2), or more precisely, who 
have argued for   
storytelling as a solution to the problem of attaining legal recognition on the grounds that 
it allows for testimony regarding ‘life contexts,’ or alternative realities, excluded by 
normative rules of evidence, and that it enables privileged legal decision makers to 
empathize with people whose experiences and constraints may be very different from 
their own. (12) 
 
For Krueger, historicizing literary narrative opens up and objectifies its relationship to the law 
and to the stories and histories in which both are implicated and by which both are produced (1-
22). For my purposes, “historical narrative jurisprudence” serves as a reminder that we cannot 
assume that literature functions only to expose the limitations, biases, or idiosyncrasies of the 
law; rather, it can just as well operate to advance or propagate a particular, and sometimes 
controversial legal agenda. In fact, the law is an institution always already bound up with the 
literary, with each field’s fictions constantly influencing and being influenced by the other.    
                                                 
by legal and literary fictions. There are also critical texts that focus on representations of the law in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century fiction generally. See Swan, Fictions of Law; and Loncar. 
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The Marriage Contract, Fiction, and the Historical Record 
Fictions have permeated, and continue to permeate, our historical consciousness. They 
work in ways that represent and conceal, define and shape, and authenticate and repudiate our 
present and our past. This dissertation investigates the relationship between legal and literary 
fictions occurring in a discrete historical context—eighteenth-century England—and respecting 
one particular social and legal institution—the marriage contract.  Reading a variety of primary 
legal texts alongside and against a multitude of early domestic novels, I demonstrate how literary 
narrative acts to expose, revise, mitigate, and even advance some of its more thorny legal 
counterparts, and I reveal legal narrative’s influence on the development of the early novel and 
its diverse genres. Ultimately, this project offers a more comprehensive outlook on early modern 
marriage and the emerging modern subject, particularly the female subject.15 It also establishes 
the novel form as useful to legal thought on legal fictions, and it illustrates the utility of a 
collaborative—i.e. law and literature—approach to historical inquiry.  
Why the eighteenth century, the marriage contract, and the novel? Eighteenth-century 
England, as a hub of Enlightenment philosophy, is a place of intense social, economic, and legal 
change. It is here that modern liberal ideas about individual right and economic freedom are 
advancing on the traditional systems of social class and economic feudalism. England’s private 
sphere is responding to this progressive movement by rethinking the dynamics of courtship, 
marriage, and the family, and its legal system is reacting by modifying, to varying degrees, the 
law of contract and the law of domesticity—i.e., the law of marriage, separation, and divorce. In 
                                                 
15 For a useful discussion of how the nineteenth-century novel interacts with legal fictions (in the form of 
presumptions about women) that construct female subjectivity, see Ledwon. In addition, Melissa Ganz has published 
a dissertation that, according to its Abstract, “examines the ways in which eighteenth-century novels both 
participated in and were shaped by [legal] debates” on the relationship between “contract logic” and “the conjugal 
tie.” Because the dissertation itself was not available to me at the time of writing my project (as of January 2018, 
Proquest’s Dissertation and Theses database continues to display the following: “At the request of the author, this 
graduate work is not available to view or purchase”), I cannot speak to its relevance.  
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addition, literary culture is experiencing a major evolution with the development of the novel 
form. As a prose structure with strong mimetic and ideological objectives, the novel is focused 
on representing and shaping individual subjectivity and its domestic sphere, both of which are 
heavily influenced by the law and its fictions. Thus, this period and these longstanding 
institutions are ripe for thinking about the ways in which legal and literary fiction have worked 
together to create and re-create the modern historical consciousness. 
“Legal Fictions, Literary Narrative, and the Historical Truth” is organized into three 
chapters, each of which treats a distinct phase in the marriage contracting process: formation, 
unification, and dissolution. I begin each chapter with an overview of the legal fiction(s)—and, 
as earlier noted, I use this term broadly—implicated by the particular stage under review. I then 
analyze primary and secondary legal materials that not only represent important developments in 
eighteenth-century marriage law, but also act as bearers or managers of the fictions at issue. The 
research includes legislation, court opinions, pre- and post-nuptial contracts, and legal treatises. 
Following this discussion, I analyze the ways in which early domestic novels operate as 
participants in marriage-related jurisprudence. I consider how the texts’ authors employ form, 
genre, and content to represent, legislate, and adjudicate the relevant legal fictions, and I argue 
that these writers provide an important extra-institutional framework for comprehending and 
assessing the law’s relationship to modern notions of self and other, and of past and present.  
Chapter I investigates the legal fictions implicated in the formation of the marriage 
contract, with a particular focus on the classical liberal assumptions that underlie (proto)modern 
contract theory. I analyze the legislative history and content of the 1754 Act for the Better 
Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, as well as case law on breach of promise of marriage, in 
order to understand whether and to what extent burgeoning presumptions about party rationality, 
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equality, and autonomy in the contract negotiation process appear in marriage formation 
jurisprudence. I argue that the law was relatively ambivalent about these presumptions, 
especially in regard to the female subject. I then read four novels that explore the courtship 
process—Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1748) by Samuel Richardson, Emmeline (1788) by 
Charlotte Smith, and Sense and Sensibility (1811) by Jane Austen—for literary culture’s 
developing response to these presumptions. I argue that the Richardson’s mid-century 
sentimental novels identify emerging liberal formation principles as legal fictions, while Smith’s 
and Austen’s late-century gothic and realist works seek to dispel or de-fictionalize the 
inventions. Indeed, the earlier narratives challenge the legal assumptions about contractual 
bargaining power and the will to consent, and claim for their heroes and heroines modern 
contractual rights; while the later novels serve as treatises on contract negotiation, teaching 
readers how to properly conduct themselves on the marriage market so that the legal fictions 
identified by their authorial predecessors might be translated into cultural truths.  
Chapter II examines the classic legal fiction attendant upon the execution of the marriage 
contract: unity of person. This fiction posits husband and wife as one entity and authorized the 
law of coverture, which, among other constraints, deprived women of the right to own property. I 
investigate eighteenth-century legal culture’s complex treatment of this fiction through an 
analysis of marriage settlement agreements and equitable case law, the former of which created 
an exception to the fiction in the form of married women’s separate property rights and the latter 
of which established the scope of such rights. I argue that while the law was beginning to 
rewrite, often implicitly, what it meant to be “one person” in marriage in more liberal terms, it 
retained a commitment to the fiction’s patriarchal underpinnings. I then read four novels in 
which the concept of unity of person and the married woman’s separate estate are given narrative 
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significance: specifically, Daniel Defoe’s Roxana (1724), Eliza Haywood’s The History of Miss 
Betsy Thoughtless (1751), Frances Burney’s Cecilia (1782), and Jane Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice (1813). I argue that these texts work—in different ways and to different effects—to 
render the traditional presumptions that underwrite unity of person untenable fictions. Indeed, 
their authors use a variety of forms and genres—from the fictional autobiography to the novel of 
manners—to divorce the notion of unity of person from ideas about male superiority and 
patriarchal right and to recast marriage as a true alliance of wills and personhood. Yet, it is only 
Austen who successfully manages to consign the disabling version of marital unity to the legal 
sphere and to imagine for the domestic sphere a marital oneness that honors both the individual 
and her social commitments.  
Chapter III explores the legal fictions surrounding the dissolution of marriage. 
Specifically, I consider the patriarchal and patrilineal presumptions that informed the doctrines 
of marital permanence and paternal right, as well as the doctrine of filius nullius, a classic fiction 
by which children born out of wedlock are rendered parentless for inheritance purposes. I study a 
variety of dissolution jurisprudence—parliamentary acts for divorce, private deeds of separation, 
and common and equitable law—with the purpose of understanding how ostensibly progressive 
developments in separation and divorce law dealt with these centuries-old assumptions and 
fallacies. I argue (much like I do in the earlier chapters) that the legal system, although attuned to 
the problem of “bad” marriages and ostensibly committed to the idea of marriage as a “civil 
contract,” remained largely invested in the presumptions and fictions by which the nation’s 
longstanding, rigid dissolution policy had been upheld. I then read six novels that stage marital 
or familial breakdown—Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722), Haywood’s Miss Betsy 
Thoughtless, Elizabeth Inchbald’s A Simple Story (1791), Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of 
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Woman: or, Maria. A Fragment (1797), and, very briefly, Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility 
(1811) and Mansfield Park (1814)—in order to chart how literary fiction contributed to the 
apparent cultural interest in facilitating divorce and separation. I argue that these texts participate 
in a cycle of revelation and reformation. Defoe’s and Haywood’s mid-century novels—both 
fictional histories—reveal as false the presumption that equates marriage with individual, social, 
and national welfare. Inchbald’s and Wollstonecraft’s late-century texts, which fall within the 
sentimental, Gothic, and Jacobin traditions, supplement this earlier work, demonstrating the 
inutility and injustice of assumptions about paternal fitness and legal bastardy, and arguing the 
necessity of legal reform. Austen, with her realist novels of manners, then completes the cycle by 
returning to a less subversive, yet meaningfully critical and potentially reformative, 
representation of bad marriage and its sustaining fictions. 
The Coda revisits the notion of the legal fiction and its historical influence, and it argues 
for a collaborative approach to legal and literary history. In this final section, I review the 
advantages and disadvantages of legal fictions, including the ways in which the fictions 
surrounding marriage and contract have continued to shape law and society into the twenty-first 
century. I also introduce nineteenth-century developments in marriage law, many of which were 
arguably fostered by the eighteenth-century domestic novel. I argue that the dialectical 
relationship between legal and literary fictions on marriage demonstrates the need both for a 
reappraisal of traditional conceptions of law and literature—the former as rational truth-bearer 
and the latter as agent of the imagined and invented—and for interdisciplinary historical study. I 
also reinforce the importance of a renewed attention to the legal fiction, with the hope that this 
project will stimulate more discussion about the nexus between the supposedly “innocuous” 
device and the developed and developing modern historical consciousness. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE FICTIONS OF MARRIAGE-CONTRACT FORMATION 
Marriage is the defining feature of the eighteenth-century domestic novel, and more often 
than not, it is the courtship process that drives this novel’s narrative action. Protagonists 
endeavor, alongside secondary characters, to negotiate nuptial arrangements that offer emotional, 
economic, and social stability, as well as personal happiness. Yet, their efforts are often 
complicated by predatory practices and endogamous pressures. This is particularly true of the 
novel’s heroine, who frequently finds herself either an object of male seduction and betrayal or 
subject to familial coercion and social tradition. Germane to this study are the courtship 
narratives of four pioneering mid- to late-century novels, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) 
and Clarissa (1747-1748), Charlotte Smith’s Emmeline (1788), and Jane Austen’s Sense and 
Sensibility (1811). In their preoccupation with the difficult, and often painful, experience of 
private marriage negotiation, these texts represent and respond to burgeoning constructions of 
the modern individual as a contracting subject. More to the point, the novels contemplate the 
legitimacy of those legal principles and presumptions that helped give rise to (and, in fact, 
continue to influence) notions of liberal selfhood.  
This chapter examines the relationship between legal and literary discourse on the 
participants in and process of marriage-contract formation. Part I provides an overview of 
Enlightenment philosophy on the modern liberal subject. It is here that I introduce classical 
contract theory, an eighteenth-century invention that transformed the meaning of market-based 
contractual exchange. This historical outline reveals contract law’s investment in constructions 
of the individual as a rational, autonomous subject, who regularly acts from a position of equality 
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and reasoned self-interest. Part II investigates the jurisprudence surrounding two major 
developments in eighteenth-century marriage-formation law, Hardwicke’s Marriage Act and the 
common law cause of action for breach of promise of marriage. This investigation demonstrates 
marriage law’s reluctance to extend classical liberal presumptions about contractual capacity and 
contractual freedom into the private sphere. This is particularly true, I demonstrate, in regards to 
the female subject. Part III examines the novel’s contribution to law and society on the issue of 
modern contractual subjectivity. I argue that novelists interested in marriage formation use 
distinct forms and genres to interrogate classical contract theory and its conception of the 
individual and her external condition. Specifically, I argue that the mid-century novel—in its 
sentimental epistolary form—deconstructs the classical liberal subject, emphasizing the fictional 
nature of the legal principles by which she is authorized, while the late-century novel—in its 
gothic and realist forms—works to reconstitute this subject, translating the legal fictions into 
social truths.  
Part I: The Liberal Subject and the Freedom of Contract 
Over the course of the early modern period, there occurred a major shift in Western 
European conceptions of the individual and his position as a political, social, and legal subject. 
Sir Henry Maine famously described this shift as “a movement from Status to Contract” (141). 
Indeed, Maine’s nineteenth-century theory about the development of modern Western society 
took as its point of departure the individual’s transformation from patriarchal dependent to 
contractual agent: 
Through all its course [‘the movement of the progressive societies’] has been 
distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of 
individual obligation in its place. . . . Starting . . . from a condition of society in which all 
the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have 
steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the 
free agreement of Individuals. (139-41) 
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Although Maine’s thesis has been the subject of much critical debate, its foundational claim—
that at a point in history the individual came to be defined less by his “position in the family” and 
more by his “own will by contract” (MacCormack 363)—remains a useful way to understand the 
large-scale cultural changes occurring across eighteenth-century Europe. 
In England, the movement toward modernity was informed by classical liberalism, the 
political philosophy most closely associated with the rise of economic capitalism, religious 
secularism, and social democracy. Grounded in the work of Enlightenment philosophers such as 
John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Adam Smith, classical liberalism is marked by the principles 
of self-determination, self-reliance, and freedom of contract.  In the ideal classical liberal society, 
members are rational, autonomous, and equal—each individual has the right to pursue his own 
interests through property ownership and contractual exchange and to expect others to honor that 
pursuit. As George H. Smith describes, under this political theory, “[o]ne is truly free when one 
can act on one’s own judgment in pursuit of one’s own goals, enter into voluntary relationships 
with other people, and dispose of one’s person and property as one sees fit, so long as one 
respects the equal freedom of other people to do the same” (7). And, it is the province of the state 
to ensure, without overreaching, that its citizenry exercise their liberality in a manner that is both 
self-satisfying and inoffensive to others. In other words, governmental interference is appropriate 
as long as it is undertaken with the express purpose of protecting the liberal subject’s bundle of 
rights.16 
Classical liberal thinkers were not, therefore, unconcerned about the prospect of 
individuals misusing and abusing the broad autonomy conferred by their sort of liberalism. Many 
(especially early nineteenth century theorists) believed that education was necessary to protect 
                                                 
16 For excellent in-depth descriptions of classical liberal ideology, see Bronner 41-60; Conway 6-24; and G. Smith. 
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the individual from his excessive passions and irrational impulses, as well as to enable him to act 
advantageously, responsibly, and even morally.17 For these reformers, England’s economic, 
social, and moral prosperity depended on its citizens’ abilities “to understand their own 
interests,” to demonstrate “self-reliance,” and to exert “self-discipline” (Atiyah 267-68). Legal 
regulation was also believed to be an important safeguard against imprudent or reckless 
expressions of freedom. Classical liberalism, as earlier suggested, contemplated a political 
system with the authority to preserve the “public good” by way of restrictions on individual 
liberties (G. Smith 19-20).18  For example, Hobbes, in Leviathian (1651), envisions a 
government which acts to ensure that men “live peaceably amongst themselves, and [are] 
protected against other men” (121; ch. 18) while Locke in Second Treatise of Government 
(1689) imagines a government vested with the authority to preserve the life, liberty, and property 
of its members (154-75; chs. 9-14). Moreover, Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1790), devises a legal framework for regulating individual liberty. Titled “[t]he most sacred 
laws of justice,” Smith’s tripartite scheme includes “laws which guard the life and person of our 
neighbor; . . . [laws] which guard his property and possessions; and . . . [laws] which guard what 
are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others” (98; pt. 2, sec. 
2, ch. 2). In this liberal society, then, criminal and civil law systems work alongside systems of 
                                                 
17 P.S. Atiyah explains: 
The fact that the classical economists and the utilitarians wanted to free people to follow their interests, 
their wills, did not mean that they were indifferent to what people did with these new-found freedoms. . . . 
On the contrary, they were intensely concerned with the way men exercised their freedom. . . . They had . . 
. a great faith in education . . . for they wanted to teach people how to choose wisely, while leaving the 
ultimate choices to them. (260) 
Atiyah also clarifies that by the nineteenth-century, individualism had become a moral value, one with its own set of 
“ideals” (260).  
 
18 For a protracted discussion of the notion of “public good” in liberal philosophy, see G. Smith 26-48. 
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education to secure and to balance the liberties, properties, and expectations on which the 
individual and the common good depend.  
One of the most significant legal contributions to the development of liberal subjectivity 
in England was the law of contract, and in particular, the instantiation of classical contract 
theory. This theory was the defining feature of nineteenth-century contract law and is the 
precursor to modern contract theory. While classical principles were neither fully developed in 
the eighteenth century nor wholly integrated into its legal system, they were present and 
developing in the period.19 To understand the radical nature of classical contract theory and the 
ways in which it reconceived of the individual and his legal relationships, one must first 
understand the pre-classical system. Under pre-classical law, a person’s “legal [rights and] duties 
arose from status, from custom, from relationships and transactions” (Atiyah 146). In other 
words, what one owed to, or was due from, another was determined, not by an exchange of 
promises, but by the parties’ pre-existing relationship and the legal rules by which that 
relationship was defined (see Atiyah 141, 139-46). Legal historian P.S. Atiyah offers the 
following examples of early modern contract principles at work: 
A man to whom (for instance) goods were entrusted for repair or carriage might be under 
a duty with respect to those goods, not because of any promise he had made, but because 
of who or what he was—because of his status. A common carrier or a common innkeeper 
. . . would have been under various duties in medieval law, not because he promised, but 
because of the legal duties associated with his status. (145) 
 
The problem with this approach to contract formation, especially in an era of liberal reform, is 
that it does not allow individuals to create and to define for themselves the scope of their legal 
                                                 
19 P.S. Atiyah establishes 1770-1870 as the period during which the classical/will-based theory of contract 
dominated jurisprudence in England (see, e.g., 398). Yet, he and other legal historians have identified its principles 
in earlier discourse, thereby suggesting its significance for the eighteenth century more broadly (see Atiyah 167; 
Lieberman 92-93 et passim).  
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obligations. In fact, it does not even recognize as legally binding the act or content of a mere 
promissory exchange (Atiyah 139-46).  
In contrast, under classical contract theory, individuals were vested with significant 
authority in the construction of their contractual relationships, and their promises were of serious 
legal consequence. As Atiyah writes, this theory’s hallmark was that it recognized “[t]he 
autonomy of the free choice of private parties to make their own contracts on their own terms” 
(408). It was now the act of promising and the content of party promises, rather than the function 
of party status, which established and defined one’s legal rights and duties. In order to facilitate 
this mode of contract, England’s classical theory established several presumptions about the 
conditions of contract formation. First, and most important, is the assumption that “contractual 
obligations are created by the will or the intention of the parties” and that any legal consequences 
arising out of those obligations are “themselves . . . the creation of the will of the parties” 
(Atiyah 406, 405-08). Second, is the presumption that “[contracting] parties deal with each other 
‘at arm’s length,’ . . . each rel[ying] on his own skill and judgment” to negotiate the terms of the 
agreement (Atiyah 403). Third, is the idea “that . . . parties know their own minds, that they are 
the best judges of their own needs and circumstances, that they will calculate the risks and future 
contingencies that are relevant, and that all these enter into the bargain” (Atiyah 403).20  
While these formation principles established the classical liberal ideals of individual 
autonomy, equality, and self-reliance within the law of contract, they did not establish them as 
social truths nor did they guarantee the fairness or justness of contractual exchange. In fact, with 
the rise of contractual freedom, the common law courts’ interest in adjudicating the equitableness 
of contractual arrangements declined. In the pre-classical era of contract law, the English 
                                                 
20For formation presumptions outside the scope of this project, see Atiyah 402-403.  
 
30 
(lawyers, courts, politicians, communities, etc.) devoted a great deal of attention to the fairness 
of an agreement’s terms: “Justice was more important than freedom of choice” (Atiyah 62). If a 
court found that the benefits exchanged were not equal or were otherwise inequitable, it could, 
and (it appears) would, modify the agreement accordingly.21 (Atiyah 61-67, 167-69). With the 
shift to the classical system, this all changed. Atiyah explains how the judiciary conceived of its 
authority post-shift:  
The Court’s function . . . is to ensure procedural fair play: the Court is the umpire to be 
appealed to when a foul is alleged, but the Court has no substantive function beyond this. 
It is not the Court’s business to ensure that the bargain is fair, or to see that one party 
does not take undue advantage of another, or impose unreasonable terms by virtue of a 
superior bargaining position. (Atiyah 404)22  
 
Unless the parties failed to follow an established rule, their agreement—even if full of 
inequities—had all the force of law behind it.   
One probable reason for this retreat from equitable intervention was the law’s interest in 
ensuring economic stability. To reject or revise agreements according to equitable ideals, was to 
challenge market and party expectations and, perhaps, to threaten the “public good.” In The 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785), William Paley writes of the connection 
between expectation and the obligation to perform one’s promises:  
Men act from expectation. Expectation is in most cases determined by the assurances and 
engagements which we receive from others. If no dependence could be placed upon these 
assurances, it would be impossible to know what judgement to form of many future 
events, or how to regulate our conduct with respect to them. Confidence therefore in 
promises, is essential to the intercourse of human life; because, without it, the greatest 
part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. (73-74; bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 5) 
 
                                                 
21 Atiyah indicates the common law and equity courts’ outlook on fair price, usury, and fair exchange at various 
points in his tome (see, e.g., 61-67, 146-48, 167-80). 
 
22 Atiyah qualifies this general finding, noting, for example, that there were instances in which courts rejected the 
principles associated with full and free exchange and sought, instead, to ensure the “substantive justice” of an 
agreement (404).  
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In a world where values and belief systems were in flux, the idea of legal stasis on the scope of 
one’s contractual rights and duties must have been attractive. Another reason for the judiciary’s 
reluctance to adjudicate issues of fairness or justice in realm of contract certainly had to do with 
the emerging theory’s formation presumptions. Why revisit an agreement if the terms represent 
each party’s will and intention? Why revise an agreement if each party’s general disposition is to 
act voluntarily, judiciously, and out of reasoned-self-interest? To revisit or revise would be to 
jeopardize the contracting subjects’ right to freedom of contract and right to depend upon the 
promises of others.  
The eighteenth-century emergence of liberal ideas about the contracting subject and his 
market-based agreements elicits questions about the law’s understanding of the private 
individual and her domestic agreements. Was the “privately contracting subject” also beginning 
to be conceived in liberal terms—i.e., as rational, equal, and self-aware? Were the legal 
principles governing the formation of her domestic relationships likewise informed by classical 
assumptions about party proficiency, bargaining power, and will to contract? Did the period’s 
legal actors debate the legitimacy—the truth or falsity, disadvantages or utility—of these liberal 
ideals as they applied to the private subject? Was there a sense that domestic well-being also 
required more consideration for individual autonomy, and, therefore, less legal oversight of the 
marriage contract?  
Part II: Freedom of Contract in the Private Sphere and Key Developments in Marriage Law  
Classic social historians have identified the long eighteenth century as the period during 
which the private individual began to break away from his social and familial ties, and they 
locate his disengagement in changing attitudes toward courtship and marriage.  Lawrence Stone, 
for example, contends that whereas in the sixteenth and much of the seventeenth centuries, 
family members and friends arranged marriages for young people, in the eighteenth century, 
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children were increasingly able to choose their own romantic partners, with “parents being left 
with no more than the right of veto over socially or economically unsuitable candidates” 
(Family, Sex and Marriage 183).23 Just as it was in the public sphere, then, status-based duty in 
the private sphere was apparently buckling under the pressure of contractual freedom. Yet, if we 
look to the law governing marriage formation, this shift from status to contract becomes more 
complicated than traditional social histories might otherwise suggest. Indeed, the legal rhetoric 
surrounding two key developments in marriage law—the passage of a highly contested statute 
proscribing rules for marital formation and the growth of breach of promise of marriage as a 
common law cause of action—demonstrates that the emerging liberal legal subject of the public 
sphere was being met with skepticism and resistance in the private realm. While both 
jurisprudential innovations at issue represent a decided shift away from marriage as a religious 
sacrament to marriage as a civil contract, they also reveal a persistent tension between patriarchal 
and liberal ideas about the conditions of and parties to private exchange—between traditional 
“truths” and new “fictions.” 
Hardwicke’s Marriage Act 
One of the most comprehensive and divisive pieces of marriage legislation in English 
history was the 1753 An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, otherwise 
known as Hardwicke’s Marriage Act (the “HMA”).24 This new law transferred jurisdiction over 
marriage from the ecclesiastical to the civil courts and codified canonical requirements for 
contract formation. It stipulated that a valid and binding marriage must be either preceded by the 
                                                 
23 See also Trumbach 97-113.  
 
24 “Hardwicke” refers to the 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Philip Yorke, who was Lord Chancellor at the time of the act’s 
introduction to Parliament. 
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publication of the banns or accompanied by a special license. It further required that an ordained 
clergyman preside over the ceremony in a parish church or public chapel and that the marriage 
be witnessed by at least two persons and registered in the official legal record. If one or both of 
the parties was younger than twenty-one, the law mandated the consent of a parent or guardian.25 
The legislation also instituted harsh penalties for failure to comply with these requirements. For 
example, it was a felony, punishable by transportation to America, for clergy members to 
“solemnize matrimony” outside of the law, and marriages that deviated from the required 
protocol were considered “null and void.”26 Although the HMA was mightily criticized as 
arbitrary and excessive, it passed into law within a year of its parliamentary introduction.27   
 Prior to the HMA and under ecclesiastical law, marriage could be contracted in a variety 
of ways. Since the sixteenth century, most English marriages followed the HMA’s rules (Probert 
1). But some did not. Some couples opted for a simple ceremony in front of a clergyman at a 
clandestine center, such as the Fleet Prison in London where chaplains oversaw between 200,000 
and 300,000 ceremonies in the forty years before the HMA’s passage (Brown 117). Other 
couples entered into a marital agreement by simply exchanging private promises to marry at 
present or in the future.  Under the ecclesiastical doctrine of spousals, an exchange of the phrases 
“I do take you” (a spousal de praesenti) or “I will take you” (a spousal de futuro) sufficed to 
demonstrate consent and, thereby, mutually obligate the parties. A spousal de praesenti, if 
                                                 
25 Consent rules differed depending on how couples announced their marital intentions. A couple married after the 
publication of the banns need not secure the positive consent of a parent, as the public announcement was enough to 
put him on notice; however, this parent could, after the banns were read, withhold his consent. A couple married by 
license did have to secure a parent’s positive consent, there being no public notification.  
 
26 In another severe provision, Parliament fixed the punishment for destroying or falsifying marriage records at 
death. 
 
27 The description of the HMA contained in this paragraph is entirely based on the text of the act itself. See the 
bibliography entry for An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages. 
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proven to exist, was considered a binding marriage, such that children born to the union were 
legitimized and any subsequent public marriage by one of the parties was rendered bigamous. A 
spousal de futuro was considered an exchange of promises to marry. While it did not create an 
irrevocable contract, its dissolution required the mutual consent of both parties or fornication or 
desertion by either.28 Spousals eventually lost legitimacy under the common law due to 
difficulties related to property and inheritance rights, but they retained their ecclesiastical force.29 
In fact, the verbal consent of a qualified betrothed couple remained the sole and absolute 
requirement for marriage formation up until the passage of the HMA.30 This meant that a 
marriage could be annulled only by disproving consent or capacity to contract: “Consent might 
be negatived . . . by proof of duress, or insanity, or mistake, . . . [or] tender age . . .” (i.e., 12 for 
girls and 14 for boys), while capacity might be successfully rebutted by proof of “precontract (a 
previous marriage with another spouse), consanguinity (blood relationship), affinity (relationship 
by marriage or carnal connection), and impotence at the time of marriage” (Baker 491-92). With 
the HMA’s ratification, then, the grounds for voiding a marriage expanded greatly to include the 
failure to follow basic formation requirements. This development was one that many considered 
                                                 
28 Henry Swinburne offers a wonderfully detailed overview of spousals in his seventeenth-century treatise on the 
doctrine. For a modern historical discussion of medieval and early modern litigation on the doctrine, see Ingram. 
 
29 Brown explains that “common law lawyers . . . adopt[ed] the attitude that a marriage performed without the 
presence of a priest or deacon was neither good nor effectual” in order to circumvent the problems that arose when 
“the legitimacy of a marriage” was challenged in property and inheritance disputes (118-19). That said, every 
indication is that the church continued to view formal requirements to marry, including the presence of a clergyman, 
as “directory” rather than “negatory” (i.e., failure to follow these requirements did not void a union under 
ecclesiastical law) (118). 
 
30 Referencing the work of legal and social historians, David Lemmings affirms the primacy of verbal consent: “. . . 
[T]he verbal contract remained the essence of a valid marriage and was the law of England until 1753; and it was 
agreed that ‘the positive law of Man’, or canons of the church and statutes of the state, which ultimately required 
formal church marriage and made other unions illegal, nevertheless did not render contract marriage null and void” 
(344).  
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a dangerous lowering of standards and that some understood to be an infringement on contractual 
freedom.31 
It is in the 1753 House of Commons debates over the bill’s passage and the 1781 House 
of Commons debates over the act’s repeal that the complexity of eighteenth-century views about 
the privately contracting subject and the public significance of her domestic agreements 
surfaces.32 The HMA’s supporters heartily believed the law addressed the “great mischiefs and 
inconveniences” engendered by clandestine marriages.33 In the 1753 debates, M.P. Charles 
Townshend (who, incidentally, opposed the bill) summarized the primary problems the law was 
intended to alleviate:  
The foundation [for the bill] is upon three grievances, which are now said to be severely 
felt, that is to say, the unhappy marriages clandestinely made, which bring shame and 
vexation upon private families, and want and misery upon the individuals that contract 
them; the difficulties that are often found to prove the marriage, or the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of children; and the frequency of polygamy, or bigamy, call it which you 
will. . . . (15: 49)  
 
Of particular concern to the bill’s supporters was the “ruin” and “distress” visited upon upper 
class families by informal marriages contracted between their children and avaricious upstarts 
(15: 7).34 M.P. John Bond, for example, questions the fate of “young gentlemen of fortune” who 
                                                 
31 For two excellent historical studies on Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, including its ecclesiastical and common law 
precursors, as well as its social consequences see Probert, Marriage Law and Practice and Outhwaite, Clandestine 
Marriage in England. 
 
32 All references to the House of Commons’ debates are from Cobbett’s Parliamentary History, volumes 15 
(covering 1753-1765) and 22 (covering 1781-1782). The debate records (particularly those from 1781) do not 
always supply the first name or title of the speaker. Where possible, I have provided this information based on The 
History of Parliament’s online database of member biographies. Note that these biographies were originally 
published in two print volumes, 1715-1754, edited by Romney Sedgwick, and 1754-1790, edited by Lewis Namier 
and John Brooke. I have listed each volume on the bibliography page according to the lead editor’s last name, 
although History of Parliament’s website indicates that the online entries are continuously updated.  
 
33 The quoted language is from the HMA’s preamble.  
 
34 This is a specific reference to the remarks of A.G. Ryder (15: 1-12). 
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are “a prey to bawds and prostitutes” and that of “young ladies of fortune” who are “a prey to 
sharpers and fortune-hunters” (15: 41). In order to protect the wealthy against these predatory 
rogues and trollops, supporters reasoned, a parental consent requirement was necessary. The 
law’s advocates also claimed that the strict formation requirements would protect young women 
from would-be seducers and deserters. Lord Barrington argued that the HMA’s clear guidelines 
for marital formation and registration ensured “that no woman can be deceived” as to the validity 
of her marriage (15: 30). Proponents further maintained that, in codifying contract formalities, 
Parliament would prevent the common practice of bigamy. As it now stands, Attorney General 
Dudley Ryder deplored, “a man may have privately a wife in every corner of this city, or in 
every town he has been in, without its being possible for them to know of one another, or for the 
next women to whom he makes his addresses, to discover his being a married man” (15: 8). 
Moreover, some supporters proposed a practical reason for the law’s passage. They argued that it 
would minimize the number of property and inheritance lawsuits generated by bigamous 
marriages. Individuals would no longer be able to overburden the court system with claims of a 
prior, informal marriage that, if proven, would delegitimize and disinherit a man’s acknowledged 
wife and children (see, e.g., 15: 7).35 On this side of the debate, then, the private contracting 
subject is framed as either vulnerable to deception or inclined to deceive, and socio-economic or 
gender inequality is presented as the impetus for contractual duplicity. In this view, whether 
blinded by passion or overcome by self-interest, parties to marriage negotiations are rarely 
rational and free-willing actors, and the conditions for marriage contract formation are seldom 
conducive to voluntary and informed choice. The restrictions on contractual freedoms 
contemplated by the HMA are, therefore, authorized by the limitations of individual subjectivity 
                                                 
35 Once again, this is a reference to Ryder’s remarks. 
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and the vagaries of the private marketplace. 
To establish the government’s regulatory privilege over marriage contract formation, the 
HMA’s supporters summoned the “public good” exception to the classical liberal right of free 
enterprise. Speaking on behalf of the act’s proponents, Ryder argued Parliament’s role in 
ensuring the public’s well-being: “. . . I think nothing can be more inconsistent with common 
sense than to say, that the supreme legislature of a society cannot put contracts of marriage, as 
well as every other contract, under what regulations they think most conducive to the good of 
society” (15: 6). According to Ryder, the policy of providing legal recognition to clandestine 
marriages “add[s] a sanctity to the marriage contract, which is inconsistent with the good of 
every society, and with the happiness of mankind in general” (15: 7). For supporters such as 
Lord Barrington, the familial, public, or individual good rested in ensuring that “a child . . . not 
contract a scandalous or infamous marriage,” that “all marriages . . . be publicly known,” and 
that citizens don’t “run headlong into contracts” (15: 24). In these politician’s minds, to regulate 
the private contracting subject—and, consequently, to resist the liberal fictions by which his 
public counterpart was coming to be defined—was to protect the domestic sphere and to assure 
English society’s welfare. 
 Like the HMA’s supporters, its parliamentary opponents presented a litany of arguments 
for rejecting the bill, and later, for repealing the act, which one member characterized as “cruel 
as well as impolitic, and disgraceful, as well as absurd” and another labeled “a disgrace to the 
country, and to the statute book.”36 Much of this side’s antipathy was directed at the parental 
consent requirement, which it saw as a conservative political powerplay. These parliamentarians 
                                                 
36 Both quotations appear in the 1781 debates for repeal: the first belongs to M.P. George Dempster (22: 373) and 
the second (it appears) to Hon. Charles James Fox (22: 372). Interestingly, my research indicates the 1781 call for 
repeal was one of no fewer than five attempts in the fifty years following the HMA’s enactment. 
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argued that the nobility and their representatives in the House of Lords intended the provision as 
a way to consolidate political authority and to (re)establish England as an oligarchy. Townshend 
outlines the commoners’ concerns:  
There must be some latent design . . . to secure all the heiresses of the kingdom to the 
eldest sons of noble and rich families, in order thereby to establish that sort of 
aristocratical government, which, from the Conquest to the reign of Henry 7, was the 
plague of this country, and so often involved us in bloody civil wars. . . . (15: 61).37 
 
Opponents also claimed that the consent requirement would interfere with the national interest in 
democratic wealth distribution. M.P. Robert Nugent reminds his colleagues, “[r]iches is the 
blood of the body politic: it must be made to circulate: if you allow it to stagnate, or if too much 
of it be thrown into any one part, it will destroy the body politic, as the same cause often does the 
body natural. . . .” (15: 15).38 This anti-elite and anti-privilege sentiment is further implicated in 
critics’ vigorous arguments against the law’s strict pre- and post-ceremony requirements. Indeed, 
many claimed that the law discriminated against the poor by requiring extra time (i.e., the 
reading of the banns) and money (i.e., license and registration fees) to form a valid marriage 
contract. For example, M.P. George Haldane remonstrated, “. . . it will really prove a sort of 
prohibition of marriage with respect to all our poorer sort of people, because it will render the 
solemnization of that ceremony so tedious and troublesome, or so expensive, that many of them 
will either chuse to live single, or agree to live together without any marriage at all” (15: 39). 
Moreover, Nugent, arguing in 1781 for the act’s repeal, challenged the notion that the law 
                                                 
37 For another extended argument on supporter’s political objectives, see M.P. George Haldane’s remarks (15: 33-
39). 
 
38 Nugent goes on to argue the physical and social dangers posed by such closely endogamous marriages:  
. . . if this Bill passes, our quality and rich families will daily accumulate riches by marrying only one 
another; and what sort of breed their offspring will be, we may easily judge: if the gout, the gravel, the pox 
and madness are always to wed together, what a hopeful generation of quality and rich commoners shall we 
have amongst us? What a fine appearance will they make at the head of our army, should we ever happen 
to be invaded by a foreign enemy? (15: 15) 
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operates for the good of the whole: “Should a bill be provided without being general? Yet this 
had never been the case of the Marriage Act; for it never thought to preserve Jenny or Molly with 
her twenty guineas clinking against a silver thimble; its only attention was to lady Jenny or lady 
Mary” (22: 409). Though dismissed by HMA supporters as hyperbolic and misleading, these 
arguments registered serious concerns about the way in which seemingly innocuous restrictions 
on private contract could operate as dangerous impediments to England’s social and political 
progress.  
The HMA’s dissenters did not confine their points of protest to conservative political 
engineering and social prejudice, however; they also made claims about the law’s conflicting 
relationship with England’s moral code. Some argued that the law’s consent requirement 
sanctioned parental despotism: “This is really establishing such a tyrannical power in the father, 
as will, I am persuaded, be the ruin of many children, especially such as may have a father under 
the government or influence of a cruel stepmother,” Townshend protested (15: 59). Many also 
argued that the law’s stringency would promote sexual deviance amongst the general population, 
and that it would increase non-marital cohabitation amongst the poor. Haldane again worried that 
the law would “force the poor to make the best shift they can without marrying,” and that it 
would “render[] common whoring as frequent among the lower sort of people, as it is now 
among those of the better sort” (15: 41, 39). In addition, Townshend, among others, argued that 
the law would increase polygamy and, consequently, the number of “debauched” women (and, 
presumably the number of illegitimate children): “a cunning fellow,” he maintained, would only 
have to omit a formation requirement to avoid a binding marriage and punishment for bigamy 
(15: 53-54). Moreover, M.P. Henry Fox argued that, in many cases, “attempting to [‘void’ 
clandestine marriage] will be attended with this bad consequence, that the parties may think 
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themselves no way bound either by the divine or the moral law” (15: 72-73). And, he offered the 
following example to press his point: 
Suppose . . . a young gentleman should marry a young lady of equal rank, but no fortune, 
in some sort of clandestine manner, but in such a manner as every divine in England 
would deem to be a good marriage: suppose that he, depending upon the nullity of his 
marriage by virtue of this law, should desert her and marry another: and suppose she 
should in two or three years die for mere want. I will aver . . . that, during her life, his 
living with the other would be a continual course of adultery, and by her dying in such a 
manner, he would be guilty of a most cruel murder. Could any man who had been 
concerned in promoting this Bill lay his hand upon his heart and say, I was in no shape 
the author of these atrocious crimes? (15: 73). 
 
From Fox’s perspective, the HMA would give cover to those whose wills and intentions ran 
afoul of the moral values and religious duties traditionally ascribed to marriage upon its 
formation. In fact, for many in the opposition’s camp, the law allowed those who were ethically-
challenged to profit from the fictions of rationality, informed consent, and equality by which 
England’s contract theory was coming to be defined.  
 Yet, these opponents also believed that the law unjustifiably encroached on the liberal 
rights from which these fictions arose. In Parliament’s 1781 repeal deliberations, M.P. Charles 
Turner “spoke of [the Act] with indignation” and described it as “a breach of religious liberty, 
and an encroachment upon the natural freedom of the subject” (22: 373). M.P. Fox continued in 
this vein, arguing that by passing the law, Parliament tread on man’s natural rights.39 The debate 
records note that “[h]e [Fox] did not conceive that parliament had it in their power to destroy or 
to abridge one single right of nature; such was the right of marriage, such was the right of human 
liberty, for which our constitution had so amply provided” (22: 397; see also 22: 373-74). For 
Fox, the “right of marriage” was inextricably linked to the right to freedom of contract and, 
                                                 
39 Based on the member records from Namier and Brooke’s collection, it appears that the speaker here is M.P. 
Charles James Fox, M.P. Henry Fox’s son.  
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specifically, to the ability to exercise one’s own judgment and choice in the contracting process. 
At one point, he accused Parliament of engendering an “intolerable abuse of women, (who [a]re 
unquestionably best qualified to judge what husband would please)” (22: 381); and, at another, 
he contended that “no person, not even a parent . . . could possibly judge so well for a son, a 
daughter, or a ward, as the person themselves” (22: 399). Together, the dissenting arguments 
suggest that while the HMA’s opponents were, like its supporters, concerned about the falseness 
of classical contract presumptions regarding party rationality, intention, and equality, they were 
perhaps more solicitous about enacting legal restrictions on contractual freedom. For these 
parliamentarians, the “public good” turned on the broad recognition of marriages and, thus, on a 
more generous (i.e., less patriarchal and paternalistic) conception of the individual and the 
marriage negotiation process.  
Breach of Promise of Marriage 
Efforts to repeal the HMA and its restrictions on the right of private contract did not 
succeed in the long eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the liberal terms that came to define public 
contract, including its fictions, were not entirely absent from eighteenth-century marriage law. 
Indeed, progressive ideas about the contracting subject and his market-based opportunities were 
implicated in the common law action for breach of promise of marriage, the only legal relief 
available for broken contracts to marry post-HMA. This cause originated in the seventeenth 
century and allowed men and women “to recover pecuniary damages against a faithless lover for 
breach of an engagement” (Lettmaier 1).40 In Holcroft v. Dickenson (1672), the Court of King’s 
Bench confirmed the common law’s jurisdiction over such cases, holding that the injury 
                                                 
40 Saskia Lettmaier identifies Stretch v. Parker (1639) as the first case to recognize breach of promise of marriage as 
a legal cause and Holcroft v. Dickenson (1672) as the case that established, once and for all, its viability at common 
law (23n16).   
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sustained from a broken engagement is not merely “spiritual”; rather, many jilted lovers also 
experience a “temporal loss” for which the ecclesiastical courts do not offer compensation. 
Justice Atkins remarked that women, in particular, are liable to experience material injury, as 
marriage for this group “especially, is an advancement or preferment” (934). Therefore, this right 
of action not only confirmed marriage as civil contract, it also, on its face, legitimized women as 
contracting subjects, recognizing in them the agency to negotiate and litigate their pre-marital 
agreements. Indeed, single women now had a legal voice in the area of private wrongs, a faculty 
that they long had been denied in other “heartbalm” (to borrow from Lettmaier) causes of 
action.41 
In the long eighteenth century, the elements for proving breach of promise of marriage 
were relatively straightforward: there must have been an exchange of promises to marry,42 a 
failure on the part of the defendant to fulfill the obligation created thereby, and damages 
sustained by the plaintiff. Evidentiary requirements were also well-defined in the period. Letters 
from the defendant indicating an intention to marry the plaintiff, as well as eyewitness testimony 
regarding the promissory exchange or the parties’ courtship behavior, were sufficient to establish 
a reciprocal agreement. Written and oral evidence, often of a subsequent marriage, was also used 
to prove both defendant’s breach and plaintiff’s damages, of which there were three types: 
restitution, expectation, and emotional. Specifically, plaintiffs could ask for recompense for 
                                                 
41 As Lettmaier observes, “[i]n common law seduction actions, the woman did not have standing to sue. As the 
action was conceived of as one for the loss of services . . ., the right to sue was granted to those entitled to the 
woman’s services, usually her master or her father” (8).  
 
42 For more on the issue of mutual exchange, see MacColla 17; and Lettmaier 23-26. As a point of clarification, 
however, in Hutton v. Mansell (1705), the Court of King’s Bench suggested that the recipient of a marriage proposal 
need not verbalize her return promise; conduct is sufficient to satisfy the exchange requirement. Chief Justice Holt 
opined, “[i]f there be an express promise by the man, and it appear that the woman countenanced it, and by her 
actions at that time behaved herself so as if she agreed to the matter, though there be no actual promise, yet that shall 
be sufficient evidence of a promise on her side” (928).  
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money they had expended in anticipation of the marriage, for money or property they had 
expected upon the execution of the marriage, or for any mental or emotional distress they had 
experienced consequent to the termination of the relationship.43 Although damages could range 
from one shilling to several thousand pounds, it appears that liability was generally assured if the 
plaintiff could show words indicating the defendant’s contractual intention and his or her breach 
of the agreement formed thereby.  
One exemplary breach of promise case is Davis v. Wilson (1747).44 Here, plaintiff Davis, 
a young lady lodger, sued defendant Wilson, a distinguished and wealthy clergyman, for 
breaking their proposed marriage contract. Plaintiff’s counsel proffered several witnesses and 
numerous letters to demonstrate a valid and binding agreement between the parties, as well as to 
show the defendant’s disregard for his promissory commitment. The first witness, the parties’ 
landlady, testified to the mutual exchange of promises: “He called her his Angel, and insisted 
that she should promise to marry him, and no other Man, and he would make her the same 
Promise, which he did; and I heard the Lady say she would be his Wife; for she had no Objection 
to it; and hoped he would not deceive her” (6). Another witness recounted the parties’ courtship 
and, in particular, Wilson’s apparent affection for Davis, as well as his stated marital intention:  
[T]he Defendant always seemed very fond of the Plaintiff, and declared in Publick 
Company, that he should soon be happy in her as his Wife, and that the greatest Princess 
in the Universe should never have the least share in his Affections, for that he had 
sufficient to support her like a Lady, and no Dutchess [sic] in the Land should make a 
better Appearance. (14) 
 
                                                 
43 For a description of damages for “wounded feelings,” see MacColla 28.  For a description of the variety of 
damages available during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Lettmaier 19-27 and 47-53. Lettmaier argues 
that by the close of the long eighteenth century, the focus of the action, and therefore, the type of damages, had 
shifted from “the economics of a broken contract” and restitution or expectation damages “to the emotionalism of a 
woman’s wounded feelings and injured affections” and tort-influenced damages (18, 18-26). 
 
44 All of the information about this case comes from an unofficial trial pamphlet entitled The Trial Wherein Miss 
D—v—s was Plaintiff, and the Rev. Dr. W—l—n, Defendant. 
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Defendant’s effusive letters, introduced into evidence after being authenticated by a witness, 
supported these testimonials. In them, Wilson addressed Davis with terms of endearment and 
urged her to set a wedding date: “I hope, my dear Life (and I crave it, as the only Blessing in 
View) that you will be pleas’d before I have the Pleasure of seeing you, to settle the Bridal Day, 
which I trust will make us eternally happy; and believe me to be, with the greatest Love and 
inviolable Affection &c.” (11). Nevertheless, subsequent testimony revealed that as Davis’s 
suspicions about Wilson’s intentions grew, Wilson “broke off all Courtship, and withdrew into 
the Country to N—w—k” (21). According to plaintiff’s counsel, defendant’s breach occasioned 
substantial hardship to his client, who, during the engagement, rejected “‘advantageous Offers 
made her by a Gentleman of Fortune and Reputation’” (21, 21-22). The jury agreed with 
counsel’s assessment and awarded Davis an enormous sum—£7,000 in damages. 
Notwithstanding this unusually high monetary judgment, the Davis case, and in particular its 
evidentiary narrative, offers a model of how contracts for marriage and their breach were 
established in the eighteenth-century common law courts.  
As the century progressed, cases like Davis v. Wilson continued to appear on the civil 
court docket. Jilted women and men applied to the law for redress, and the courts turned to 
emerging contract principles to provide them relief.45 As in the commercial marketplace, “mere” 
promissory exchange in the marriage market established a valid and legally enforceable 
agreement. Moreover, classical presumptions about party autonomy, rationality, discernment, 
and will to contract influenced how the broken engagement was presented and interpreted in the 
                                                 
45 In a wonderfully insightful essay analyzing the separation of spheres phenomenon in legal and literary discourse, 
Anat Rosenberg posits breach of promise of marriage as “a borderline area” between the public and the private, and 
she observes the action’s embeddedness in “general contract law,” including the classical principles by which it was 
informed (401, 402, 401-04). 
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common law courts. While plaintiff’s counsel invoked the presumptions to demonstrate contract 
formation, defense attorneys attempted to dispel them, with the purpose of either mitigating the 
plaintiff’s damages or voiding the agreement entirely. The use of these rules to define and 
regulate domestic relationships suggested to some a convergence of the public and private 
spheres, with one attorney remarking: “What is passing before us in this court at present is a 
miniature of what is passing in the world at large; (as scenes in private life something resemble 
those which are acted in publick)” (Trial for a Breach 18).  
The implementation of commercial contract principles in the breach of promise 
courtroom is demonstrated in contemporaneous case reports. Davis v. Wilson once again offers a 
representative example. Here, the plaintiff’s attorneys focused their attention on proving that she 
was deliberate in her consideration of Wilson’s numerous offers of marriage and that her 
eventual acceptance was an expression of her will and intention. In contrast, the defendant’s 
attorneys argued that words and behavior do not prove intention nor do they create a binding 
obligation:  
[A Gentleman] might tell [a Lady] that he would marry her, and twenty other Tales, and 
profess a great deal of extraordinary Friendship and Love, take her abroad, and treat her, 
and make her many Presents, and yet we cannot well infer from thence, that he is obliged 
to make that Woman his Wife. . . .We all know, that when Men are enamour’d with a 
Woman they promise her many Things, which perhaps they never intend to perform, and 
I believe that most of our Sex are convinced that the Women are not a Whit behind-hand 
with us. (23) 
 
Additionally, the defense suggested that it is bad public policy—an injustice even—to enforce 
disadvantageous agreements on the grounds that the parties were rational actors who had 
performed their due diligence prior to the promissory exchange. Wilson’s lawyers argued 
(unconvincingly, it turns out) that men frequently make “bad Choice[s]” in romantic partners and 
to conduct “an honourable Retreat . . . is the most honest and just Way” to proceed upon such a 
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discovery (23). Similarly, the defense counsel in Williams v. Harding (1793) challenged such 
presumptions as false and, therefore, unjust. A contemporaneous newspaper account records 
counsel as saying that “his Client . . . was very young, in the hey-day of blood, and likely to be 
suddenly prevailed upon to make promise of marriage in the moment of amorous passion; but 
which could not be supposed he would keep when reason and deliberation returned” (“Williams 
v. Harding,” n.p.). Yet, the case’s arbitrators appeared to reject this line of reasoning. The 
newspaper article notes that the “learned Judged observed . . . that the violation of a solemn 
promise of marriage was a private injury of a serious nature, and frequently attended with the 
most tragical consequence” (“Williams v. Harding,” n.p.). And, much like the Davis court, the 
Williams jury responded with a verdict for the plaintiff, this time in the much smaller amount of 
£50. Thus, whether true or false, the liberal assumptions of classical contract theory were of 
some importance to the breach of promise courts as they worked to ensure, through near strict 
liability, that private individuals could rely on others’ promises and realize the economic, social, 
and emotional expectations created thereby. 
Notwithstanding the law’s reliance on liberal formation principles in determining liability 
in breach of promise cases, the courts were, it seems, inclined to minimize the principles’ (or 
fictions’) significance in the process of damage assessment. In the case of Chapman v. Shaw 
(1790), for instance, the jury awarded the female plaintiff just £20 after defense counsel pleaded 
with the jury for equitable relief. During the plaintiff’s trial presentation, counsel provided 
evidence that plaintiff’s family had expended £42 (“30l. with a linen-draper and 12l. for silk with 
another”) in reliance on the defendant’s promise of marriage (12).46 They also offered testimony 
                                                 
46 All of the information about this case comes from the trial pamphlet Trial for a Breach of Promise of Marriage. 
Miss Elizabeth Chapman, Against William Shaw, Esq; Attorney at Law. Eighteenth-Century Collections Online 
records Miss Elizabeth Chapman as the pamphlet’s author; however, there is no such indication on the text of the 
document itself. Therefore, I have recorded it as an anonymous entry in the dissertation bibliography.  
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that could establish compensatory damages for emotional distress. Chapman’s mother testified to 
her daughter’s suffering: 
After Mr. Shaw discontinued his visits to my daughter, she was out of her mind. She kept 
her bed, and never slept for seven days. She was ill twice; and this illness was manifestly 
occasioned by Mr. Shaw’s breaking off his visits. . . . My daughter’s illness was not a 
sore throat, nor fever: her’s was a disorder of the mind. She was out of her senses two 
months. (11-12) 
 
Chapman’s apothecary confirmed Mrs. Chapman’s assessment, swearing that “Miss Chapman’s 
mind was disordered” after the breach and that “her disorder was the effect of an unhappy mind” 
(16-17). In response, defendant’s attorneys made arguments both pragmatic and pathetic. They 
maintained that Shaw was forced to break off the engagement when it became clear that “there 
was no property on either side” (24). To punish him too severely for recognizing the parties’ 
difficult financial circumstances post-formation would be unwise and unfair. The defense also 
reminded jurors that, like Shaw, “we have [all] cast our affections into a quarter where fortune 
has not cast her smiles,” and they shrewdly encouraged the defendant’s peers to act “like men of 
humanity and justice” by making a “proper and moderate use of [‘the whip’]” the law “has put . . 
. into [their] hands” (28). Lord Kenyon, the case’s presiding judge, gave force to the defense’s 
position, instructing the jury “always to have respect to the situation in life of the person who is 
to pay those damages” and, in this instance, to consider that the defendant’s “conduct . . . does 
not appear to . . . [have been] marked with any peculiar delinquency” (29-30). The jury’s 
minimal award of £20 suggests that it both found Shaw’s argument persuasive and heeded the 
judge’s command. Thus, while the verdict for Miss Chapman was assured by the liberal 
presumptions of classical contract, the damages to which she was entitled were mitigated by 
considerations both moral and equitable.47 
                                                 
47 In another case of damage mitigation, Leeds v. Cook (1803), the presiding judge, Lord Ellenborough instructed the 
jury to consider in its damage assessment evidence of the male plaintiff’s “brutal or violent manner,” as well as 
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There was one particular instance, however, in which the law ignored the rights of the 
liberal contracting subject entirely: the case of an unchaste plaintiff. In fact, courts accepted the 
plaintiff’s immoral character as a complete defense to an otherwise valid breach of promise 
claim. Lord Kenyon, in Chapman v. Shaw, recites the common law on this issue:  
If any person who enters into . . . [an] engagement is reputed to be of sober life and 
conversation, but who turns out, on a fair inquiry, to be a woman whose character is 
stained, the promise, although made to her, will not bind the other party in point of law. If 
a lady is chaste and virtuous at the time of making the promise, but before the 
performance of it acquires a different character, there is in this case likewise an end of it. 
. . . (29) 
 
Although Kenyon initially suggests that this rule is gender-neutral (i.e., applicable to “any 
person”), his attention to the indecent woman reveals its narrow focus. Moreover, subsequent 
case law demonstrates its prejudicial application. Take, for example, Foulkes v. Sellway (1800), a 
breach of promise case where plaintiff, a widowed businesswoman, sued defendant, a well-off 
widower, for reliance damages. According to the Albion and Evening Advertiser, plaintiff 
presented evidence at trial that, after yielding to defendant’s demands to give up her boarders and 
her shop, defendant unceremoniously ended the engagement on the grounds that “he had heard 
some unfavorable reports of her” (“Fowkes v. Selway,” n.p.) The Sun reported that the defendant 
responded to plaintiff’s charge by claiming her immoral character:  
On the part of the Defendant it was contended that the Plaintiff was not only deficient in 
point of chastity . . . but that she was most infamously immodest; that she had lived at 
Chelsea, where she exhibited such scenes of gross and offensive indelicacy, as could not 
be mentioned without a blush, two persons being in bed with her together, &c. &c. 
(“Fowkes v. Selway” n.p.) 
 
Significantly, the law reporter entry on this case indicates that the testimony suggesting 
plaintiff’s “general bad character” was hearsay and that plaintiff’s attorney challenged its 
                                                 
evidence that he was “of gross manners and destitute of feeling.” The jury returned with a verdict of nominal 
damages (1 shilling) (711). For a newspaper account of this case, see the entry for “Leeds v. Cook” in The Times. 
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admission on that ground. However, Lord Kenyon, the trial judge, surmised that “public opinion, 
founded on the conduct of the party, . . . was a fair subject of enquiry” and that unsubstantiated 
third party testimony was proper evidence of “what that public thought” (Foulkes v. Sellway 
600).48 Unsurprisingly, then, the verdict was for the defendant. It is an outcome that 
demonstrates how the classical contract presumptions of party equality and informed, intentional 
consent were often outweighed in these case by concerns about female virtue and excessive 
female sexuality. Once alleged, indecency or immorality diminished the female plaintiff’s 
standing as a contracting subject at law—she was not even able to insist that the court uphold 
established evidentiary standards. Once “proven,” the allegations emptied her of both her legal 
and social standing. We can imagine that she had little hope of reclaiming her reputation and 
negotiating another marriage contract. 
The “chastity” exception to breach of promise law in many ways reflects the public’s 
deeply ambivalent response to the rising cause of action and women’s right to claim legal relief 
under it. Early in the century, the popular social journal The Tatler satirized the typical breach of 
promise fact pattern. Entry no. 262 entertains readers with a description of a case for breach of “a 
Marriage Contract” brought by Winifred Lear against Richard Sly in the Court of Honour. To 
establish the couple’s engagement, Lear offered testimony that Sly had not only “Ogled” her on 
numerous occasions (“twice at an Opera, thrice in St. James’s Church, and once at Powel’s 
Puppet-Show”), but also flattered her with a promissory “Side Glance.” Upon hearing the 
plaintiff’s evidence, the judge (the Tatler’s fictitious editor Mr. Bickerstaff) sentenced Sly to a 
public shaming and ordered the prosecution of a courtroom member caught “Ogling a Lady of 
                                                 
48 Note that case name differs between law reporter and newspaper entries. In the former, it is Foulkes v. Sellway 
and in the latter, Fowkes v. Selway.  
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the Grand Jury.” He then issued “an Edict against these common Cheats, that make Women 
believe they are distracted for them by staring them out of Countenance and often blast a Lady’s 
Reputation whom they never spoke to, by saucy Looks and distant Familiarities” (329-330). The 
absurdity of both Lear’s claim and the judge’s decree reflects prevailing anxieties about 
women’s vulnerability to male seduction and about the potential for judicial overreach in cases 
responsive thereto. The biting vignette also appropriates alternative—in this case, sexualized and 
sentimentalized—fictions about female subjectivity, further destabilizing the notion of women as 
legitimate—i.e., rational and informed—legal agents and further discrediting the one legal action 
that recognized this agency.  
Contemporaneous newspaper accounts of trials for breach of promise of marriage, though 
ostensibly objective rather than satirical, also undermined liberal conceptions of the female 
subject and her legal cause. Descriptions of the breach of promise trial environment present the 
courtroom as a place of spectacle and its female participants as both objects of entertainment and 
bearers of a dangerous sentimentality. For example, in 1787, the World Fashionable Advertiser 
published “Extract of a letter from Exeter,” which describes the dramatic trial of a man who had 
abandoned his pregnant lover and married another. According to the correspondent, the 
courtroom was “thronged with all the beautiful women of the county, whose tears eloquently 
expressed the feelings of tenderness and pity” and who, along with the trial’s male observers, 
“burst into frequent exclamations of applause” during plaintiff counsel’s opening statement 
(n.p.). A theatrical image of the court and its female observers is likewise created in the 1800 
Albion and Evening Advertiser account of Shawe v. Baker. Here, the author reports that the 
details of the case were so salacious that “the ladies of the county,” who had “crowded” the 
courtroom, were “requested to withdraw” (“Shawe v. Baker” n.p.). Moreover, an 1809 Times 
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story on the Hulme v. Warbrick trial describes the courtroom as a site of intense female 
experience: the female spectators were “excited” by an “uncommon . . . interest” in the case and 
appeared at the trial “to gratify their curiosity,” while the female plaintiff, upon hearing 
evidentiary letters read in court, “shed tears abundantly” (“Hulme v. Warbrick” n.p.).49 Further, 
an 1810 Times report of Bishop v. Robinson includes a parenthetical apology that suggests the 
popular obsession with breach of promise cases: “[Though this trial occurred at an early hour, the 
Court was uncommonly crowded. We regret that the pressure and bustle arising from this 
circumstance, prevented our giving a more detailed account]” (“Bishop v. Robinson” 3). These 
descriptions of the breach of promise court as voyeuristic and melodramatic, and as a space of 
unrestrained female sensibility, certainly influenced whether jilted women pursued their legal 
right to compensation. As Charles Townshend argued in the 1753 HMA debates, the “public and 
mercenary” character of the cause provided “an uncomfortable relief for a woman of any 
character” (Cobbett’s 15: 53).50 Whether framed as the virtuous victim or impure imposter, she 
was never considered wholly rational or fully equal to her male counterpart—the classical 
contract fictions that were beginning to define his legal subjectivity simply had not yet 
conquered the patriarchal fictions that had for centuries defined hers. 
Eighteenth-century discourse on the HMA and the common law action for breach of 
promise of marriage reveals the contested nature of liberal subjectivity and its classical contract 
roots in the developing law of marriage. While parliamentarians debating stricter marriage 
                                                 
49 The quality of this newspaper account’s digital reproduction is poor (a portion of the left side is cut off); however, 
I have done my best to reconstruct the journalist’s description of the courtroom and the case. 
 
50 This conclusion is supported by Ginger Frost, who notes that, in the Victorian period, “[breach of promise] had a 
scandalous reputation” and was generally fodder for “local newspapers [that] often printed every salacious detail when one 
occurred. . . .” (8), and by Lettmaier, who claims that the action often sullied the reputation of the female plaintiffs who, in 
their refusal to accept those losses privately, “put [themselves] directly at odds with the central values of ideal femininity” 
(74, 73-77). 
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formation requirements generally agreed that the classical principles that informed and 
authorized liberal legal selfhood were essentially fictitious, they disagreed on the utility of those 
principles. For proponents of the HMA, presumptions about the advanced state of a contracting 
subject’s mental and emotional capabilities, as well as about the optimal conditions in which he 
exercised his will to contract, endangered personal and public well-being. It was only through 
paternalistic restrictions on the process of marital formation that the individual and her 
community were protected from the irrational impulses and deceitful behaviors that threatened to 
corrupt the domestic sphere. For opponents of the Act, idealistic assumptions about the 
contracting subject and the environment in which she negotiated marriage agreements operated 
to preserve, and sometimes advance, her social and economic position, as well as to safeguard 
the nation’s incipient democratic values. To refuse to honor informal marriage contracts founded 
on these assumptions was to disregard the right to individual autonomy and free choice in private 
relationships, to jeopardize the material and social welfare of would-be spouses and their 
children, and to risk a return to an elitist government.  
The jurisprudence on breach of promise of marriage reflects a similar ambivalence 
regarding the liberal rights and fictions that informed contract formation. On the one hand, the 
court’s commitment to contractual freedom and party expectations authorized the strict 
interpretation of contractual liability; on the other hand, its desire for equitable outcomes 
required that defendants be able to reduce their monetary exposure by demonstrating the flawed 
or impractical conditions of exchange. Moreover, the court’s unwillingness to recognize the 
“unchaste” female as a legitimate contracting subject, coupled with outside representations of 
women in breach of promise trials, suggests that the liberal fictions of contractual subjectivity 
were in constant competition with the traditional fictions of feminine excess. Thus, while 
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progressive views about private contract formation allowed the jilted woman unprecedented 
access to legal relief, patriarchal constructions of the female ideal ensured that her legal 
subjectivity remained unequal to that of her male counterpart. 
These conflicting and confused legal assessments of the private contracting subject and 
her conditions of exchange not only reflect the instability of and patriarchal bias in eighteenth-
century marriage law, they also reveal the large-scale difficulties posed by the law’s doctrinal 
presumptions. Indeed, part of what underlies the idiosyncrasies and prejudices of the legislative 
and judicial developments discussed herein are concerns, often legitimate, about the legal and 
social (dis)advantages of contract law’s liberal fictions. The legal discord further emphasizes the 
need for greater involvement in promoting responsible selfhood. If individuals are to engage 
productively with the law on private agreements, particularly with its fictions (liberal and 
patriarchal), and if they are to be assured fairness in domestic contracting, they must learn how to 
properly exercise their rights and duties. Yet, while the law might be able to deter or punish, it 
cannot often instruct—that task is the province of outside cultural authorities.  
Part III: The Domestic Novel and the Fictions of Formation 
One of the principal cultural authorities in the long eighteenth century was the domestic 
novel. Although contemporaneous writers, critics, and lay people debated its propriety, 
particularly for young women, there is little doubt among novel theorists that this early literary 
form had a significant influence on the English subject’s social and personal development. As so 
many literary scholars have shown, the domestic novel’s representational, critical, and 
instructional qualities worked together to help establish the modern individual and to guide his 
private endeavors.51 Here, I will examine how this literary form influenced the English subject’s 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Watt; Spencer; Bellamy; Armstrong, How Novels Think; J. Thompson, Models of Value; and McKeon, 
Origins. 
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legal development, with a particular focus on how it worked with and across the law to define 
and cultivate the private contracting individual, as well as the conditions of his exchange. I will 
argue that, like the legal conversation on marriage formation, this novelistic discourse identifies 
emerging classical contract principles as fictions; yet, unlike the law, as this literary mode 
develops, it becomes invested in transforming those fictions into social and legal truths.  
 Two of the earliest novels to venture earnestly into the experience of the private 
contracting subject are Samuel Richardson’s Pamela or, Virtue Rewarded (1740) and Clarissa, 
or, The History of a Young Lady (1747-1748). Written in the sentimental epistolary tradition, 
these novels employ the immediacy and intimacy of the private letter to explore “virtue in 
distress,” a trope that R.F. Brissenden argues is “the sentimental style[’s]” “paradigm cliché” 
(94). Central to this narrative design is the transition from status to contract, with the narratives’ 
afflicted heroines asserting the right to shed the duties associated with their respective socio-
familial positions and follow their personal inclinations in domestic bargaining. Yet, as each 
protagonist enters the market of private contract, both sexual and marital, she confronts 
challenges to her free will, as well as obstacles to legal aid. Pamela, with the help of providence, 
survives the hardships produced thereby; Clarissa, operating independently of divine will, does 
not. In Richardson’s domestic world, where the fictions of contract formation collide with its 
realities and where the laws surrounding marriage formation and sexual assault are inadequate 
for protecting the individual against the hazards posed by those realities, responsible, functional 
selfhood appears as a delicate balance between the divine, the patriarchal, and the liberal.  
As a novel of sentiment and didacticism, Richardson’s Pamela, both memorializes 
female suffering under and models female resistance to private and political forms of male, 
upper-class hegemony. The eponymous heroine’s arduous evolution from domestic servant and 
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sexual object into gentlewoman and marital subject plots the liberal foundations of this pain and 
protest, and it establishes the moral boundaries of women’s contractual selfhood. The novel also 
chronicles the vexed experience of men’s liberal development. The male protagonist’s initial 
disposition reiterates the fictions of classical legal thought, and his reformation presses the 
importance of moral education and self-discipline in the performance of contractual subjectivity. 
The novel’s heroine, Pamela Andrews, begins the epistolary narrative as a 15-year-old 
maidservant struggling against the sexual expectations attached to domestic servitude. She writes 
desperately of her resistance to her master’s, Mr. B.’s, increasingly aggressive advances, 
meticulously recording the moments of pleading, struggling, trembling, fleeing, screaming, and 
fainting to signal her private rebellion.52 Of the third sexual assault by Mr. B., she writes to her 
parents: “I found his Hand in my Bosom, and when my Fright let me know it, I was ready to die; 
and I sighed, and scream’d, and fainted away” (67). This frantic correspondence proceeds not 
only from the close proximity of the violence enacted against its author but also from the 
heroine’s critical legal awareness. In more than one epistle chronicling her abuse, Pamela tacitly 
laments her position under the law, locating her near hollow juridical capacity in the institution’s 
deeply imbricated relationship with the landed classes. Speaking of Mr. B., she writes, “Is there 
no Constable nor Headborough . . . to take me out of his House? for I am sure I can safely swear 
the Peace against him: But, alas! he is greater than any Constable, and is a Justice himself . . .” 
(64). He is, as was sometimes the case in the eighteenth century, both Gentleman offender and 
legal judge. Pamela carries the point about the inextricable link between social rank and legal 
authority into another “melancholy Scribble”: “For, Oh!,” she writes after her abduction by Mr. 
B., “what can the abject Poor do against the mighty Rich, when they are determin’d to oppress?” 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Letter XI, 34-36; Letter XV, 40-43; and Letter XXV, 64-68. 
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(95). It is a question that plagues the narrative, and one that brings to the fore the inveteracy of 
England’s inequalities.  
Yet, Richardson does not cede the political issues raised in the novel’s early domestic 
correspondence, nor does he allow his heroine to fall victim to her own sentimentality. In fact, 
Richardson supplements Pamela’s emotionally-charged testimony on the horrors of sexual 
intimidation and legal dispossession with deliberative discourse on the rights of the liberal 
individual. Pamela first contemplates the legitimacy of her subjugated position after Mr. B. 
imprisons her at his Lincolnshire estate: “[H]ow came I to be his Property?,” she asks. “What 
Right has he in me, but such as a Thief may plead to stolen Goods?” (116). This line of 
questioning later develops into a shrewd argument for contractual autonomy. Writing to Mr. B. 
as “Your greatly oppressed unhappy Servant,” Pamela pleads: “Whatever you have to propose, 
whatever you intend by me, let my Assent be that of a free Person, mean as I am, and not of a 
sordid Slave, who is to be threatened and frightened into a Compliance. . . . My Restraint is 
indeed hard upon me. I am very uneasy under it” (126). With the merging of the pathetic and the 
political in these epistolary spaces, Richardson exposes the fictions and maps the possibilities of 
contractual exchange. Indeed, the discursive functioning of Pamela’s interior—the movement 
between the sentimental and the rational—and the contested nature of her exterior—the violence 
of patriarchal norms confronting the ethics of liberal rights—reminds the reader that equality, 
willful consent, and reasoned thought are slippery, but crucial, concepts for the female subject.  
The novel further explores these concepts mid-way through the narrative when Pamela 
takes on the role of contracting subject. The opportunity arises when Mr. B., having failed to 
seduce Pamela through unilateral threats, makes an attempt at bi-lateral negotiation. He presents 
the heroine with a formal sexual contract that spans four pages of text. The document of seven 
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enumerated “ARTICLES” provides that Mr. B. will give over money, real property, and 
expensive apparel to Pamela and her parents in exchange for her services as his mistress. As 
requested, Pamela responds to each proposed term in writing, penning her answers in the 
Articles’ margins. Each response is a rejection of the proffered consideration and refers, either 
explicitly or implicitly, to the exceptional value of female virtue. For example, in reply to Article 
V, which includes a covenant for “four complete Suits of rich Cloaths” and several diamond 
accessories, Pamela writes: “to lose the best Jewel, my Virtue, would be poorly recompensed by 
those you propose to give me” (166). That the contract is meant to be a concession to Pamela’s 
firm assertion of her liberal rights becomes evident when Mr. B. implores: “Now, Pamela, will 
you see by this, what a Value I set upon the Free-will of a Person already in my Power” (166).  
Even though Pamela is reluctant to accept this characterization of the agreement, she assumes the 
conferred liberal capacity, advising her master: “. . . I will make no Free-will Offering of my 
Virtue. . . . your Offers shall have no Part in my Choice” (166). Remarkably (and after some 
time), Mr. B. honors Pamela’s rejection of the terms and withdraws the contract.  
Nancy Armstrong persuasively argues the social and political significance of this scene 
and, in particular, of Pamela’s participation in the male-dominated “field” of contractual 
exchange. Armstrong asserts that “By making the female [i.e., Pamela] party to the contract, 
Richardson implies an independent party with whom the male [i.e., Mr. B.] has to negotiate, a 
female self who exists outside and prior to the relationships under the male’s control” (Desire 
and Domestic Fiction 112, 113).53 I would add to Armstrong’s interpretation that by allowing the 
                                                 
53 For a contrary interpretation of this scene, see Folkenflik 265-66. Robert Folkenflik, in response to Armstrong, 
argues that the coercive context in which the novel’s sexual contract is presented to Pamela limits severely her 
contractual autonomy. He writes, “. . . the classical assumption about the nature of a contract, that it is entered into 
freely, is abrogated by Mr. B., who forces Pamela to take part in it and threatens her if she does not answer as he 
wishes” (266) 
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independent “female self” to appropriate the language of self-determination responsibly and to 
practice the art of negotiation ethically, Richardson imagines a model of domestic contract—a 
figure whose superlative bargaining skills eventually allow for the just achievement of self-
interest in the form of a socially-, economically-, and emotionally-advantageous marriage 
contract. Indeed, Pamela negotiates with Mr. B. in such a way as to transform herself from the 
“poor, oppressed, broken-spirited Servant” into the “happy, happy, thrice happy” upper-class 
wife (168, 289-90). 
Yet, unlike the classical model, Richardson’s exemplary agent operates within a narrow 
moral framework. Much like the female breach of promise plaintiff, Pamela’s contractual 
subjectivity is authorized by her virtue and her chastity. Mr. B. himself cites Pamela’s steadfast 
moral goodness as the principal factor in his decision to concede to her terms and enter into a 
permanent legal union:  
For I have often told you, and that long ago, I could not live without you. And my Pride 
of Condition made me both tempt and terrify you to other Terms; but your Virtue was 
Proof against all Temptation, and was not to be aw’d by Terrors: Wherefore, as I could 
not conquer my Passion for you, I corrected myself, and resolved, since you would not be 
mine upon my Terms, you should upon your own: And now I desire you not on any 
other, I assure you. (253-54) 
 
Pamela’s character—her compliance with the demands of the period’s feminine ideal—also acts 
as a defensive safeguard against male duplicity. Prior to their nuptials, Mr. B. confirms his 
earlier intention to draw Pamela into a sham-marriage, but contends that he abandoned the 
“Project” after considering the heroine’s “untainted Virtue” and her “try’d Prudence and Truth” 
(230). Importantly, the novel disregards the law on informal marriage and breach of promise in 
this sketch.54 In fact, Mr. B. advises Pamela that had he proceeded with the false contract, 
                                                 
54 Technically, Pamela would have the right to claim a valid marriage under the ecclesiastical law of spousals (this 
novel being written prior to the passage of the HMA); she might also have claim for breach of promise.   
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“[he’d] ha[ve] . . . been at Liberty to confirm or abrogate it, as [he] pleas’d” (230). Presumably, 
the law’s regulatory and punitive authority in these matters would be undercut by the power of 
social privilege, and Pamela would, once again, find herself devoid of a legal voice.55 Therefore, 
the novel suggests, the best, and perhaps only, option for avoiding the fate of the deceived 
maiden, is for the female subject to cling to her moral innocence and sexual purity in domestic 
negotiations. 
But, these are not the novel’s only qualifications for effective contractual subjectivity. 
Richardson introduces another essential condition, one that reflects the early modern belief 
system from which England was beginning to emerge: the intercession of divine providence. 
While Pamela’s superior moral judgment warrants her transition from status to contract, divine 
will secures this newfound position. The heroine frequently refers to God’s commanding role in 
her safety and happiness. For example, in writing to her parents about Mr. B.’s marriage 
proposal, Pamela praises “Providence, which,” she observes, “has, thro’ so many intricate 
Mazes, made me tread the Paths of Innocence, and so amply rewarded me, for what it has itself 
enabled me to do!” (232). The narrator’s postscript also establishes the centrality of character 
and creator to Pamela’s contractual triumph. In summarizing the qualities that distinguish 
Pamela as “worthy of the Imitation of her Sex,” the narrator identifies the relationship between 
individual agency and divine will:  
Let the desponding Heart be comforted by the happy Issue which the Troubles and Trials 
of the lovely PAMELA met with, when they see . . . that no Danger nor Distress . . . can be 
out of the Power of Providence to obviate or relieve; and which, as in various Instances in 
her Story, can turn the most seemingly grievous Things to its own Glory, and the Reward 
of suffering Innocence; and that, too, at a Time when all human Prospects seem to fail. 
(412, 410-11) 
                                                 
55 For another interpretation of the Richardson’s engagement with the civil law of marriage, see O’Connell. 
O’Connell reads the novel as a cultural representation of the “tensions” between church and state that will become 
central to the 1753 debates over marriage regulation (see 33 et passim). 
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With these allusions to moral goodness and providential predestination, then, the novel places 
paternalistic qualifications on women’s liberal capacity: the exercise of free will and the pursuit of 
self-interest in private contract are contingent on Christian temperance and the Lord’s discretion.  
Although the novel’s primary didactic effect is to demonstrate the principled female self, 
it also manages, through the male protagonist, to foster a new conception of the privileged male 
subject. Mr. B. begins the narrative as a figure of sexual and emotional excess. His early and 
frequent attempts to encroach on Pamela’s liberality are motivated by unrestrained passion, 
feeling, and impulse.56 This tendency toward the immoderate and the despotic is scripted by 
Richardson as a consequence of the hero’s social class, with Mr. B. observing: “We People of 
Fortune, or such as are born to large Expectations, of both Sexes, are generally educated wrong. . 
. . We are usually so headstrong, so violent in our Wills, that we very little bear Controul” (366). 
But Richardson does not imagine Mr. B.’s wanton egoism as a permanent condition; rather it is 
something to be corrected—it is something that can be reformed. The remedial device that 
Richardson envisions is the heroine’s own moral and political authority. Her self-discipline and 
self-possession is what triggers Mr. B.’s self-command. He abandons his intense desires and 
“imperious Will” to adopt in their place “[a] Generosity of . . . Mind; . . . Sobriety . . .; . . . 
prudent Oeconomy and Hospitality; . . . [and] Purity and Constancy of . . . Affection” (409). On 
the whole, Mr. B.’s slow transition from an impetuous and impassioned oppressor to a 
circumspect and reasoned companion charts another movement from status to contract. Sexual 
coercion gives way to reciprocal marital exchange, and we see in Richardson’s figure of 
reconstituted male subjectivity the potential for classical fictions to become modern truths. 
                                                 
56 The narrative’s correspondence relates, for example, that Mr. B. “was bewitch’d” (44); he was “long tost by the 
boisterous Winds of a . . . culpable Passion” (286); he was overpowered by “his wicked Purposes” (65); and he was 
carried along by feelings of “Revenge . . . injur’d Honour, and slighted Love” (144). 
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 Richardson continues to examine the fictions and frontiers of private contract and liberal 
subjectivity in his tragic tome Clarissa.57 Like Pamela, this epistolary novel painstakingly 
records the experience of female oppression and defiance, with the eponymous heroine forced to 
confront demands of filial obligation and claims of male privilege on the marriage market. The 
narrative also documents, through the male characters’ correspondence, the difficult process of 
masculine reform. Yet, unlike its literary predecessor, Clarissa does not envision a successful 
marriage contract for its heroine; rather, her liberality can be expressed only in isolated 
singularity and, ultimately, in death. This narrative choice both refines and modernizes the 
message of Pamela, demonstrating the deep entrenchment of paternal and patriarchal values in 
the marriage formation process and rejecting the notion of divine will as a protection against the 
most severe embodiments of these values. What emerges from the text, then, is an argument for 
novelistic intervention in the construction of the liberal contracting subject and the conditions of 
her exchange. 
 The eighteenth-century tension between status and contract is present at the novel’s 
outset, as the heiress heroine, Clarissa Harlowe, strives to preserve some semblance of autonomy 
on the marriage market. The novel’s opening volumes are comprised of letters that establish 
Clarissa in a power struggle with her nuclear and extended family over the right to exert 
independent free choice in marriage. The correspondence reveals that father, brother, sister, 
mother, aunt, and uncles, all motivated by avarice and ambition, are using increasingly 
opprobrious stratagems to compel Clarissa into a union with a man she alternately describes as 
                                                 
57 John Zomchick also considers the relationship between contract and subjectivity in Clarissa. Reading the novel’s 
heroine “[a]s both woman and abstract juridical subject,” Zomchick astutely argues that “Clarissa is caught between 
the contract’s enabling powers and her gender’s real liabilities, between the cold freedom of an abstract 
individualism and the warm comforts of genuine affective life” (60). Other scholars interested in ideas of individual 
will, consent, and freedom of contract in Clarissa include Tanner, Adultery in the Novel 3-18, 100-12; and 
DeGabriele 25-56. 
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“odious,” “disagreeable,” and “hideous” (87, 111, 187). Although subject to verbal insults and 
threats, physical confinement, and emotional abandonment, Clarissa remains resolute in her 
refusal of the wealthy Mr. Solmes. Her response to the Harlowes’ repeated admonitions about 
“absolute” filial duty (see 93)—“I will be obeyed!,” her father clamors; “duty” and “obedience”  
“must [be] show[n] . . . in [the family’s] way, not [your] own,” her mother affirms; “Your 
Parents will be obeyed,” her uncle chides (64, 95, 260)—is to frame obedience as an 
impossibility. Writing to her principal correspondent, Anna Howe, Clarissa explains, “. . . I must 
oppose [the marriage] (to comply is impossible)” (82-83) and, she declares that the command to 
marry is “a command that I cannot obey” (190). For this heroine, the right to voluntary consent 
in private contract is non-negotiable, even when set against the most potent of status claims. 
Although Clarissa is convinced of her fundamental contractual rights, she is less 
confident in her legal authority to protect those rights. In a letter describing the “trial upon trial” 
and “conference upon conference” that she has endured on account of Solmes, Clarissa implicitly 
questions (and seemingly denounces) the law’s position on women’s subjugation: “But what law, 
what ceremony, can give a man a right to a heart which abhors him more than it does any of 
God’s Almighty creatures?” (87). Moreover, the heroine adamantly denies her ability to seek 
legal recourse for the Harlowes’ threats to dispossess her of her lawful inheritance. Such bold 
action, she argues, would be an unpardonable breach of filial duty: “. . . I would sooner beg my 
bread, than litigate for my right with my papa: since I am convinced, that whether or not the 
parent do his duty by the child, the child cannot be exempted from doing hers to him. And to go 
to law with my father, what a sound has that?” (235). Rather than go to law, then, Clarissa 
attempts to negotiate her freedom privately, presenting to her family a series of oral and written 
proposals in which she variously promises to remain single, to go into exile, and to “forever . . . 
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resign” her inherited estate (95, 202-03, 197, 255). The responses to Clarissa’s offers are 
invariably cruel and disheartening, the last a veiled threat of forced marriage (see 257). Thus, 
while the heroine presents—even in her more frantic moments—rational terms for resolving the 
intra-familial conflict, and while she rejects the prospect of legal prosecution, she is repeatedly 
dismissed as a domestic dissident, a recalcitrant rebel who must be disciplined into compliance.  
Rather than submit to paternal control, however, Clarissa flees, and the novel shifts to 
another disastrous narrative of private contract. This second plot of domestic exchange charts 
Clarissa’s courtship with the unabashed libertine, Robert Lovelace. The couple’s relationship 
develops clandestinely and through a series of letters in which Lovelace exhorts Clarissa to 
escape her family’s “violence” and place herself in his care (298). It is Lovelace’s apparent 
respect for Clarissa’s independent spirit that persuades her to consider his scheme. She writes to 
Anna, “[h]e promises compliance in every article with my will: approves of all I propose” (356).  
After absconding with Lovelace, Clarissa remains comforted by his liberal assurances. She notes 
that he “promised to be wholly governed by [her] in every future step” (389) and that he 
reaffirmed her personal autonomy, stating “[y]ou are absolutely your own mistress” (393). Yet, 
Lovelace’s words are not his intentions. His own correspondence reveals that he perceives 
Clarissa as his “conquest” and considers himself her “emperor” (400). Lovelace’s power over 
Clarissa manifests in concealments and fabrications. He lies and deceives until we find Clarissa 
living in a London brothel and posing as his wife. Despite Lovelace’s empowered position, 
Clarissa does, at least for a time, maintain some measure of contractual capacity. Like Pamela, 
her great virtue recommends her to Lovelace as a wife rather than a ruined woman. In fact, 
settlements are devised, wedding plans discussed, and a marriage license procured (see 667-71, 
871). Nevertheless, Clarissa’s outward indifference to Lovelace, as well as his aversion to 
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marriage, interferes and the contract is never executed. Instead, Lovelace savagely violates 
Clarissa’s will, raping and then imprisoning her. The mutually-satisfying marriage contract that 
Pamela negotiated with Mr. B. is now unattainable for the isolated and ruined Clarissa.  
Notwithstanding this failure of contract, the novel persists in its investigation of female 
liberality. Following her rape, Clarissa recurs to the language of freedom of person. She demands 
to know how it is “in a country of liberty” she is “to be kept here a prisoner, to sustain fresh 
injuries” (901), and she reminds Lovelace of “the freedom which is [her] birthright as an English 
subject” (934). This rhetoric of autonomy is matched by a firm commitment to personal 
sovereignty. Clarissa rejects outright Anna’s suggestion that she marry Lovelace in order “to 
make [her] future life tolerably easy”—“I will not have that man,” she affirms (1087). Instead, 
the heroine determines—freely and voluntarily—to seek a martyr’s death. Clarissa’s movement 
toward self-fulfillment allows her to exercise the liberties from which she previously had been 
foreclosed. Over others’ objections, she forgives her persecutors, directs the disposition of her 
property, and alone achieves “eternal happiness” in her heavenly reward (1362, 1498). As Tony 
Tanner argues,  
[T]he final ‘triumph’ is Clarissa’s. Her father had tried to triumph by invoking paternal 
law over his child’s inclinations and disinclinations. Lovelace attempts to assert ‘the 
triumph of nature over principle,’ but finally recognizes that Clarissa is ‘the triumphant 
subduer’—triumphant through the power of her own inner will over the ‘natural’ and 
social and familial ‘wills’ to coerce her heart and violate her body. (Adultery in the Novel 
110)58 
 
Yet, though impressive, Clarissa’s victory in the battle of wills demonstrates the moral 
limitations on women’s liberal rights and, in its solitariness, her triumph undermines the notion 
that there is a dedicated and stable contractual space in which to exercise those rights. 
                                                 
58 For another excellent critical reading on rape and death in Clarissa, see Eagleton 63-94.  
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Clarissa’s fate lends the novel a deeply sentimental tone, as readers are invited to feel 
both the tragedy of her sexual trial and subsequent fall and the blessings of her spiritual 
redemption and heavenly rise. But her fate also operates within the novel’s didactic agenda. As 
he does with Pamela, Richardson draws Clarissa as a paragon of moral virtue, but in contrast 
with his earlier work, the author avoids the early modern attachment to divine will. Thus, despite 
Clarissa’s pleas for guidance and protection, “Providence” remains absent throughout much of 
the narrative. Instead, the heroine is a fully independent agent, alone responsible for navigating 
the dangers of the domestic marketplace. The difficulties that she encounters therein recommend 
her as a figure of caution and emphasize the importance of situational awareness, self-
possession, and moral self-discipline in domestic negotiations. 
We see this admonitory instruction in Clarissa’s vulnerability to Lovelace’s chicanery. In 
the preface to the novel’s third edition, Richardson gestures to Clarissa’s sentimental “faults” and 
then presents his instructive objectives, which include “warn[ing] the Inconsiderate and 
Thoughtless of the one Sex, against the base arts and designs of specious Contrivers of the other” 
(29-30). Although Clarissa is in no way the figure of indiscretion suggested in Richardson’s 
warning, she struggles to discern Lovelace’s true nature and to reconcile sentiment with careful 
judgment. Her letters to Anna reveal the internal conflict by which she is plagued. “[E]very time 
I see this man, I am still at a greater loss than before what to make of him,” she writes in the 
novel’s first edition (398). In the third edition, she confides, “It is a difficult thing . . . for a young 
creature that is able to deliberate with herself, to know when she loves, or when she hates” (308-
09). These uncertainties generate a spectrum of competing impressions, and Clarissa is powerless 
to commit to a course of action that would safeguard her against the machinations of her would-
be protector. Marriage, escape, and familial reconciliation are each sidelined by her 
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equivocation, and she is sacrificed to Lovelace’s predatory instincts. Clarissa’s position as a 
heroine-victim is a sober lesson in the realities of female agency and of private contract. Indeed, 
the young reader learns (despite what Pamela would suggest) that staid moral virtue does not 
guarantee self-preservation nor does it ensure a marital contract. The best chance for individual 
stability and domestic success, therefore, is to develop a critical awareness of self and suitor.  
The novel’s didactic purpose gathers strength in the character of Lovelace, whose 
recklessness and lawlessness lay bare the fictions of classical contract theory. Rather than forge 
relationships that honor party rights and expectations, the confessed libertine performs violence 
on the marriage market. He repeatedly makes a trial of women’s virtue, which he describes 
through the disturbing “simile of a new bird caught”: 
[A]t first, refusing all sustenance, it beats and bruises itself against its wire, till it makes 
its gay plumage fly about, and overspread its well-secured cage. . . . As it gets breath, 
with renewed rage it beats and bruises again its pretty head and sides, bites the wires, and 
pecks at the fingers of its delighted tamer. Till at last, finding its efforts ineffectual . . . it 
lays itself down and pants at the bottom of the cage, seeming to bemoan its cruel fate and 
forfeited liberty. And after a few days  . . . its new habitation becomes familiar; and it . . . 
resumes its wonted cheerfulness, and every day sings a song to amuse itself, and reward 
its keeper. (557) 
 
Lovelace perceives of his courtship methods as normative masculine behavior: “Is not the world 
full of these deceptions?,” he queries (609). Yet, his penchant for duplicity and coercion is also 
the product of a hyperactive individuality and a perverse patriarchal self-fashioning.59 As a 
privileged male in a liberalizing world, Lovelace believes that he has a right to pursue his own 
desires unfettered by the expectations or rights of others. John Zomchick argues that Lovelace’s 
sense of self and female other is “sanctioned by a legalistic conscience” (82). By adopting the 
(often gendered) terms of property ownership that pervade legal discourse and by imagining 
                                                 
59 For similar conceptualization of Lovelace’s character, see Zomchick, who argues: “Lovelace’s character is the site 
of the deliquescence of aristocratic ideals and the emergence of an anarchic version of individualism” (81). 
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himself possessed of immutable juridical power, Lovelace is able to obscure and disregard the 
female will (Zomchick 81-104). Writing of Lovelace’s treatment of Clarissa, Zomchick notes: 
“In his creative plottings, he casts her as something to be possessed rather than as a possessor” 
(85). This propertied mindset destabilizes Lovelace psychologically, leading him into fits rage 
and madness when he feels his ownership rights are being challenged (see 602, 882). Unlike Mr. 
B., however, repentance and reform are impossible for Lovelace. He writes to his principal 
correspondent, John Belford, “I can do neither” (1428), and continues a life of duplicity and 
betrayal until his untimely death at the hands of Clarissa’s cousin, Colonel Morden. Lovelace’s 
own tragic fate, therefore, serves as a dire warning about the limitations of self-possession and 
the perils of unrestrained self-interest to readers who are preparing themselves for the private 
marketplace.60 It also casts his character as a symbol for greater legal vigilance on issues of 
marriage formation and promissory breach. 
 In fact, this novel, even more than Pamela, is quite critical of the law’s protective and 
punitive capacities.61 Its principal targets are the pre-HMA law on marriage formation and mid-
century rape law, both of which are left unsettled by Lovelace’s own law of courtship. In an 
                                                 
60Amit Yahav-Brown offers an interesting discussion of the relationship between self-interest and reason in 
Clarissa. Yahav-Brown contrasts Lovelace’s and the Harlowes’ “monistic,” fully individuated desires with 
Clarissa’s “pluralist,” community-oriented desire, arguing the latter represents reasoned agency in Richardson’s 
work: “. . . Richardson suggests that reasonable governing values do depend on one pre-deliberative requirement: 
recognizing all those who happen to have been born in a nominally close relation or in physical proximity as parties 
to deliberations—recognizing them as those particular persons whose desires you ought to satisfy along with your 
own” (810, 819, 824). Yahav-Brown’s analysis indicates that Richardson is interested in demonstrating to his 
readers that reasoned negotiation on the marriage market involves multiple parties and requires thoughtful attention 
(though not necessarily concession) to the variety of rights and needs represented thereby.   
 
61 There are a number of scholars who offer extended readings of the novel in relation to rape, seduction, and 
abduction law. See, for example, Ferguson (rape law); Schwartz (rape, seduction, and abduction laws); Swan, 
“Raped by the System” (rape law); and Swan, “Clarissa Harlowe, Pleasant Rawlins” (abduction/ravishment law). 
Additionally, Ann Wagner reads the novel in light of eighteenth-century criminal law, including its standards and 
processes, more generally. In contrast to most other critical interpretations, Wagner argues that “the novel should be 
read, not as a rejection of earthly justice but as a dream of an alternative, albeit idealized, mode of adjudication” 
(322). 
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exchange of letters regarding Lovelace’s potential prosecution for the rape of the now-deceased 
Miss Betterton, the antihero, seeking to defend himself against the charge, reveals “the rules in 
all his amours”:  
to shun common women: to marry off a former mistress before he took a new one: to set 
the mother above want if her friends were cruel: to maintain a lady handsomely in her 
lying-in: to provide for the little one according to the mother’s degree: and to go in 
mourning for her if she died in childbed. (495) 
 
That Lovelace is successfully able to substitute these private “rules” for public law suggests the 
latter as ineffective at deterring those behaviors that not only compromise the integrity of the 
marriage contract process but also “corrupt” its female participants. The law’s inadequacy is 
sometimes framed by the novel as the consequence of women’s failure to prosecute their legal 
rights. For instance, in an epistle that reproduces Lovelace and Clarissa’s marriage license, 
Lovelace admits to “three or four precontracts,” boasting that “the good girls have not claimed 
upon them of a long time” (871). We see this forbearance again in the story of the “well 
descended” and “well educated” Sally Martin, a woman with whom Lovelace “contracted … 
before he knew of Miss Clarissa Harlowe” (1061).  To “obtain[] his end,” Lovelace promised 
marriage “under his hand and seal”; upon his breach, Sally avoided seeking legal redress and fell 
into prostitution (1061). While Richardson does not narrate the reasons for these women’s 
restraint, the HMA debates and breach of promise jurisprudence do, establishing in their 
deliberations that the courtroom is not a safe or particularly accessible space for female victims 
of male libertinism and violence.    
The jilted (and violated) female characters’ implicit reluctance to prosecute legitimate 
claims under the law becomes explicit in the heroine’s reaction to her own rape. After Lovelace 
sexually assaults and imprisons Clarissa, she threatens him and his co-conspirators with legal 
action:  “You, sir, and ye women, are safe from every violence of mine. The LAW shall be all my 
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resource: the LAW . . .” (950). Yet, she has no intention of making such an appeal, and remains 
unpersuaded by friendly gestures to personal and public duty. Clarissa outright dismisses Anna’s 
admonition to “tak[e] legal vengeance of the infernal wretch. . . . not only for our own sakes, but 
for the sakes of innocents who otherwise may yet be deluded and outraged by him” (1014). She 
writes in response, “. . . I would sooner suffer every evil . . . than appear publicly in a court to do 
myself justice” (1019). Moreover, Clarissa rejects Rev. Dr. Lewen’s counsel that, despite the 
“hard pressure upon your modesty,” “your religion, your duty to your family, the duty you owe 
to your honour, and even charity to your sex, oblige you to give public evidence against this very 
wicked man” (1251). Her excuse to Lewen is not “the shock of public shame” (as he anticipates), 
but rather a lack of confidence in the legal system. Clarissa expects that Lovelace will be either 
exonerated or pardoned, leaving him “at liberty to do as much mischief as ever” (1253). In the 
end, it is only divine law that will ensure men like Lovelace are “condignly punished” (1498). As 
Beth Swan suggests, with Clarissa’s insistence on divine, rather than legal, justice, Richardson 
reveals the difficulties that women faced when confronted with a “patriarchal system” that 
“empowers [the privileged male—i.e., Lovelace] and deprives [the victimized female—i.e., 
Clarissa] of basic human rights” (“Clarissa Harlowe, Pleasant Rawlins” 86-87). But this does not 
mean that Clarissa surrenders entirely to the system. Rather, she sees the publication of her story 
as that which will prove to be most advantageous to “young creatures” vulnerable to cruel and 
egoistic conduct in domestic exchange (1254-55). In Richardson’s private sphere, legal narrative, 
even when persuasive, has little power to effect cultural change, but domestic literary narrative, 
composed in moral terms and read in private, can help to produce a subject who, if not able to 
exercise fully her contractual rights, is able to identify and avoid the egoist expressions of others.  
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 As the long eighteenth century progressed, novelists continued to explore the process of 
contracting marriage and to shape its participants. Status concerns remained, as did questions 
about the efficacy of marriage laws and the vulnerability of women to male duplicity and 
violence; yet, the focus of instruction shifted as heroes and heroines were imagined as more fully 
self-determined, their autonomy deriving from parental absence or neglect as well as from legal 
and providential distance. Charlotte Smith’s Emmeline, the Orphan of the Castle (1788) and Jane 
Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1811) extend the theme of exposing the legal fictions associated 
with classical contract. In these texts, the idea of rational, informed, and voluntary private 
exchange is depicted as uncertain at best. Nonetheless, the novels persist in working to 
authenticate formation fictions by offering characters that represent the thresholds, both proper 
and improper, of contractual subjectivity. In these later century novels, it is not uncorrupted 
virtue or divine will that authorizes rewarding domestic exchange, nor is it evolving legal 
doctrine; rather it is a commitment to free-willed domestic rights and obligations tempered by 
romantic self-discipline and social expectation.  
 A gothic-inspired romance, Smith’s Emmeline narrates the courtship experience through 
the gothic tropes of isolation, dispossession, madness, and oppression, as well as through 
romantic images of affective domesticity and circumspect individuality. The eponymous heroine, 
an orphan of apparently spurious birth, begins the novel in near solitary confinement at her 
family’s remote ancestral home, Mowbray Castle. In due course, however, she is released into 
the world of male tyranny and frenetic individualism. Emmeline’s struggle against these 
powerful forces occurs within the space of domestic contract, as men threaten her with arranged, 
forced, and otherwise undesirable marriages. Yet, this space is also open to agreements and 
figures that offer a judicious and benevolent counterpart to the narrative’s gothic design. Thus, 
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by the novel’s conclusion, rational love and its contracting partners have displaced entirely the 
despotic and the impolitic, leaving the reader with a protoliberal paradigm from which to 
contemplate domestic exchange.  
As does Richardson in his novels, Smith proleptically frames the narrative conflict in 
Emmeline within Maine’s nineteenth-century status to contract thesis. The heroine is impelled 
into the corrupted marriage market by her position as an illegitimate and impoverished legal 
ward. Without rank or fortune, Emmeline must rely on her authoritarian uncle and informal 
guardian, Lord Montreville, for physical and economic security. This dependence empowers 
Montreville to ignore Emmeline’s right to contract marriage—her domestic future, he 
determines, must be secured through homosocial negotiation. Montreville’s patriarchal attitude 
authorizes a series of male-brokered marriage contracts in which social and economic capital are 
offered as consideration for Emmeline’s sexual identity. The first of the proposed transactions is 
presented by Mowbray Castle’s lecherous, but propertied, steward, Maloney. Montreville, 
“influenced” by “avarice and ambition” and concerned about his own son’s, Delamere’s, 
romantic intentions toward the heroine, is “persuade[d] . . . of the propriety of the match” (62-
63). He admonishes Emmeline, “[p]erhaps he [Maloney] has no very great advantages; yet 
considering your situation, which is, you know, entirely dependent, I really think you do 
perfectly right in designing to accept of the establishment he offers you” (66). Another contract 
is proffered by the “old bachelor” and “opulent banker,” Mr. Rochely (110, 129). Montreville, 
once again motivated by Emmeline’s dependent status and Delamere’s feelings for her, quickly 
moves to “close” the deal (129). Yet, Emmeline, drawing on her right to autonomous exchange, 
rejects both proposals. When, for example, Montreville attempts to compel Emmeline’s consent 
to the Rochely transaction by issuing “threats of indigence,” the heroine responds with an appeal 
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to her right of personal liberty. “[I]t is improbable,” she declares, “that one who has sacrificed so 
much to integrity, should now be compelled . . . to the basest of all actions, that of selling her 
person and her happiness for a subsistence” (134, 135). Even Montreville’s reminder that a 
marriage to Rochely will provide social legitimacy—“[t]he blemish of your birth will be wiped 
off and forgotten,” he promises—fails to shake Emmeline’s resolve: “to marry Mr. Rochely is 
not in my power,” she assures her uncle (148). Like Clarissa, this heroine finds it impossible to 
subordinate her right of independent marital choice to status demands.  
Unlike Clarissa, however, Emmeline’s steady (and sometimes hysterical) refusal to 
function as an object of marital exchange elevates her successfully to the role of private 
contracting subject. Montreville, who is periodically motivated by a sympathetic attachment to 
his niece, eventually abandons his plan of female commodification and commits to heterosocial 
negotiation. Guardian and ward enter into an agreement whereby Montreville promises both to 
respect Emmeline’s right to voluntary contract and to maintain his fiduciary commitments, and 
Emmeline promises never to marry Delamere without Montreville’s consent (149-50). It is an 
arrangement of paternal and filial compromise, and one through which Smith suggests the 
possibility of reasoned exchange as an antidote to gothic oppression. And, while the friction 
between despotic paternalism and democratic bargaining continues to plague the characters’ 
relationship, it is not, in the end, determinative. Montreville and Emmeline eventually negotiate 
their way into an affective alliance, with Emmeline restored to her rightful position as heir to 
Mowbray Castle and married to the man of her choosing and Montreville content in “the 
happiness of his niece” (476).  
Emmeline is not the only of Smith’s characters who struggles for contractual 
independence. Delamere is likewise subject to status pressures in courtship. Heir to a large 
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fortune and estate, his freedom to contract is circumscribed by ancestral obligation and social 
expectation. He is “persecuted . . . with proposals of marriage” to women of commensurate rank 
and “immense” fortune, women who will preserve the family’s ennobled heritage (87-88, 78). 
Nevertheless, Delamere resists these efforts to commandeer his right to marital choice, ignoring 
admonitions about filial duty and pursuing “the only union which will secure [his] happiness”: a 
marriage to Emmeline (93, 90-93). At an impasse, parents and son enter into a verbal contract 
formalized by the presence of two witnesses. Delamere agrees to spend a year abroad (or longer 
if his father so directs), and Lord and Lady Montreville promise not to “oppose” a union with 
Emmeline upon his return (207-08). This private arrangement, once closed, prompts the 
negotiation of another domestic agreement. After an emotional back and forth, Delamere 
convinces Emmeline to execute a written promise of marriage, which reads “At the end of the 
term prescribed by Lord Montreville, Emmeline Mowbray hereby promises to become the wife 
of Frederic Delamere” (209). Although the anticipated marriage contract is never executed, the 
episodes leading up to and imagining the couple’s betrothal underscore the increasing 
significance of individual prerogative and affective ties in the private sphere. Indeed, Smith’s 
decision to empower Delamere to act outside of social custom and in contravention of parental 
inclination signals an intergenerational shift in family politics and market control.  
Smith’s representations of private exchange position the novel within the scope of both 
subversive and didactic literature. The narrative simultaneously works to undermine the marriage 
market’s paternalism and to establish in its place contract law’s classical fictions. Yet, Emmeline 
is not an argument for unfettered contractual autonomy; rather it is a sort of “how-to” manual for 
developing proper liberal selfhood. The novel’s primary and secondary characters embody a 
range of competency levels from which the reader can derive instruction. The clearest example 
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of “bad” subjectivity62 lies in Delamere, whose reckless individuality ensures that he can never 
fully realize the liberal conditions of contract. Indeed, Delamere’s unbridled self-interest and 
extreme romantic sentiment frequently preclude him from rational thought and action. He is 
instead prone to bursts of madness and bouts of illness: he experiences “a temporary phrenzy” 
after Emmeline rejects his initial marriage proposal (97), “rave[s] like a madman” when she 
refuses the second (209), vacillates between “effusions of phrenzy” and an “alarming” “sullen 
calm” when she appears to have been unfaithful (258-60), and is “seized with a [near fatal] 
fever” when she is lost to him (366). Even more troubling is that Delamere’s lack of self-
discipline precipitates acts of domestic violence. At one point, he abducts Emmeline in an 
attempt to force a clandestine marriage (166); and at another, he participates in a duel to avenge 
his ruined sister’s honor (see 469-70). The narrator attributes Delamere’s temperament to the 
“defects of his education,” which include “boundless indulgences” and parental myopia (68-69). 
Yet, like Richardson in Clarissa, Smith does not contemplate subjective reform for her figure of 
overwrought masculinity. As did Lovelace, Delamere dies in a duel, his violent death providing a 
stark warning about the dangers of emotional and psychological excess.  
The path to good contractual subjectivity is, therefore, located in Emmeline and her 
future husband, Godolphin, both of whom possess, at the novel’s outset, the qualities necessary 
for enacting valuable agreements in the private sphere. Measured and circumspect in his 
approach to domestic relationships, Godolphin serves as Delamere’s foil. His feelings for 
Emmeline, as well as his pride of family, do not produce aberrant or violent behaviors; instead 
they yield sympathy and restraint. When Godolphin learns of Emmeline’s engagement to 
                                                 
62 In my reference to bad subjectivity, I am indebted to Nancy Armstrong’s engagement with Althusser’s “bad 
subject” in How Novel’s Think (see, e.g., 29-32). 
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Delamere, he conceals his romantic interest; when Emmeline informs him of her desire to remain 
single until she retrieves her estate and establishes her social and legal legitimacy, he respects her 
wishes; and when his sister’s virtue is compromised by close friend, Godolphin seeks 
reconciliation instead of extra-legal vengeance (i.e., a duel). Diane Hoeveler argues that 
“Godolphin becomes worthy to be the hero of this text when he eschews ‘masculine’ codes of 
conduct—epitomized in that very deadly masculine pastime of dueling—and empathizes instead 
with the ‘feminine’ fates of his sister and Emmeline” (42).  I would add that Godolphin’s 
exceptional “merit,” his “nobleness of character,” and his rationality of emotion also render him 
a model of classical contract.63 His capacity for reasoned, sympathetic exchange guarantees 
marital happiness with Emmeline and secures the well-being of his sister and her illegitimate 
child. 
Godolphin’s place as good contractual subject is exceeded only by Emmeline, whose 
gender and birth make her a particularly remarkable representative of liberal individualism. 
Introduced into the novel as a figure of “uncommon understanding . . . and unwearied 
application” (46), Smith’s orphaned and illegitimate heroine develops into a rather powerful 
figure of moral reasoning and ethical exchange. Importantly, it is Emmeline’s commitment to 
promise-keeping (rather than her sexual chastity) that bespeaks her exceptional and principled 
subjectivity, and, as Cheryl Nixon argues, “proves[s] her virtue” (Orphan 101). Emmeline’s 
contractual integrity first arises in the novel’s ravishment scene. As Delamere carries Emmeline 
against her will to Gretna Green for a clandestine marriage, she resolves to protect her agreement 
with Montreville over her social reputation. The narrator observes, 
                                                 
63 See Emmeline’s assessment of Godolphin for these heroic descriptions (361). 
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The idea which seemed to press most painfully on her mind, was the blemish which the 
purity of her character must sustain by her being so long absent with Delamere—a 
blemish which she knew could hardly ever be removed but by her returning as his wife. 
But to break her promise to Lord Montreville; a promise so solemnly given . . . was a 
measure which she could not determine to pursue. (181) 
 
Emmeline’s promissory ethics is further demonstrated in the narrative’s breach of promise 
sketch. Here, Emmeline upholds her written agreement to marry Delamere, despite her feelings 
for Godolphin, whose “admirable qualities of heart and understanding” make him a more prudent 
marital choice. The narrator writes of Emmeline’s resolve “to forget him [Godolphin], and no 
longer to allow any partiality to rob Delamere of that pure and sincere attachment with which he 
would expect her to meet him at the altar” (282-83). In fact, it is not until Emmeline receives the 
contract “torn in two pieces” and accompanied by a written “release” that she allows herself to 
contemplate marriage to the novel’s hero (351). More significantly, it is not until this moment 
that the heroine’s gothic trappings are subverted by romantic rewards. She is reconstituted, 
though the discovery of long-concealed legal documents, as a person of legitimate birth and 
propertied wealth, and she is firmly established, through reasoned mediation, in an intimate and 
benevolent domestic environment. Thus, in this imaginative realm, persevering in one’s promises 
is a marker of rational and rewardable selfhood, and it is a principal quality in women’s pursuit 
of equal and autonomous exchange.  
The novel does not, however, portray female contractual subjecthood as free of 
eighteenth-century English culture’s conservative traditions.  As other scholars, including 
Cynthia Klekar and Nixon, have demonstrated, the novel’s social and legal contexts reveal that 
the pressures creating, challenging, and enforcing Emmeline’s promissory commitments are 
often prescribed by patriarchal or aristocratic conventions.64 For example, Emmeline is 
                                                 
64 Klekar and Nixon each offer an insightful discussion of the tension between liberal exchange and patriarchal 
tradition in Emmeline. Klekar argues that the novel employs the “language of gift and obligation” in order to conceal 
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motivated to negotiate contracts with Montreville and Delamere by traditional family politics and 
the patrician laws on inheritance. Her dependent and liminal position within the Mowbray 
kinship network and under the law obligates her to enter into agreements that require 
considerable self-sacrifice. Moreover, English society’s gender norms mean that neither the 
promise to refrain from nor the promise to enter into marriage are Emmeline’s to break; rather 
she must wait for male-authorized dispensation. Additionally, Emmeline is tempted to execute a 
clandestine marriage contract with Delamere by the culture’s strict conceptions of female virtue 
and its unforgiving expectations for women’s chastity. The heroine’s equivocation on the matter 
not only confirms the hegemony of patriarchal ideas about proper womanhood, it also reveals the 
law’s protective failures. Neither Emmeline nor her narrator is able to contemplate even the 
possibility that the law would defend her from the stain of sexual assault or the threat of forced 
marriage. Emmeline’s accommodation to the patriarchal order further extends to the negotiations 
over Mowbray Castle, which occur after she is revealed to be of legitimate birth. Eva König 
argues that the terms of “masculine territory”—i.e., “property ownership”—in the eighteenth 
century required a woman so empowered to engage in a “masquerade of femininity” (161-63). 
Emmeline, therefore, “claims her inheritance” by male “proxy”—her future brother-in-law 
negotiates the estate’s transfer—and “assumes feminine, submissive or propitiatory behaviour 
and language” with those who pose an obstacle to her birthright (König 162). Yet, as König 
shows, Emmeline’s capacity for masquerade is a compelling argument for female agency in 
                                                 
the “coercive and violent” presence of “patriarchal authority” in private contract (“Obligations of Form” 269-70; see 
also 287). She writes, “the seemingly disinterested exchanges [with Montreville and Delamere] mask the 
impossibility that Emmeline can escape the asymmetrical cycle of exchange that subjects her to competing forms of 
male control” (272). Drawing on Klekar’s work, Nixon observes the conflict between Emmeline’s “attempt[] to 
enact structures of mutual, reciprocal obligation” and the male characters’ “attempt[s] to trap her into contractual 
arrangements that place her in a subordinate position and force her to give up power to them. . . .” (Orphan 101). 
Nixon further suggests that the legally-framed conflict represents late eighteenth-century concerns about the 
unsettled boundary between public and private (100-05). 
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private affairs. Indeed, the heroine’s ability to manipulate conservative ideologies of femininity 
to great economic and social advantage demonstrates women’s fitness for self-government and 
domestic authority. 
Thus, notwithstanding Smith’s engagement with the period’s conservative norms, her 
novel helps to construct the liberal individual and the modern world in which she operates. As 
the reader is confronted with the inequities wrought by the patriarchal, the paternal, and the 
patrician in the private sphere, she is also presented with new ways of seeing and knowing. 
Smith’s despotic characters and characters of excess underscore the need for domestic progress, 
while her appropriately sentimental protagonists offer a vision of how to accomplish this 
evolution. Indeed, Emmeline and Godolphin’s rational, disciplined individualism and their 
capacity for voluntary and equal exchange demonstrate how to turn classical liberal fantasy into 
modern cultural truths.65 
Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility, published at the end of the long eighteenth century, 
joins social realism with romantic sentimentalism to explore the marriage market’s pitfalls and 
possibilities. Through an intricate weaving of multiple courtship narratives, the novel both 
condemns the status concerns that regularly plagued upper-class market conditions and 
interrogates the limits of liberal individualism and the contracting process through which it is 
expressed. What materializes in this novel of manners is a moderated version of the individual 
and her contractual rights—equality and free choice are fully legitimated, while autonomy is 
                                                 
65 Joan Forbes and Hoeveler also emphasize the socio-political significance of the novel’s final marital union. 
Forbes positions Emmeline as an anti-romantic text and suggests that the hero and heroine’s marriage—a union “not 
so much of romantic or courtly love, but more brotherly protection offering . . . respect, safety, and affection”—
resists the constraints that “patriarchal society” places on women through “romance and romantic love” (301). 
Hoeveler similarly argues that Emmeline and Delamere’s union replaces the unruly “older and aristocratic order” 
with a civilized “new order,” one that “value[s] self-possession, restraint, bodily repression, and emotional control” 
(43). 
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authorized only through self-discipline and social responsibility.66 In this way, Austen carries 
forward Smith’s work in Emmeline. Yet, by anchoring the novel in contemporary life and 
character, she not only creates urgency on the issue of arranged marriage, but also provides a 
more fully accessible version of proper contractual selfhood and its fictions.  
Austen addresses the friction between status and domestic contract in the novel’s heir-
heiress courtship plots. In the most developed of these plots—the marriage negotiations between 
the Morton and Ferrars families—the author represents the way in which inheritance and 
property ownership could cause a loss of identity and volition on the eighteenth-century marriage 
market. Rather than being treated as a self-determining individual, Miss Morton is regarded by 
the text’s marriage brokers as an object of rank and fortune to be offered in interfamilial trade. 
Mrs. Ferrars identifies her as “the daughter of a nobleman with thirty thousand pounds” (264) 
and Mr. John Dashwood refers to her as the “only daughter of the late Lord Morton, with thirty 
thousand pounds” (159). As Edward Neill suggests, these characterizations not only emphasize 
Miss Morton’s position as “a person of consequence,” they also reduce her to monetary capital: 
rather than having thirty thousand pounds, Neill writes, “Miss Morton is thirty thousand pounds” 
(127). The heiress’s (de)valuation is reinforced in her textual marginalization. She inhabits the 
novel without a literal voice—she is not ascribed any dialogue and the narrator does not share 
her thoughts with the reader—and her figurative voice is transferred (and only briefly) to the 
                                                 
66 Where Austen falls on the issue of individualism and its political underpinnings has and continues to be the 
subject of much scholarly debate. Alistair Duckworth (112-14), Mary Poovey (183-94), and Tony Tanner (Jane 
Austen 101-02), for example, all note Austen’s privileging of self-discipline and social duty in Sense and Sensibility; 
yet, these scholars also suggest (albeit with different degrees of emphasis) that the novel seeks some balance 
between the individual and the social, between emotion/desire and prudence/obligation, and between progressive 
and conservative. Nancy Armstrong (How Novels Think 43-52) and Claudia Johnson (Jane Austen 49-72), on the 
other hand, locate Austen more firmly in the progressive/reformist camp. Armstrong, for instance, posits Austen as 
an “Enlightenment intellectual[],” for whom “self-restraint entailed no loss of individuality but, quite the contrary, 
guaranteed an accretion to the self of individual rights” (How Novels Think 48).  
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novel’s heroine, Elinor Dashwood. This transference occurs soon after the Ferrars’ decide to 
modify the terms of contractual exchange by substituting one son (Robert) for another (Edward). 
Elinor, speaking with her brother John, the Ferrars’s representative, addresses the development: 
‘The lady, I suppose, has no choice in the affair.’ [Elinor] 
 ‘Choice! – how do you mean?’ – [Mr. Dashwood] 
‘I only mean, that I suppose from your manner of speaking, it must be the same to Miss 
Morton whether she marry Edward or Robert.’ 
‘Certainly, there can be no difference; for Robert will now to all intents and purposes be 
considered as the eldest son. . . .’ (210) 
 
The heroine’s incisive allusions to marital choice, romantic apathy, and the landed class’s 
“manner” (John Dashwood being an heir himself) carry with them a critical defense of the 
heiress’s singularity: Miss Morton may, Elinor subtly suggests, have legitimate desires that run 
counter to economic or social aggrandizement and that extend beyond the promise of patrilineal 
succession. Yet, Dashwood’s response that “there can be no difference” between Edward and 
Robert indicates that the individual qualities of both heir and heiress are of little consequence to 
the propertied marital trade; rather, what signifies is one’s class condition, such that “choice,” to 
the extent that it exists, is superficial and generic. In fact, within this system of exchange, the 
prime signal of patriarchy, heritable property, is always threatening to disrupt the prime signal of 
liberality, the ability to bargain.  
This threat is made tragic in the novel’s retrospective subplot on courtship, marriage, and 
divorce. A minor narrative, told by Colonel Brandon, the anecdote relates the history of Eliza 
Williams, an orphaned heiress whose great fortune made her vulnerable to patriarchal 
consumption. Brandon explains that, although attached to him, Eliza was “married against her 
inclination to [his elder] brother” in order to preserve the “much encumbered” “family estate” 
(145). Her appropriation by filial duty—it was her uncle and guardian, Brandon’s father, who 
arranged the marriage—destroyed her sense of self and her capacity for self-control. She 
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transitioned from a happy and spirited young woman, to a miserable and adulterous wife, to an 
unchaste and infirm divorcée. Once released from the disastrous marriage, Eliza was unable to 
expel that part of her that identified as a commodity, trading the role of patrilineal possession for 
that of sexual good. Her collapse into “a life of sin” thus ended as all such lives do in a 
sentimental narrative, in exile, debt, and death (146). With this story of oppression and suffering, 
then, Austen intensifies the private conflict between status and contract, urging a critical, even 
sympathetic, response to the market’s treatment of its most “privileged” participants.  
Because Austen’s heiresses, and, to an extent her heirs, are directed by their status 
positions, her non-propertied heroines and their suitors serve to demonstrate the complexity and 
(im)propriety of autonomous private contract. Void of fortune or estate, these characters are not 
valuable commodities to be bought and sold in familial exchange; rather they are independent 
negotiators of their domestic futures. Reading the courtship experience of Marianne and John 
Willoughby alongside that of Elinor and Edward Ferrars reveals the “liberal” marriage market as 
a site of conflicting motivations, unintelligible wills and moralities, and disparate proficiencies; 
yet, the experiences also demonstrate the market as a place for individual growth and reward. In 
point of fact, Austen’s featured romances prove as false the principles on which classical 
contract theory is founded at the same time that they verify the possibility of these principles and 
the liberal subject who enacts them.67  
Austen examines the hazards of private contract in the relationship between Marianne 
and Willoughby, a romance that begins in haste and ends in sorrow. This courtship, forged as it 
is between two figures of immoderation, reveals the ways in which excessive individuality 
imperils the female subject and her prospect of marital exchange. Willoughby’s “[e]xtravagance 
                                                 
67 For another reading of Austen’s representation of “personal autonomy” on the marriage market, see J. Thompson 
“Sense and Sensibility,” 153 et passim.  
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and vanity,” as well as his “cold-hearted and selfish” nature (235), compel him to pursue, quite 
recklessly, his advantage in the marriage market. He draws Marianne into a romantic 
entanglement and then cruelly abandons her for the wealthy Miss Grey. At the same time, 
Marianne’s deep sensibility urges her to engage in conduct that borders on indelicacy and that 
ultimately leaves her defenseless against romantic deception and physical breakdown. Indeed, 
she runs headlong into the courtship, ignoring her sister’s admonitions about “the propriety of some 
self-command” (41), and upon discovering Willoughby’s duplicity, falls seriously ill. Her recovery is 
assured only after she takes a turn on the sentimental death bed. 
Marianne’s precarious position is made manifest in the characters’ post-courtship 
analyses. In a letter to the lovesick heroine, Willoughby shrewdly invokes the requirement of 
contractual intent to escape liability for his actions:  
. . . I entreat your forgiveness of what I can assure you to have been perfectly 
unintentional. . . . [I]f I have been so unfortunate as to give rise to a belief of more than I 
felt, or meant to express, I shall reproach myself for not having been more guarded in my 
professions of that esteem. That I should ever have meant more you will allow to be 
impossible, when you understand that my affections have been long engaged elsewhere. . 
. . (129) 
 
While Willoughby eschews the idea that the couple had engaged in promissory exchange, 
Marianne interprets the relationship as a mutual and binding agreement. She informs Elinor that 
she “felt [her]self . . . to be as solemnly engaged to him, as if the strictest legal covenant had 
bound [them] to each other” (133), and admits that although “never professedly declared,” his 
love “was every day implied” (132). Still, feelings and implications are not enough to establish 
Willoughby’s will and intention and, consequently, to authorize Marianne’s intense romantic 
sentiment. As Elinor observes, her sister’s very open attachment to her former suitor—and, in 
particular, her well-publicized and unchaperoned visit to his family’s estate—could cause her to 
“lose much” if their social community were to discover that “[Willoughby] has broken no 
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positive engagement” to her (139). To preserve Marianne’s reputation and domestic future, 
Elinor must conceal the magnitude of her injudicious nature, a seemingly difficult task in a world 
where the vicissitudes of courtship occupy a key place within the social conscious.   
Marianne’s courtship experience is not, however, limited to the disastrous nor is her 
position in the story restricted to the role of impassioned and impulsive heroine. For this 
sympathetic figure, heartbreak inspires subjective enlightenment and opens a space for domestic 
fulfillment. Once restored to physical health, Marianne admits her prior behavior was “a series of 
imprudence” (244) and commits to reasoned and deliberate self-government (245-46). When she 
again enters the market, her desire for “irresistible passion” has subsided and she “voluntarily” 
forms a new agreement with the solid and staid Colonel Brandon (268). Of Marianne’s 
emotional condition in her newfound marital role, the narrator observes: “[She] could never love 
by halves; and her whole heart became, in time, as much devoted to her husband, as it had once 
been to Willoughby” (268). With this reconstitution of character, Austen bodies forth a new 
version of female selfhood, one that acquires or develops into (as opposed to innately possesses) 
the rational, informed, and self-affirming fictions of liberal contract.   
The novel’s investigation of male intemperance, in the form of Willoughby, follows 
another direction. Although this handsome and charismatic character enters the narrative as a 
figure of “general admiration” (33), he exits as a symbol of caution. Joyce Kerr Tarpley correctly 
argues that “[b]y consciously flouting the moral norm for courtship conduct, Willoughby enacts 
a serious abuse of freedom” (102). Not only does he inflict emotional injury on the novel’s 
heroine, he offends the social code and upsets the domestic order. His aggressive libertinism and 
gross self-interest contribute to the hardship of female ruin and the rise of illegitimate birth68; 
                                                 
68 At a point in the novel, we learn that Willoughby seduced and abandoned Colonel Brandon’s pregnant niece, the 
younger Eliza Williams, before turning his attentions to Marianne. 
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and, when set against his apparent “gallantry” and “gracefulness” (33), they foster confusion and 
distrust among those who form a part of his social compact. Mrs. Dashwood, for example, 
wonders, “Has not his behaviour to Marianne and to all of us, for at least the last fortnight, 
declared that he loved and considered her as his future wife, and that he felt for us the attachment 
of the nearest relation? Have we not perfectly understood each other?” (59-60). Importantly, 
Willoughby too suffers under the weight of his subjective incoherence. In a frenzied meeting 
with Elinor, brought on by his concern about Marianne’s illness, Willoughby admits to an 
“insensible” heart (226), to not knowing “what it was to love” (227), to a deliberate penchant for 
romantic indifference (231), and to a misguided devotion to “riches . . . and expensive society” 
(229). Although this lack of introspection does not ultimately prohibit him from realizing 
“domestic felicity”—the narrator assures us that “[h]is wife was not always out of humour, nor 
his home always uncomfortable”—it does produce in him prolonged feelings of “envy” and 
“regret” (268-69). It also prevents him from achieving financial independence, his aunt refusing, 
based on his bad conduct, to will him the family’s estate. Thus, Willoughby serves to remind the 
reader of the importance of contemplative self-awareness, enlightened self-interest, and social 
duty in the private marketplace. Yet, he also, in his rather benign downfall (especially as 
compared to that of Richardson’s Lovelace and Smith’s Delamere) and subjective stasis, 
represents the reality of the period’s gendered politics and the truth of male privilege. 
Austen offers a counter to the courtship experience of Marianne and Willoughby in that 
of Elinor and Edward. Like Austen’s couple of excess, these figures also fail to come to a firm 
understanding about the status of their relationship; yet, Elinor’s rational pragmatism and 
Edward’s attention to duty allow them to manage safely the perils of private contract. The 
narrative conflict for these characters arises, as it did for their counterparts, out of ill-defined 
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contractual intention. Throughout much of the novel, Edward is clandestinely contracted to Lucy 
Steele. Nevertheless, his external conduct toward Elinor suggests to her and others an internal 
promissory intent. “Your behaviour was certainly very wrong,” Elinor chastises him after the 
two reunite, “because—to say nothing of my own conviction, our relations were all led away by 
it to fancy and expect what, as you were then situated, could never be” (260). Edward, for his 
part, “plead[s] an ignorance of his own heart”: “I was simple enough to think, that because my 
faith was plighted to another, there could be no danger in my being with you. . . . I felt that I 
admired you, but I told myself it was only friendship ” (260). Where Elinor diverges from 
Marianne is in her ability to check her romantic desire and reserve judgment on Edward’s 
contractual will. The narrator reveals that “[s]he was far from depending on that result of his 
preference of her, which her mother and sister still considered as certain” (19) and Elinor herself 
states that she is “by no means assured of his regard for [her]” (18). Where Edward diverges 
from Willoughby is in his dedication to romantic promise-keeping. Although disinherited for and 
disillusioned in his initial marital choice, he remains committed to a marriage with Lucy. As he 
informs Elinor, “I thought it my duty . . . independent of my feelings, to give her [Lucy] the 
option of continuing the engagement or not” (259). Thus, when Lucy jilts Edward for his brother 
Robert, he and Elinor are morally free to contract with one another. 
More sensible than sensuous this courtship narrative sketches the moral boundaries of 
late-eighteenth-century contractual exchange. In Elinor, Austen demonstrates that awareness of 
self and other prevents the more flexible boundaries of liberal subjectivity from interfering with 
and transgressing the more restrictive boundaries of social subjectivity. In Edward, she 
emphasizes the value of submitting one’s liberal desires to society’s deeply vested interest in 
contractual expectation. While we are not privy to all of the negotiations that lead-up to the 
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marriage between Elinor and Edward, the narrator assures us that they were ideal: “brought 
together by mutual affection, with the warmest approbation of their real friends, their intimate 
knowledge of each other seemed to make their happiness certain” (261). Equal, voluntary, and 
informed, the domestic contract between this hero and heroine validates what it is to interact 
responsibly in a classically-conversant private sphere.   
Ultimately, Austen’s investigation of the marriage market recalls the practical concerns 
of classical liberal philosophers, who understood the realities of nascent liberal subjecthood and 
sought to dispel them through education or contain them through legal regulation. The novel 
functions as a conduct book for market relations, with the status-bound secondary characters 
demonstrating the importance of free will and voluntary consent in marriage and the liberated 
primary characters showing the importance of equal, rational, informed, and sympathetic 
autonomous exchange. The narrative’s significance as an educative tool is reinforced by the 
sustained absence of civil law as a body of protection and redress in domestic contract. Indeed, 
the legal silences remain even at this late-point in the long century, confirming the law’s 
impenetrability on matters of marital formation and promissory breach. Consequently, Austen 
suggests a scheme of social regulation. David Kaufmann persuasively argues that for Austen 
(and many of her historical contemporaries) such regulation begins with manners, because they 
“are the laws that govern the face-to-face interactions that constitute civil society” (388). Of 
particular importance, Kaufmann contends, is the courtesy of “acknowledgement” (391-92): in a 
world that supports the “private nature of the individual,” he argues, “public admissions [are] 
imperative. If we cannot read others’ minds, we have to be able to trust their words and their 
actions” (391-92). I would add to this that the novel admonishes market participants to monitor 
closely marriage negotiations and to work reasonably within the values by which they are 
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socially encoded. In the end, Austen contributes to and refines a long list of domestic narratives 
seeking to understand and to shape what it means to contract marriage in a world where status 
and duty are rapidly becoming displaced by individual will and desire and where the laws 
charged with protecting those entangled in the morass of patriarchal obligation and 
unencumbered self-interest are rendered inaccessible and ineffective.  
Conclusion 
Many scholars agree that in eighteenth-century England liberal subjectivity began to 
subvert patriarchal subjectivity and the self-governing individual began to displace the socially-
determined subject. A corollary is contract law’s transformation from principles that valued 
status and duty to a theory emphasizing equality and autonomy. Indeed, the publicly contracting 
subject begins to emerge in eighteenth-century jurisprudence as a fully rational, self-determined, 
and self-aware individual, one whose market-based relationships are voluntarily created and are 
entirely defined by the mutual will and intention of their constituents. The privately contracting 
subject also takes on some of these liberal qualities, though his position is highly contested in 
contemporaneous legal documents. Whether men and women negotiating the marriage contract 
are capable of properly exercising their rights underlies much of the parliamentary debates over 
Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, and informs judicial opinion in breach of promise of marriage cases. 
It became the province of literature and, in particular, the domestic novel to expose the fictitious 
nature of the assumptions that were shaping classical contract theory, as well as cautiously to 
authenticate them. Indeed, what emerges in the eighteenth-century domestic novel is a courtship 
process that values the autonomy of the participants, but also contemplates duty to self and 
others as an indicator of rational and enlightened contracting.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE FICTIONS OF MARITAL UNIFICATION 
The eighteenth-century domestic novel is not only concerned with the pressures and 
fictions of courtship; it also is deeply interested in the vicissitudes of marriage. For many 
protagonists, inhabiting the marital space is as difficult as engendering it, because the ideological 
and legal tensions that influenced their experience of marital formation remain to shape the 
conditions of unification. The novels’ heroines are at a particular disadvantage, as their efforts to 
establish a nuptial union that promotes personal autonomy and relational well-being are 
continuously frustrated by the demands of a legal system chiefly defined by patriarchal and 
patrilineal values. Of interest here are four long-century novels that feature heroines caught (to 
varying degrees) between the dictates of individual right and the laws of marital obligation: 
Daniel Defoe’s Roxana (1724), Eliza Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless (1751), France Burney’s 
Cecilia (1782), and Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813). Presenting narratives that 
interrogate women’s position within marriage, these novels provide a cultural context for 
assessing, both contemporaneously and historically, the legal precepts that substitute the 
liberality of formation for the status of unification.  
 This chapter places the aforementioned literary works in dialogue with the laws that 
define marriage post-contract execution—in other words, the laws that determine the rights and 
duties of husbands and wives. Part I outlines the precepts and foundations of the common law of 
coverture, with a particular focus on “unity of person,” the principal fiction by which this law 
was defined. The section also introduces the political and legal tensions over the meaning of 
marriage and married women’s legal identity in the period. Part II explores the jurisprudence 
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surrounding the development of the married woman’s separate estate, an equitable regime that 
signaled a departure from some of coverture’s most restrictive covenants. This examination 
reveals that England’s legal culture, though committed to establishing married women’s property 
rights, was ambivalent about the scope and potentially liberalizing effect of those rights. It also 
demonstrates that the law, as an institution, was uncertain about the extent to which it was 
willing to accommodate a new and more progressive approach to marital unity. Part III explores 
the domestic novel’s engagement with shifting cultural perspectives on the conditions of 
marriage. I argue that this literature operates as a forum for adjudicating the utility and ethics of 
legal conceptions of marital unity, and I demonstrate how the representative texts work at 
progressively sophisticated levels and in different generic forms to imagine a matrimonial 
“oneness” that operates outside of the common law. The early- to mid-century novels—in their 
biographical forms—offer a vision of unity that seeks to upend the traditional marital hierarchy, 
but that vision is complicated by strains of conservative feminine ideology. The later-century 
texts—both novels of manners—conceive of unity of person in strictly egalitarian terms, but it is 
only Austen’s Pride and Prejudice that successfully preserves the individuality and autonomy of 
its espoused participants. 
Part I: A Return to Status 
Marriage in eighteenth-century England retained only a vestige of its sacramental 
character, and its religious foundations were being displaced by the principles of secular 
contract.69 Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, which severely limited the scope of ecclesiastical 
                                                 
69 For a comprehensive discussion of historical developments in Western conceptions of marriage, see Witte. John 
Witte locates the movement away from a “sacramental model of marriage” in the sixteenth-century and the 
Protestant Reformation (218), and he charts marriage’s subsequent conceptual development through social, 
covenantal, commonwealth, and contractarian models (113-323). 
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jurisdiction over marriage formation, might be understood as a legal manifestation of this 
conceptual transition. Returning for a moment to the 1753 House of Commons debates on the 
HMA, we see parliamentarians locked in a debate over marriage’s core meaning. Certain of the 
Act’s opponents argued that marriage retained a special religious quality that required 
ecclesiastical superintendence. M.P. Nugent, for instance, found “the marriage contract” to be 
the most obvious example of “a religious and sacred engagement amongst mortals” and advised 
that “to remove . . . even that superstitious character of sanctity” was not only to license 
“transgress[ions] of the marriage vow,” but also to undermine “religion itself” (Cobbett’s 15: 12-
13). The Act’s supporters, on the other hand, argued that ecclesiastical law on marriage 
formation reflected an earlier period of “popery, ignorance, and superstition” (15: 8-9) and 
“add[ed] a sanctity to the marriage contract” that was in contravention of the public good (15: 
7).70 The HMA, they contended, would remedy this doctrine of religious excess by treating 
marriage as a civil agreement. With the Act’s passage, therefore, the idea of marriage as a 
secular construct gained legal and, we might assume, social traction.  
The notion of marriage as a civil contract found authority in the Enlightenment 
philosophy of John Locke.71 In Second Treatise of Government, Locke envisions “[c]onjugal 
society” as a “voluntary compact between man and woman,” one that “draws with it mutual 
support and assistance, and a communion of interests” (133; sec. 78). For Locke, the terms of 
marriage are settled by this compact: in other words, it is the province of the husband and wife to 
determine, through mutual agreement, how to enact their marriage (135; sec. 83).72 As John 
                                                 
70 The quoted material references the remarks of A.G. Ryder. 
 
71 For a more extensive discussion of Locke’s marriage philosophy, see Witte 278-85. 
 
72 To be clear, Locke does not imagine unrestricted contractual freedom for spouses. Rather, he argues in Second 
Treatise that any agreement between them must honor the primary purpose of marriage, which is the maintenance 
and welfare of any children born thereto (133; sec. 78, and 135; sec. 83). Locke also entertains the possibility of 
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Witte observes, Locke’s nuptial philosophy is significant because it suggests “that a law of 
marriage based on contract could be valid even if God were not viewed as the founder of the 
marriage contract, nor his church engaged as an agent in its governance” (290).73 William 
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, confirms that English jurisprudence took a position similar to 
Locke on the relationship between marriage and divine authority: “Our law considers marriage in 
no other light than as a civil contract,” he wrote (1: 421). However, Blackstone’s description of 
the state’s authority over marriage post-execution demonstrates a departure from Locke’s theory 
on marital government. As described by Blackstone and other of the period’s treatise writers, the 
terms of property ownership, legal contract, and legal standing were set, not by the husband and 
wife in their contractual capacities, but by legislation, legal custom, and court precedent. Indeed, 
at the point of ceremonial exchange, lawful marriage was divested of its contractual nature and 
husband and wife experienced a return to status obligation—to a point where their identity, rights 
and obligations were defined by the state.74   
This reversion to status was effected by the common law doctrine of marital coverture, a 
medieval invention that denied married women a separate legal identity and stipulated the 
conditions under which spouses were to perform marriage. Under coverture, a married woman’s 
legal person merged into that of her husband. As she transitioned from feme sole (single female) 
to feme covert (married female), she lost the right to own, alienate, and devise property; to 
contract in her own name; and to sue or be sued independently in the common-law courts. Any 
real property that she brought to or acquired during the marriage became her husband’s to 
                                                 
restricting wives’ contractual wills (see, e.g., 135; sec. 82). For an excellent discussion of women and contract in 
Lockean philosophy, see Grant. 
 
73 Mary Lyndon Shanley offers another useful discussion of Locke’s historical influence on conceptions of marriage. 
74 Pateman offers an informative review of feminist scholarship on the tension between status and contract in 
conceptions of marriage (see 166, 154-88). She also provides a definition of status on which I drew here (166). 
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control and any personal property she possessed became his absolutely. In exchange, a married 
man was charged with providing his wife’s “necessaries” and deemed responsible for any debts 
she acquired to secure her lawful maintenance. He also was obligated to prosecute and defend 
lawsuits on her behalf and to honor her common law right to dower, which commenced upon his 
death and provided her a one-third life estate in all the real property that he owned in fee simple 
(i.e., absolutely and without condition) during the marriage.75 Although there were legal 
exceptions to and work arounds for coverture, some of which this chapter will explore, on the 
whole, it was a precept that inured to the benefit of the husband at the expense of the wife.76  
The justification for coverture developed over the centuries, but the chief explanation 
provided by lawyers, jurists, and treatise writers was the legal fiction “unity of person.”77 This 
fiction posited husband and wife as “one person”—the husband—and, in the medieval and early 
modern periods, rested on Biblical scripture and natural law constructs: specifically, Old 
Testament references to spouses as “one flesh” and Biblical passages on wifely submission, as 
well as the idea that women were, by nature, subordinate to men.78 For example, Sir Henry 
Bracton, in On the Laws and Customs of England (circa. 1220-1250), variously describes 
                                                 
75 For a succinct, but informative, description of a widow’s dower rights, see Spring 40-41. 
 
76 For additional descriptions of coverture law, see Blackstone 1: 430-33; Baker 483-89; Greenberg 172-75; and 
Stretton and Kesselring 6-9.  
 
77 Tim Stretton (“Coverture and Unity of Person”), Sara Butler (“Discourse on the Nature of Coverture”), and 
Maeve Doggett (62-99) each provide critical reflections on the historical relationship between coverture and marital 
unity. Together, these scholars argue that unity of person was secondary to cultural ideas about male power in 
coverture-related discourse until at least the seventeenth century; yet, all concede that references to unity of person 
abound in medieval and early modern legal texts.  
 
78 See, e.g., Baker 483-84; and Doggett 74-86. The principal Scripture implicated in early discussions of unity of 
person include the following: “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: 
and they shall be one flesh” (King James Bible, Gen. 2.24); “Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy 
sorowe and thy conception. In sorrow thou shalt bring forth children: and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and hee 
shall rule over thee” (Gen. 3.16); and “Wives, submit your selves unto your owne husbands, as it is fit in the Lord” 
(Col. 3.18). 
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husband and wife as “one flesh,” “one flesh though different souls,” and “one flesh and one 
blood” (4: 84, 3: 129, 4: 142, and 4: 335), and decrees that the husband “rules his wife” while 
she acts “under [his] rod” (4: 335, 4: 287, and 2: 36). Centuries later, Justice Robert Hyde, in 
Manby v. Scott (1659), opined on the divine origins of unity of person and, consequently, of 
coverture:  
In the beginning when God created woman an helpmate for man, he said ‘They twain 
shall be one flesh;’ and thereupon our law says, that husband and wife are but one person 
in the law: presently after the Fall, the judgment of God upon woman was ‘Thy desire 
shall be to thy husband, for thy will shall be subject to thy husband and he shall rule over 
thee.’ Hereupon our law put the wife sub potestate viri [i.e., under the authority of] [her 
husband] . . ., and she is disabled to make any grant, contract, or bargain, without the 
allowance or consent of her husband. (783)  
 
An early eighteenth-century legal treatise, Baron and Feme (1719), similarly enlists the “Law of 
Nature” and the “Law of God” to justify a wife’s “Obedience” and the surrender of her “Will” to 
her husband through coverture (7 and 9). As her husband’s spiritual, moral, intellectual, and 
physical inferior, these commentators suggested, the wife merited and benefitted from the 
fictitious existential bond.  Moreover, in affirming such conceptions of marital unity, the 
common law preserved God’s male-centered vision for domestic government.  
Yet, religious tradition and social custom were not the only authorities through which 
unity of person achieved cultural legitimacy. Recently, Tim Stretton has argued that Blackstone 
himself authorized a modern understanding of the concept, imbuing the fiction with a distinctly 
contractual character for the eighteenth century and beyond. The celebrated treatise writer and 
jurist describes marital unity and its relationship to coverture as follows:  
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she 
performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme covert; is said to be 
covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; 
and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of an 
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union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights and duties, and 
disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. (1: 430) 
 
Stretton, who reads this passage in its larger theoretical context, contends that Blackstone 
connected marital unity and coverture to “the liberty of the individual” (120). By denying 
coverture’s natural law foundations and either rejecting or remaining silent on issues of 
“masculine power,” female submission, and domestic violence, the jurist presented marriage law 
as a product of reasoned liberal compromise: wives ceded their “natural liberty” for “the price of 
the marital bond that made them as one with their husbands” (Stretton 120-122). Nonetheless, 
Stretton concludes that Blackstone’s use of unity of person was ideologically motivated: he 
sought only “to justify the status quo” and in so doing, “helped to shelter the [traditional] rules of 
coverture from discussions of the liberty and freedom of the individual” (126-27).79 Therefore, 
even a “liberal” interpretation of unity of person functioned as a fictional substructure for 
denying married women legal agency and contractual power.  
Notwithstanding Blackstone’s efforts to maintain coverture’s legitimacy, eighteenth-
century law affecting married women was changing—and arguably modernizing. The Court of 
Chancery, tasked with “correct[ing] and control[ling] [the municipal laws] when they do 
amiss,”80 began to recognize a married woman’s right to own and alienate separate property, 
                                                 
79 Scholarship on the origins and meaning of the legal fiction of unity of person is complicated and conflicting, and 
Stretton departs from historical discourse that locates the fiction’s foundation in Genesis 2.24 and in cultural ideas 
about women’s subordination to men. Instead, Stretton argues that unity of person was an entirely separate concept, 
one that “was employed in a series of metaphors and rarely represented the same way twice” in legal literature (116-
17). In Stretton’s view, Blackstone provided the fiction with stable meaning and reconfigured it as the primary 
justification for coverture. No matter how one interprets the origins and breadth of unity of person, however, the fact 
is that references to husband and wife as “one person under the law” abound in legal writing from medieval times 
on, demonstrating the importance of the fiction to the law setting forth married persons’ rights and responsibilities. 
Moreover, the fiction’s consequences for married women in the eighteenth century remain unchanged whether we 
understand it to arise out of patriarchal or liberal ideology. 
 
80 This quote is from A Treatise of Equity (5-6; bk. 1, ch. 1), the author of which is sometimes referred to as Henry 
Ballow. There is no author listed for the edition cited herein, however. 
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both real and personal, and to receive pecuniary payments, or pin money. This retreat from 
established common law is significant for thinking about whether and to what degree 
conceptions of marriage and of women’s position in relation to men were changing in the period, 
and it is crucial for understanding the influence and function of the legal fiction unity of person. 
Does this equitable doctrine suggest marriage was becoming a more egalitarian enterprise? That 
status was being subverted by contract in marriage’s execution phase? Does the jurisprudence 
indicate that women were escaping paternal and patriarchal ideas about their subordinate roles 
within the family and English society? That liberal selfhood was being extended to the feme 
covert?  Should we understand the law as revising the fiction of unity of person to account for 
the burgeoning “reality” of the liberal individual?  
Part II: Unity of Person and Key Developments in Equitable Property Law 
For some decades now, historians and feminist scholars interested in early modern 
marriage have debated the significance of equitable exceptions to the common law of coverture. 
Classic social historians, such as Lawrence Stone, Randolph Trumbach, and Alan MacFarlane, 
have connected married women’s property rights to a larger cultural shift in perspectives on 
marriage and the family. For these scholars, property ownership and income management by 
wives suggests a movement from the traditional and patriarchal toward the egalitarian and 
companionate.81 Stone, for example, maintains that “[t]he hardest evidence for a decline in the 
near-absolute authority of the husband over the wife among the propertied classes is an 
admittedly limited series of changes in the power of the former to control the latter’s estate and 
income” (221). Feminist scholars, such as Susan Staves, Susan Moller Okin, and Eileen Spring, 
                                                 
81 See Stone, Family, Sex and Marriage 217-224; Trumbach 83-84, 116-17; and Macfarlane 287-90. As an aside, 
Macfarlane appears to see this shift occurring much earlier in English history than Stone and Trumbach. 
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have challenged these conclusions, arguing instead that the period’s equitable legal 
developments provided women little autonomy and more often had the effect of reinforcing 
patriarchal values. Married women’s separate property (“MWSP”), they contend, was primarily a 
mechanism either for the paternalistic safeguarding of women and their children or for 
preserving the patriline.82 While these dichotomous assessments of the relationship among 
MWSP rights, domestic government, and female liberality clearly reveal a historical 
ambivalence about equity law’s contributions to social change, they also implicitly evoke 
questions about the function of unity of person, specifically whether and how it influenced 
jurisprudential change.  
The Marriage Settlement  
To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the legal texts through which 
MWSP was instantiated and adjudicated,83 beginning with the primary instrument through which 
married women acquired separate property or a fixed income: the pre-, or sometimes post-, 
nuptial settlement agreement.84 Reproductions of these agreements are included in the period’s 
                                                 
82 See Staves 221-22; Okin passim; and Spring 121, 181-86. See also Karen Pearlston whose dissertation, according 
to the Abstract, “is a study of exceptions to coverture and their reception in the common law courts in the last half of 
the eighteenth century” (iv). Included in Pearlston’s project is an investigation of married women’s separate 
property rights.  
 
83 Other scholars, including some of the historians and feminist scholars cited herein, also have reviewed form 
marriage contracts, judicial opinion, and legal commentary in their examinations of the legal and social significance 
of MWSP. Here, I contribute to their excellent work by investigating the specific implications of this writing for one 
of the most prominent legal fictions in Anglo-American history. 
 
84 Apparently, there were two types of agreements used to establish a married woman’s property or income rights: 
the marriage articles and the marriage settlement. My research suggests that marriage articles were executed prior to 
the marriage and generally confirmed in a pre- or post-nuptial settlement agreement. In fact, many of the settlement 
agreements that appear in the conveyancing manuals reference a previous “treaty,” which I have taken to mean the 
marriage articles. To avoid confusion, I will refer to all contracts that address property and inheritance rights 
between spouses as settlement agreements.  For a discussion of marriage articles and marriage settlements, see 
Atherley 81-150; chs. vi-ix. 
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conveyancing manuals, with party names and property descriptions either altered or omitted.85 
Generally, the contracts are among three parties—intended husband, intended wife, and the 
wife’s trustees—and are supported by consideration that includes the marriage itself.86 The 
documents, while ranging in breadth and depth, use standard language to establish the bride’s 
property rights: a statement conveying the property, real or personal, to the trustees, is followed 
by a statement reserving the property for the intended wife’s use and excluding it from the 
intended husband’s control.87 Additionally, many agreements include language that grants to the 
wife the power to dispose of the property during the marriage or upon her death, and some also 
provide for marital and post-marital maintenance in the forms of pin money and jointure. This 
latter provision, which typically took the form of an annuity due upon the husband’s death, was 
elected in lieu of the wife’s common law right to dower.88 Finally, many settlements stipulated 
the inheritance rights and marital portions of future children and, if there was a family estate, the 
terms for its transmission. Although the agreements were primarily useful to parties vested of 
material property or wealth, the conveyancing manuals include contracts for those in the 
merchant and professional classes, thereby demonstrating that they were not unique to elite 
families. Such manuals, therefore, help us better understand how individual couples from across 
                                                 
85 I consulted a number of conveyancing manuals for this project. The two to which I specifically refer are 
Horsman’s Precedents in Conveyancing and Bird’s Original Precedents of Settlements. 
 
86 The bride and groom’s family members also occasionally appear as parties to these agreements: fathers, sons, and 
even mothers might undertake the role of trustee, or parents might assume the position of contractual obligor or 
beneficiary. 
 
87 To be clear, not all eighteenth-century settlement agreements provided separate property or income to the wife. 
Some only contemplated the widow’s inheritance rights, or the inheritance or property rights of husbands and 
children. 
 
88 As noted in Part I, a widow’s dower right encompassed a one-third life interest in the real property that her 
husband held in fee simple at any point during the marriage. In the eighteenth century, it was commonplace to 
forego this right in favor of equitable jointure, which husbands and wives could attach to any marital property, 
personal or real.  
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the social spectrum, along with their lawyers, implemented the common law doctrine of 
coverture and approached the traditional, patriarchal assumptions underlying unity of person.  
The typical eighteenth-century conveyancing manual was a compilation of transactional 
documents by legal specialists and served as a reference guide for non-specialist lawyers. Gilbert 
Horsman’s three-volume Precedents in Conveyancing (1744), for example, is comprised of 
early- to mid-century “Draughts” composed by “the most eminent Practisers in this Branch of 
Law” (1: 1). Its forty-four marriage agreements vary in length, complexity, and focus. Some 
agreements are entirely concerned with the wife’s property and inheritance rights, while others 
address the rights and duties of husbands, wives, parents, elder sons, and younger children. Like 
Horsman’s Precedents, James Barry Bird’s Original Precedents of Settlements (1800) contains 
pre- and post-nuptial contracts by the day’s “most distinguished” practitioners. Nevertheless, 
Bird distinguishes his text from that of Horsman and other “precedents of established authority” 
by arguing that the edited agreements in his collection are an improvement in content and style 
(v-vi). Indeed, he maintains that his (ostensibly) late-century form settlements account for the 
period’s advancements in jurisprudence and professional standards. Yet, Bird’s claims to render 
“more neat and intelligible” the once “barbarous and uncouth” rhetoric of conveyancing and to 
correct “the defects and inaccuracies of former settlements” (vi-vii) are undercut by the manual’s 
many circuitous and inarticulate entries, as well as by the inclusion of separate property clauses 
that are, for the most part, duplicative of Horsman’s. The rhetorical parallels across manuals, 
therefore, indicate the sustained complexity of the economic transactions collateral to marriage, 
and they suggest that the essential terms of equitable exchange remained relatively stable 
throughout the century. 
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Of principal interest here are settlement provisions that establish the wife’s separate 
estate. Horsman’s 1733 agreement among the fictitious Bona Brown, Arthur Autry, and trustees 
exemplifies the standard terms for exempting married women from the proprietary disabilities of 
coverture. This seven-page pre-nuptial contract secures property in trust for the intended wife’s, 
Brown’s, use and disposal during marriage, and it binds the intended husband, Autry, to a 
jointure equivalent to one-third of his real and personal estate. The agreement first details the 
property at issue (i.e., real estate leases, bank stocks, and East-India bonds that Brown inherited 
from her father) and recites the proffered consideration (i.e., “the said intended Marriage . . . and 
. . . the Sum of 10 s.” (2: 75)). Later clauses record the asset transfer into trust and set forth the 
operative terms for the property’s settlement on Brown:    
[Trustees] . . . shall and do from Time to Time, . . . pay and dispose of the clear yearly 
Interest, Rents, Profits, Dividends and Produce of the said Messuages or Tenements, 
Hereditaments, Bonds, Stock and Premises . . . unto such Person or Persons, and to and 
for such Uses and Purposes, and in such Parts and Proportions, Manner and Form, as she 
the same Bona Brown shall from Time to Time, notwithstanding her Coverture, by any 
Note or Writing under her Hand direct or appoint; to the intent that the same may not be 
at the Disposal of, or subject or liable to the Control, Debts or Engagements of said 
Arthur Autry her intended husband, but only at her own sole and separate Disposal; And 
in Default of, and until such Direction and Appointment, to the proper Hands of her said 
Bona Brown . . . to and for her own sole and separate Use and Benefit. (2: 76; with the 
exception of party names, emphasis added)  
 
The agreement further reserves to Brown absolutely the power to dispose of her separate estate: 
[Trustees] . . . shall and do assign, transfer, and dispose of all and every [of the separate 
property] . . . as she the said Bona Brown shall from Time to Time, notwithstanding her 
Coverture and whether she shall be sole or married, by any Writing or Writings under 
her Hand and Seal, attested by two or more credible Witnesses, or by her Last Will and 
Testament in Writing, . . . direct, limit, give or appoint the same, or any Part thereof; to 
the Intent that the same … may not be at the disposal of, or subject or liable to the 
Controul, Debts or Engagements of the said Arthur Autry her intended husband, but only 
at her own sole and separate Disposal. (2: 76; with the exception of party names, 
emphasis added)  
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The settlement concludes with a description of the rules for trustee administration and 
substitution, as well as Autry’s jointure provision for Brown. 
The rhetoric of this early-century agreement reveals that early modern lawyers negotiated 
conflicting ideologies as they developed the terms of MWSP. On the one hand, the language 
conferring on the wife a right to “direct,” to “appoint,” and to “use” the income from trust 
holdings, as well as the language vesting her with the right of asset disposition, implies a quasi-
liberal agenda for female subjectivity. As the wife’s property rights are deemed “sole and 
separate,” independent from the husband’s “controul, debts, or engagements” and inclusive of 
the power to compel trustee action, so her person is framed as an autonomous, free-willing legal 
agent. Moreover, the settlement’s repetitive contractual jargon reinforces the feme covert’s 
proprietary powers, each list of directive verbs, descriptive nouns, and instructive statements 
creating another layer of female authority and another line of equitable defense. This effort to 
restore to the married woman the fundamental rights of ownership acts not only to challenge the 
terms of coverture, but also to trouble the traditional meaning of unity of person: here, marital 
unification proceeds without absolute female subordination to male legal identity. Yet, the 
property’s disposition in trust, and its superintendence by third-party trustees, reflects demands 
for paternalistic oversight and manages patriarchal concerns about female ownership post-
marriage. In fact, the mere inclusion of trustees as equal parties to the agreement suggests that 
the law was unwilling to break unity of person of its traditional chains without some assurance of 
masculine control.   
This ideological conflict persists in the late-century agreements that appear in Bird’s 
Original Precedents. One model settlement, for example, transfers into trust—and places under 
the immediate control of third-party trustees—certain of the intended wife’s real and personal 
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property, including an unnamed estate, as well as “bonds, bills, notes, and other securities” (1). 
Its author uses language almost identical to that employed in the Autry-Brown agreement to 
establish the separate estate: the wife’s income is “for her sole and separate use and benefit”; she 
may “direct” or “appoint” income assignees; and she is to be unencumbered by the husband’s 
“debts, controul, or engagements” (4). She also is entitled to the “sole and separate use” of the 
property that comes to her through gift or devise after the marriage (see 7-8). The agreement 
diverges from the Autry-Brown settlement, however, in the end of life provision. Here, unlike 
Brown’s fundamental right of alienation in regard to her separate estate, the intended wife agrees 
that her separate property—both personal and real—will remain in trust for her future children’s 
use and benefit. On its face, this restriction to filial distribution invokes conservative tradition; 
yet, the intricacies of the clause reveal some degree of liberal intention. The intended wife and 
future mother, “alone, and notwithstanding her coverture,” is empowered to control the terms of 
matrilineal descent: she determines each child’s heritable portion and specifies the conditions, 
including the age, time, and manner, under which the portions will be distributed (10, 3-4). 
Reserving such authority in the mother is a significant departure from English common law: as 
per Blackstone, mothers were “entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect” (1: 441). 
Therefore, the contractual language that constrains wives also grants them self-determination as 
mothers—they are simultaneously subject to, and empowered by, familial obligation. Ultimately, 
these tensions between women’s rights and patriarchy’s authority demonstrate that coverture and 
its authorizing fiction are, even at the century’s turn, equivocal ideas at law.  
Two additional settlement provisions that are crucial to understanding the uncertainty in 
legal thought on coverture and unity of person are those that grant the intended wife marital and 
post-marital annuities. Referred to as “pin money” and “jointure,” respectively, these annual 
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payments were fixed in the contract, often at a percentage of the bride’s dowry.89 An early-
century agreement included in Horsman models these provisions for a married women’s 
equitable estate. The thirteen-page document begins with a description of intended wife Celia 
Row’s £12,000 marriage-portion, which is to be divided between intended husband Adam Arden 
and his trustees, and concludes with the terms upon which Arden will raise portions for the 
couple’s future children. Interposed is boilerplate language that identifies the consideration for 
the two annuities—i.e., the marriage portion paid by intended mother-in-law Ruth Row—and 
that creates the annuities themselves. The language that stipulates Celia Row’s right to pin 
money requires the payments be made at specific quarterly intervals and that they be available 
“notwithstanding her Coverture, for her own sole and separate Use and Benefit, for her Cloaths 
and other [of] her Ocasions as she shall think fit, without the Controul or Intermeddling of the 
said Adam Arden her intended husband” (2: 293; with the exception of party names, emphasis 
added). In this provision, the general language of female agency and subjective independence 
mirrors that of the separate estate provisions; however, there are particular differences indicating 
that the marital annuity is a more circumscribed right. One distinction is a consequence of the 
property type: a fixed annuity, payable in four equal installments on four specified dates and tied 
to a dowry provision, offers a more regulated independence than an indefinite (and likely 
greater) amount payable at the beneficiary’s request. The other difference is the inclusion of 
conditional language following the ostensibly broad grant of “separate Use”—the wife’s pin 
money is restricted, it appears, to purchases of apparel, accessories, and the like. Row’s 
provision for jointure during widowhood bears a similar ambivalence. It too assigns fixed terms 
                                                 
89 In a review of marriage settlements and corresponding paperwork, Spring found that the common ratio of jointure 
to bridal portion in the eighteenth century was 10% (50-51). Thus, for a £100 jointure, the bride and her family 
would have had to provide a £1,000 dowry. 
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to the payments (2: 294), which could be understood as a limitation on the widow’s reinstated 
legal autonomy (no longer united to a husband, she technically has returned to feme sole status). 
But, it also allots Row considerable legal remedies for late payments, including the right to 
confiscate or to “enter, . . . have, hold and enjoy” the property to which the jointure is attached 
(2: 294-95). These remedial rights demonstrate a concerted effort on the part of the agreement’s 
parties to protect and encourage the widow’s independence.   
A comparison of Bird’s late-century annuity provisions to that of Horsman’s early-
century ones demonstrates both similarities and differences in how husbands and wives, and their 
lawyers, structured pin-money and jointure rights across the century. One complex post-nuptial 
agreement, which spans twenty-three pages, includes marital annuity language that is, at points, 
interchangeable with that of the Arden-Row agreement. As with the earlier settlement, Bird’s 
agreement contains a clause that grants to the wife £300 in pin money “for her sole and separate 
use, exclusive of the said Husband, who is not to intermeddle therewith” (139). The provision 
also contemplates the wife’s ability to assign—i.e., “direct or appoint”—the income “as if she 
were sole and unmarried,” and it sets forth in detail the quarterly payment schedule (139-40). 
Unlike Horsman’s model provision, however, Bird’s clause does not include the potentially 
restrictive language on pin money use, an omission that could suggest progressive development 
in the area. Nonetheless, omissions in the agreement’s post-marital annuity clause indicate a 
contraction of rights. Like the Arden-Row agreement, Bird’s model contract includes language 
granting to the wife a jointure in lieu of her common law dower right, but the exact sum, which 
is tied to the variable interest income on trust property (property that she cannot sell or otherwise 
dispose of), is not fixed (143). Without a stated amount (or the right to alienate the assets that 
comprise the jointure fund), there is no guarantee that she will receive enough income to inhabit 
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her social class. Moreover, and further inconsistent with Arden-Row, this agreement lacks a 
payment schedule, as well as language outlining the widow’s remedies in cases of non- or late-
payment. Importantly, this absence of rhetorical specificity surrounding equitable jointure is not 
confined to this one agreement; rather it is a feature of most other of Bird’s jointure provisions, 
suggesting that either late-century professionals were making an innocuous attempt to economize 
legal text or there was an institutional effort to limit the widow’s ability to receive and manage 
her maintenance.  
These linguistic consistencies, discrepancies, and shifts demonstrate that the ideological 
tensions that pervade the separate property provisions of the Autry-Brown agreement and its 
late-century counterpart likewise inhabit the annuity provisions of the Arden-Row settlement and 
its subsequent correlative. The pin money clauses, with their applications to the vocabulary of 
female autonomy—“sole and separate,” “exclusive,” “without the control,” “direct or appoint”—
reiterate the wife as a quasi-liberal subject; while the requirement of trustee management and the 
proximate relationship between annuity and marriage portion perpetuate her traditional position 
as female subordinate and marital commodity. This legal equivocation on female subjectivity is 
further suggested in the early-century subclause connecting pin money to apparel and other basic 
necessities. Certainly, such language could be interpreted as narrowing the scope of wifely 
independence, or even as relieving the husband of his common law duty of wifely maintenance.90  
Moreover, this legal drafting could imply a professional intention to leave the traditional ideas of 
marital unity intact. The rhetoric of the jointure provisions, and in particular the latter 
settlement’s exclusions and ambiguities, also suggests conceptive and professional tensions: the 
terms of the widow’s post-marital income posit her simultaneously as a self-governing subject 
                                                 
90 Staves discusses pin money as a substitution for the husband’s common law duty to maintain his wife (143-47). 
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and as a potential legal dependent, and they reveal the law as complicit in a fracturing of the 
female self.  
Yet it is the contextual conditions of these particular equitable provisions that most 
clearly register the law’s ambivalence on the point of wifely autonomy and, consequently, the 
terms of marital unity. Indeed, the extensive historical work of feminist scholars on MWSP 
indicates that equitable jointure generated less income for the widow than did the common law 
right of dower, and it argues that the substitution of jointure for dower was in large part driven 
by patrilineal concerns, specifically the desire to transmit to male heirs a family estate 
unencumbered by female dower rights.91 Moreover, this scholarship maintains that pin money 
was most often used to purchase necessaries or “amusements,” and that its inclusion in the 
marriage settlement was a token gesture by the “husband’s family” who wanted to secure 
“jointure and other features advantageous to their side” (Staves 132, 160). The point here is that 
the eighteenth-century trend toward marital and post-marital annuities for women is not a clear 
indication of full bore progressive professional innovation nor is it a decided reflection of radical 
institutional change on the contours of marriage’s legal fiction. While the period’s lawyers 
sought, through separate property provisions, to reduce the stultifying impact of marital 
coverture on women, their commitment to a liberalized version of marital unity is highly 
debatable.  
In fact, eighteenth-century equitable work product suggests that legal professionals were 
seeking to accommodate a third iteration of legal unity, specifically the notion that marriage is a 
union of estates.  In this view, the marriage settlement operates not just to provide MWSP but 
also to combine two family’s assets, whether capital, moveable, or landed. This is particularly 
                                                 
91 See Spring 57, 39-65; Staves 86, 95-130; and Erickson 25. 
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true of agreements among members of the aristocracy and gentry, who often came to the 
marriage with significant fortunes and extensive estates. H.J. Habakkuk, in a study of eighteenth-
century settlement agreements, famously (and somewhat controversially) argues a material 
connection between marriage—“always a most effective method of acquiring more property”—
and the “rate of growth of great estates” in the period (“Marriage Settlements,” 25, 29).92 To 
support his thesis, the historian cites a rise in the standard amount of bridal portions, which could 
be used to purchase additional land (22, 24-26), the “increasing flexibility” of jointure rights (27, 
24-26), which allowed the groom to adjust the bride’s inheritance according to his income, and 
the development of the strict settlement, which not only restricted the alienability of the family 
estate but also preserved it in the male line.93 For Habakkuk, these settlement devices suggest an 
upper class view of marriage primarily concerned with wealth aggregation and, presumably, the 
continuity of the patriline. Whether familial and professional motives were this mercenary is 
arguable. Nonetheless, Habakkuk’s work offers an important alternative—or supplement—to the 
ideas of marital unity as a patriarchal (coverture) or a liberal (MWSP rights) concept, further 
problematizing the direction of the law’s perspective on the fiction.  
Married Women’s Separate Property in Equity 
Early eighteenth-century equitable case law on MWSP rights supports a fairly 
progressive view of female autonomy, coverture, and marital unity. The mere fact that the Court 
of Chancery recognized such rights in contravention of the common law doctrine of coverture 
                                                 
92 See also Habakkuk, “English Landownership, 1680-1740.” Habakkuk’s scholarship has received an abundance of 
critical attention. For an excellent assessment of the historian’s arguments regarding marriage, the strict settlement, 
and the “‘rise of great estates,’” see Bonfield 93-120.   
 
93 This latter settlement, which typically occurred at the eldest son’s marriage, placed the family estate in trust and 
gave the future husband a life interest and his future eldest son the “remainder in tail” (see Habakkuk, “Marriage 
Settlements,”16). By this device, landholders were prohibited from alienating the estate, such that the ancestral 
interest could not be reduced for at least a generation.  
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demonstrates a marked interest on the part of jurists to mitigate coverture’s disabling effects on 
women. Moreover, precedential case law, such as Fettiplace v. Gorges (1789), reveals the court 
as rather liberal in its interpretation of the rights attached to the wife’s personal estate.94 In 
Fettiplace, the plaintiff husband sued to have his deceased wife’s will, which devised annuities, 
stock, and furniture to her niece, annulled. He argued that the legal instruments through which 
she was granted the property at issue—a marriage settlement and a subsequent testamentary 
will—did not expressly contemplate a “power of disposal” (374); therefore, any heritable 
bequest was outside the bounds of her equitable right. The court disagreed, upholding a strong 
line of Chancery precedent that found married women were to be treated as feme soles with 
respect to their personal property. Lord Chancellor Thurlow opined: “All the cases shew that the 
personal property, where it can be enjoyed separately, must be so with all its incidents, and jus 
disponendi [(the right of disposal)] is one of them” (375). In other words, the court held that 
explicit language creating a right of disposal is not required for a married woman to be vested 
with such right; rather, the generic language of “sole and separate use” carries with it the entirety 
of proprietary rights that she enjoyed while single.  
But, the court’s capacious perspective also cut the other way. In Hulme v. Tenant (1778), 
for example, Chancery enforced a credit bond entered into by a married woman and secured with 
her separate estate. LC Thurlow commented: “I have no doubt about this principle, that, if a 
court of equity says a feme covert may have a separate estate, the court will bind her to the whole 
extent, as to making that estate liable to her own engagements; as for instance, for payment of 
debts & c.” (961). Here, the court clarifies that feme sole privileges are accompanied by feme 
                                                 
94 See Wagstaff v. Smith (1804) and Rich v. Cockell (c. 1802, 1804), each of which confirms Fettiplace as 
controlling precedent on the issue of a wife’s power of disposal over separate personal property (705 and 647, 
respectively). 
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sole duties, such that the feme covert estate holder will be foreclosed, as to her separate property, 
from claiming coverture’s legal protections (i.e., the husband’s assumption of his wife’s debts). 
Rather than suggest the court’s injustice, however, Hulme indicates its commitment to restoring 
to the married woman a legal identity with the rights and responsibilities attendant thereon. It 
also, in conjunction with Fettiplace, suggests an equitable re-shaping of marital unity—a slight 
levelling of its previously stratified constituents.  
Perhaps the most compelling indication that jurists were progressing toward a more 
egalitarian perspective on unity of person is found in a particular subset of equitable 
jurisprudence on married women’s property rights: specifically, cases involving property of 
which a woman was or became possessed outside of the pre- and post-nuptial contract. As we 
shall see, Chancery sometimes extended its equitable treatment to property that the married 
woman acquired by gift or devise during the marriage, as well as to property in which she was 
vested prior to marriage but over which she retained no interest after marriage. Nineteenth-
century legal practitioner and treatise writer Edmond Gibson Atherley describes the court’s 
approach:  
Though the common law allows a man to possess himself of all his wife’s personal 
property, yet the courts of equity have long deemed it unreasonable that he should do so. 
They endeavor, therefore, wherever it can be done, without violating the principles of the 
common law, to procure the wife and her children a provision out of her fortune. They do 
this whenever the husband applies for their aid in order to possess himself of it; and the 
mode resorted to—is to refuse him their assistance unless he agrees to make such 
provision. (343) 
 
In the case of Brown v. Elton (1733), for example, Chancery denied the plaintiff husband’s 
petition for a £400 legacy payable to his wife upon her marriage. Instead, the court sided with the 
defendant executor who refused to turn over the bequest unless and until the husband settled a 
portion on his wife. Lord Chancellor King acknowledged that the equitable “practice” of 
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requiring a husband to “make a settlement” on his wife was in opposition to the common law and 
“sometimes . . . inconvenient” (1031). Nonetheless, he deferred to the court’s “custom and long 
usage” of the practice, which he argued was “intended . . . as a cautionary provision in favour of 
the wife” (1031). In this ruling, King appears to support the defendant’s argument that “those 
who would have equity ought to do equity” (1030).  
The court confirmed King’s opinion almost seventy years later in the case of Druce v. 
Denison (1801). Here, the principal issue was whether a pre-marriage settlement amounted to the 
“purchase” of a wife’s entire fortune, such that any property that she acquired during the 
marriage automatically devolved to her husband. Lord Chancellor Eldon, following precedent, 
held that a settlement agreement must either expressly provide or “plainly” imply a 
comprehensive dispensation of future property to the husband (1110). The import of this holding, 
as recorded in the case’s digest entry, is that it reaffirmed the principle that, unless otherwise 
provided in a “distinct agreement” between the spouses, a wife is “entitled to an additional 
provision out of [an] additional fortune” (e.g., as when she is the beneficiary, post-marriage, of 
an inheritance marked by the testator for her “sole and separate use”) (941). Together, Brown 
and Druce, and their juridical precedessors, demonstrate a court willing to establish equitable 
property rights for married women even in cases where wives had not bargained for, or received 
their husband’s explicit consent to, those rights.95 The cases also demonstrate a court seemingly 
at odds with the common law on the notion of female welfare and marital unity. Indeed, 
Chancery appears to consider some degree of material and nuptial independence as a protective 
                                                 
95 For additional cases related to property given or devised to a wife prior to or during marriage, see Harrison v. 
Buckle (c. 1719, in the Court of King’s Bench); Rollfe v. Budder (1724, in the Court of Exchequer); and Bennet v. 
Davis (1725, in the Court of Chancery).  
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advantage to married women and to charge the hegemonic presumptions underlying traditional 
conceptions of unity of person with patent unfairness.  
Chancery Court’s investment in MWSP as a protective mechanism and its interest in the 
contours of married women’s separate identity are further suggested in the infamous case of 
Strathmore v. Bowes (1788). Here, Lady Strathmore sued to have the separate property deeds 
that she executed in contemplation of a marriage proposal from Mr. Grey “carried into 
execution,” and her husband, Mr. Bowes, countersued to have “the . . . deeds delivered up or 
cancelled” (14).  Bowes, who won the Lady’s hand from Grey in a “sham duel” (15), argued that 
his wife committed fraud when she married him without reference to the extant deeds. The 
justices found for Strathmore, LC Thurlow arguing “the mere deprivation” of a husband’s 
“dominion of [his] wife’s property” did not amount to fraud; rather, there must be “something 
beyond”—specifically, a deceptive intention on the part of the wife (16). It is not, however, the 
court’s discrete holding on the nature of marital fraud that is of particular note; instead, it is the 
opinion’s dictum, which offers valuable insight into Chancery’s perspective on marriage and 
coverture. Indeed, in the non-binding portions of the opinion, both Thurlow and Buller attest to 
coverture’s legitimacy, Thurlow focusing on the wife’s property as consideration for the 
“burthens” undertaken by the husband and Buller maintaining that it is the “sui generis” 
character of the marriage contract that “entitle[s] the husband to all that the law gives him of his 
wife’s” (15). Yet, in addition to invoking legal precedent, both justices reconcile Equity’s 
departure from the common law with an investigation into the spouses’ individual characters. 
Buller argues that Bowes’s pugilistic and exploitative courtship “stratagem”—he used the duel to 
manipulate Strathmore into marriage—prohibits him from receiving “much favour either in law 
or equity”; while Strathmore’s weakness or delusion—she hastily yielded to Bowes’s spurious 
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attentions—casts her “in a much more favorable light” (15). Thurlow likewise forecloses Bowes 
from equitable accommodation by reference to his “conduct” in the “transaction” at issue; and he 
legitimates Strathmore’s legal position by considering that her decision to execute separate 
property deeds was the “lucid” moment in her romantic “madness”—“the single spark of reason . 
. . in the whole of her conduct” (16). Thus, the Strathmore judges clarify that performing equity 
requires the court to evaluate litigants’ relative moral characters and, in so doing, reconsider 
coverture’s presumptions about male superiority and protective capacity.  
Significantly, the Strathmore court simultaneously engages and challenges traditional 
cultural assumptions about the relationship between gender and character in its rationale for the 
recognition of MWSP rights. Indeed, Buller and Thurlow represent the plaintiff wife as 
emotionally weak and prone to romantic insensibility, but Thurlow also represents her as capable 
of reasoned action. Each representation carries with it an equitable purpose—in her vulnerability, 
the married woman necessitates separate property rights; in her rationality, she merits such 
rights. This latter perspective is also suggested in Hearle v. Greenbank (1749), where Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke, argues the historical difference between disabilities arising from legal 
infancy and those arising from marital coverture:  
I take it in law . . . that the disability of an infant . . . is more favoured and a stronger 
disability, than that of feme coverts. . . . ‘[C]overture was not at common law so far 
protected as infancy, and some other disabilities, as non sane memory, &c.’ the ground of 
the disability being not from want of judgment but from being under the power of the 
husband; she having as much judgment as if discovert. (1047)96 
  
What I want to suggest by joining Strathmore and Hearle is that Chancery was deeply skeptical 
of the notion that married women’s legal disabilities were justified by what it perceived as her 
artificial subordination. If she retained moral and material judgment after executing the marriage 
                                                 
96 Here, Hardwicke quotes a “marginal note” from an unnamed legal text. 
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contract, why should she not enjoy that which allowed her moral and material independence? If 
her marriage contract bound her to one who was immoral or inclined to profligacy, why should 
she not receive legal protection in the form of equitable property rights? Ultimately, the court’s 
focus on the vagaries of individual character, judgment, and capability reveals as problematic the 
highly gendered fiction that underlies marital coverture, and it validates both a paternalistic and a 
liberal approach to the enforcement of married women separate property rights.  
Yet, the issue of individual difference—or the problem of status and gender certainties—
also persuaded the court to restrict married women’s equitable rights. Chancery, in the latter part 
of the century, acted according to its concern over wives’ vulnerability to husbands’ chicanery 
and violence and adopted the doctrine of restraint against anticipation. This doctrine severely 
limited a wife’s access to the “capital fund” in which her property was held.97 LC Thurlow, in 
Pybus v. Smith (1791), hinted at the necessity of the restrictive maxim, expressing concern over 
the defendant wife’s decision to pledge the entirety of her separate property for her husband’s 
debts (573). Just seven years later, Lord Chancellor Loughborough communicated a similar 
anxiety in Whistler v. Newman (1798), a case where the wife testified to being “coaxed” and 
“bullied” into assigning the bulk of her separate estate to her husband for investment in trade 
(74). Loughborough lamented that if the “rule” that married women are feme soles as to their 
separate property “is to be pushed to its full extent, a married woman . . . is infinitely worse off, 
and much more unprotected than she would be, if left to her legal [i.e., common law] rights” 
(74). The consequence of cases like Pybus and Whistler is that lawyers began to include express 
language in marriage settlements constraining the wife’s right of alienation, and the court 
                                                 
97 Staves offers a useful overview of the development of the doctrine of restraint against anticipation, including a 
discussion of the cases of Pybus and Whistler (151-53). It is from Staves that I borrow the term “capital fund” (153). 
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sanctioned such language.98 Atherley observes that attaching the clause “but not by way of 
anticipation” to the contractual term establishing the wife’s right to receive trust income or 
assign trust property will have the desired limiting effect: “By this mode, she will be prevented 
from making an absolute, or sweeping disposition of the property; all that she can do will be, to 
dispose of any payment that has actually become due.—Any disposition which went beyond that 
would not be available” (331-32). Restraint, therefore, became part of the contract negotiation 
process, and perhaps a condition of the wife’s family, who would be concerned that her future 
husband could fail to meet the presumptive qualifications of protection and maintenance that 
authorized his marital power under coverture.99 From this perspective, the doctrine was a 
challenge to, rather than an endorsement of, traditional conceptions of unity of person—the 
limitation on the wife’s autonomy serving as a contractual safeguard against the fictional and 
patriarchal terms of subordination. In other words, the doctrine of restraint against anticipation 
becomes a way for women to avoid having to choose between their equitable rights and their 
common law duties.  
But, did the doctrine also enable the court to reestablish control over married women—to 
ensure that the liberality contemplated by equitable property rights did not alter, in any 
meaningful way, the patriarchal subjectivity contemplated by the common law? Staves 
convincingly argues that restraint against anticipation was one of several “idiosyncratic rules” for 
MWSP that the court developed to recover women and the family from too liberal contract ideals 
                                                 
98 According to an English Reports case note to Pybus v. Smith, LC Thurlow, after the case, incorporated restraint 
against alienation language into a settlement over which he served as trustee. That language was subsequently 
upheld in Chancery and presumably became the model for limiting a wife’s ability to dispose of her separate estate 
(573n1). 
 
99 I speculate about the bride’s family’s interest, in part, based on Staves’s conclusion regarding the purposes of 
MWSP: “One aim . . . was to increase the security of the wife and the minor children should her husband prove 
feckless or unlucky. Another was to secure some of the wife’s father’s property for his grandchildren without risking 
its being swallowed up in the husband’s estate” (133). 
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(161). These rules were not, Staves contends, based on “legal logic”; rather they were a 
consequence of the “political pressures of patriarchy” and, as such, indicative of “why married 
women’s property did not then lead to married women’s power” (161). Certainly, this is a valid 
point and one that supports my own argument about legal equivocation on conceptions of female 
autonomy and marital unity. Indeed, it seems there were a multitude of competing ideas, 
ideologies, and interests influencing equitable jurisprudence on MWSP, a circumstance that 
complicates any attempt to historicize the law’s contribution to the development of the modern 
liberal subject and the modern—i.e., companionate or egalitarian—marriage. 
In general, eighteenth-century equity law, as represented in the writings of practitioners, 
jurists, and theorists, is largely silent on the fiction of unity of person—its scope, its conditions, 
and its (dis)advantages. Moreover, those contracts, judicial opinions, and treatises that address 
married women’s separate property rights give little express indication of whether and to what 
extent equity intended to challenge, shift, or shape the legal fiction. Nevertheless, the language 
establishing and limiting those rights, along with the legal rhetoric rationalizing their institution 
and their circumscription, provides material for interpreting and assessing the law’s ambivalent 
intention. Clearly, Chancery and conveyancing lawyers were working in the period to remedy 
coverture’s severity, and their efforts suggest a revelatory, if not revisionary, purpose on marital 
unity. Through their equitable work, the traditional concept of unity of person takes on a false 
and unjust cast—it becomes an idea in need of subtle and cautious liberal revision. Yet, there 
remains a strong conviction of marriage as a status and of wives as its lesser constitutive 
component—hierarchal unity, while capable of being contracted into and around, is not a 
condition to be contracted out of.  Additionally, the structure of the device in which MWSP 
rights typically appear—the marriage settlement—itself prefigures the law’s investment in the 
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notion of marriage as a union of estates. Indeed, in setting forth the conditions for a wealth and 
property merger and in indulging patrilineal ideas of heritable succession, the pre-nuptial 
agreement can be read as recasting unity of person in primarily material terms. 
Eighteenth-century law’s ideological and structural conflicts on marital coverture, thus, 
opened a generative space for extra-institutional responses to the doctrine’s enabling fiction. 
Indeed, with the legal principles that enforced a patriarchal conception of oneness in flux, there 
appears the opportunity and need for an external review of the fiction’s utility and a 
reconstruction of its terms. Therefore, just as cultural agents sought to legitimate the liberal legal 
fictions of marriage formation, so they endeavored to judge and legislate the terms of marital 
unification—to critically analyze and equitably reframe the conditions under which unity of 
person was felt and lived.  
Part III: The Domestic Novel and the Fiction of Unification 
A primary interest of novels written in the long eighteenth century is the experience of 
marriage, including the way in which it embodies the increasing conflict between legal norms, 
equitable change, and the rising ethos of individuality. As novel theorists have demonstrated, 
over time this new narrative form gained authority on the contours of modern domesticity and, in 
particular, the moral character and relational attitude of its espoused inhabitants.100 Here, I 
investigate the early novel’s attention to unity of person as a constitutive force, considering how 
writers understood and shaped the fiction’s relationship to individual subjectivity, particularly 
female, and domestic government. I argue that, like the period’s equitable jurisprudence on 
MSWP, this literary discourse sometimes equivocated on unity’s patriarchal and patrilineal 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., McKeon, Secret History 621-717; J. Thompson, Models of Value; Armstrong, Desire and Domestic 
Fiction; and Spencer.  
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undertones. Nevertheless, the novel ultimately developed a valuable progressive alternative to 
the traditional fiction, one that preserved elements of the private contracting subject who 
appeared at the formation stage and one that could exist peaceably and productively alongside its 
more conservative legal counterpart. 
Daniel Defoe’s Roxana: The Fortunate Mistress (1724) and Eliza Haywood’s The 
History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless (1751) provide two of the earliest and most compelling 
cultural investigations of marital coverture and its foundational fiction. Each novel masquerades 
as a piece of biographical life writing, and each, true to its political context, plots the tension 
between individual desire and social expectation, between personal and collective identities, and 
between subjective reality and institutional invention. The biographical subjects, Roxana and 
Betsy, initially conceive of themselves as rights-bearing individuals, but their histories are 
complicated by the demands of social convention and the restrictions on women’s legal 
subjectivity. In both cases, marriage functions as a site of self-conflict and self-discovery: its 
own discordant nature renders it a paradoxical space, one capable of deconstructing and either 
recriminating (Roxana) or rehabilitating (Betsy) the female self. Through these strained 
interactions between institution and individual, Defoe and Haywood simultaneously resist the 
common law version of marital unity and gesture toward the fiction’s potentially stabilizing 
impact, both for the female subject and her domestic domain.  
Part memoir and part confessional, Defoe’s Roxana traces and appraises the eponymous 
heroine’s scandalous history. Recalling a life of marriage, prostitution, and murder, the narrator 
Roxana seeks to understand and account for the forces that shaped the narrated Roxana’s 
identity, perspective, and story. As widely noted in scholarship on the novel, Roxana’s efforts are 
often confused and artfully misguided: the external factors that she identifies as central to her 
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moral collapse, such as legal disability, social circumstance, and spiritual evil, rest in a state of 
unease with internal motivators, such as vanity, pride, and unrestrained self-interest. Thus, the 
heroine and her hardships—their legitimacy and their sentimental power—are caught up in 
questions of individual agency. Marriage, as a contested space for women’s agency, becomes 
central to the novel’s critical interrogation, and while Defoe does not offer a settled picture of the 
legal institution, he does register and attempt to rethink the inequities of its foundational fiction. 
Roxana’s autobiography begins with a retrospective look at her first marriage, a 
corrupted union that sets in motion her tragic story and that challenges outright the gendered 
assumptions that underwrite unity of person. Roxana’s troubles arise when she is thrust into an 
arranged marriage devoid of property rights: at just “Fifteen Years of Age,” she recalls, “my 
Father gave me . . . two Thousand Pounds Portion, and married me to an Eminent Brewer in the 
City” (7).101 A “Handsome Man, and a good Sportsman,” the Brewer was an attractive marital 
candidate for the young and impressionable Roxana. But also “a weak, empty-headed, untaught 
Creature”—a “Conceited” and “obstinate” “Fool”—he quickly revealed himself to be a 
profligate husband and derelict father (7-9). During their short union, the Brewer squandered the 
marital estate, and he bankrupted the family business. Roxana records her helplessness in the 
matter: “I was not wanting with all that Perswasions and Entreaties could perform, but it was all 
fruitless . . . like one stupid, he went on . . . till he had not a Hundred Pound left in the whole 
World” (11). A married woman without legal status, a separate estate, or marital maintenance, 
Roxana “saw [her] Ruin hastening on, without any possible Way to prevent it” (11). The 
common law, mired in the fiction of male superiority, offered no pragmatic safeguard against the 
                                                 
101 “Portion,” in eighteenth-century legal parlance, signified a woman’s dowry, not her separate maintenance. There 
is no indication that Roxana and the Brewer executed a marriage settlement agreement or that Roxana was otherwise 
accorded separate property rights. 
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Brewer’s dereliction of legal duty. When he abandons the family, his obligation to maintain and 
protect the domestic sphere is transferred to the legally-incapacitated Roxana, and, unable to 
fulfill that role, she is forced to foster out the couple’s children and prostitute herself.  
As the memoir moves forward—outside of the marital contract—Defoe further probes 
unity of person, tackling its presumptions about female weakness and passivity. In this portion of 
the narrative, Roxana proves to be a shrewd contract negotiator and a prudent capitalist.102 
Through a multitude of sexual contracts, she acquires inheritance rights, substantial annuities, 
luxurious accommodations, and valuable material goods (see 50, 60, 182, 184-86).103 As 
Bernadette Meyler argues, the “significance” of these illicit agreements is their “formality,” 
which “will bind [the parties] even in the absence of concrete enforcement mechanisms” (244).  
To secure the benefits of this formality, Roxana employs a business manager who, through long-
term investments in mortgages and securities, helps her “la[y]-up an incredible Wealth” (182). 
Roxana’s financial acumen is complemented by a strong will that allows her to command lovers, 
servants, and friends and to pursue her self-interest unimpeded by social convention. John 
Richetti argues that like Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, a prototype for “culturally resonant 
resourcefulness” (65), Roxana “exemplif[ies] the Mandevillean pattern whereby individual and 
selfish action (vice) produces social benefits—an increase in the production of goods and 
services, a contribution to the accumulation and circulation of wealth that constitutes an 
economically healthy society (as Defoe would have defined it)” (English Novel 63).104 As 
                                                 
102 Roxana remains legally married to the Brewer until his death later in the novel; however, his desertion renders 
her free to indulge in the contractual capacity enjoyed by single women.  
 
103 For examples of Roxana’s acquisitiveness, see 41-42, 50, 60, 182, 184-86. 
 
104 There is a variety of excellent scholarship on economics and financial literacy in Roxana. See, e.g.., J. Thompson, 
Models of Value 113-31; Dijkstra passim; Novak, Economics 128-39; Scheuermann 12-59; and Gabbard passim.  
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Richetti’s assessment of the heroine suggests, Roxana’s memorials to her self-sufficiency not 
only authenticate the possibility, but also establish the civic value, of female self-governance. 
Unity of person, as a fiction that justifies female consumption by male authority in marriage, 
therefore becomes something of a socio-economic liability. 
With Roxana’s economic rise in the position of feme sole, marriage and its patriarchal 
legal structure evolve from the cause of Roxana’s moral corruption into the rationale for 
preserving her iniquitous status quo. Defoe depicts this evolution in a scene where Roxana 
confronts the prospect of a second marriage to her lover, the Dutch Merchant. Here, Roxana 
adamantly argues against matrimony on the grounds that it divests women of their natural liberal 
rights and consigns them to a position of absolute subjugation: 
I told him . . . that I thought a Woman was a free Agent as well as a Man, and was born 
free, and, cou’d she manage herself suitably, might enjoy that Liberty to as much Purpose 
as the Men do; that the Laws of Matrimony were indeed, otherwise, and Mankind at this 
time, acted quite upon other Principles, and those such, that a Woman gave herself 
entirely away from herself, in Marriage, and capitulated, only to be, at best, but an 
Upper-Servant. . . . 
 
That the very nature of the marriage-contract was, in short, nothing but giving up Liberty, 
Estate, Authority, and everything to the Man, and the Woman was indeed, a mere 
Woman ever after—that is to say, a Slave. (148) 
 
The heroine supplements this argument about a married woman’s right to the benefits of liberal 
subjecthood with an argument about her fitness for the state: “it was my opinion, a Woman was 
as fit to govern and enjoy her own Estate, without a Man, as a Man was, without a Woman” 
(149). Nevertheless, when the Dutch Merchant offers to relinquish his domestic authority and 
allow Roxana to “[p]ilot” the marital “Ship,” she argues the absurdity of such a plan in the 
eighteenth-century legal climate (151). The “Laws of Matrimony,” she contends, prohibit 
spousal equality—they “put[] the Power into your Hands; bid[] you do it; command[] you to 
command; and bind[] me . . . to obey” (151). It is a powerful argument, one that suggests the 
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tremendous influence the law had—or was believed to have—on domestic government. In this 
view, rewriting the terms of marital oneness is futile exercise—the law’s patriarchal construction 
of marital rights and duties will always pre-empt a couple’s liberal intention. Why, then, would a 
“free” woman want to return to the domestic fold? Why concede her fundamental liberties for 
oppressive status obligations?  
The Dutch Merchant, intent on marrying Roxana, seeks to answer these questions by 
offering alternative perspectives on domesticity. He begins with a description of marriage that 
upends its traditional hierarchy. He protests that, although wives bore “the Name of Subjection,” 
in reality it was husbands who bore the bonds of servility:  
He reply’d, that . . . the Man had all the Care of things devolv’d upon him; that the 
Weight of Business lay upon his Shoulders, and as he had the Trust, so he had the Toil of 
Life upon him, his was the Labour, his the Anxiety of Living; that the Woman had 
nothing to do but to eat the Fat, and drink the Sweet; . . . be waited on, and made much 
of; be serv’d, and lov’d and made easie; . . . that [Women] generally commanded not the 
Men only, but all they had; manag’d all for themselves. . . . (148) 
 
The Dutch Merchant then goes on to argue for an egalitarian approach to marital unity: “he was 
of the Opinion,” Roxana recollects, “that . . . where there was a mutual Love, there cou’d be no 
Bondage; but that there was but one Interest; one Aim; one Design; and all conspir’d to make 
both very happy” (149). From the Dutch Merchant’s perspective, the common law of marriage 
does not have to define the husband and wife’s lived experience—women can and do hold 
domestic power; spouses can and do forge companionate unions. These reappraisals of marital 
unity are meant as counters to Roxana’s “fears” about marriage (the Dutch Merchant being 
unaware of her prosperous involvement with courtesan culture), but they also operate to 
undermine her moral narrative. Is she, in fact, a victim of women’s legal circumstance, or a sly 
manipulator of the law’s gender bias?  
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Defoe continues to investigate the tension between female agency and marriage law when 
he uses the practice of equitable settlement to write his heroine into a liberal marriage contract. 
The agreement arises during a period of moral affliction for Roxana. After decades of 
negotiating and executing private sexual contracts, she has grown weary of her amatory labor, 
which she periodically perceives as sinful and lawless. When the Dutch Merchant reemerges and 
again proposes marriage, Roxana promptly accepts, thus “put[ting] an End to all the intrieguing 
Part of [her] Life; a Life full of prosperous Wickedness” (243). Shortly after the nuptial 
ceremony, the spouses enter into settlement negotiations. Together, they review documents that 
reveal the intricacies (the debits and credits) of their immense estates, and the candor of their 
exchange demonstrates an intention for a true marital partnership. Having surveyed Roxana’s 
mortgages and securities, the Dutch Merchant proposes separate property rights, using language 
reminiscent of that found in an eighteenth-century conveyancing manual: “I will not touch them . 
. . nor one of them, till they are all settl’d in Trustees Hands, for your own Use, and the 
Management wholly your own” (259). The parties then agree to a term that binds Roxana to the 
traditionally male duty of marital maintenance: she will contribute “2000 l. a Year” to the 
family’s “Subsistance,” leaving the Dutch Merchant free to invest his income, the “Encrease” of 
which, we can assume, will benefit Roxana at his death (259-60). Through this negotiated 
contract, which simultaneously allows Roxana to re-enter polite society and preserve her position 
as economic individual, Defoe confirms that unity of person is, in fact, a malleable fiction—that 
there are legal avenues for establishing spousal equality and honoring female subjectivity.  
Yet, as the narrative progresses to its rather dramatic conclusion, Defoe places egalitarian 
marriage’s moral value and, therefore, its social utility in doubt. In an effort to preserve her new 
experience of domesticity and unable, as Susan Glover contends, “to negotiate [her] living 
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possessions” (i.e., her children) (129), Roxana participates in the disappearance (ostensibly 
murder) of a daughter who threatens to expose her sexual past. This final deed—a grievous 
violation of England’s criminal and social codes—precipitates “a dreadful Course of Calamities” 
for Defoe’s heroine: “I was brought so low,” she laments in the novel’s final line, “that my 
Repentance seem’d to be only the Consequence of my Misery, as my Misery was of my Crime” 
(330). Roxana’s final assault on the domestic sphere also forces a pattern of self-reflection and 
self-condemnation so intense that it compels the very act of narration. The autobiographer 
reframes her early life as one of “crime,” “wickedness,” and folly, and she refashions her former 
self as the embodiment of vanity, pride, avarice, and sexual license. Her declaration that—“I am 
a Memorial to all that shall read my story, a standing Monument of the Madness and Distraction 
which Pride and Infatuations from Hell run us into; how ill our Passions guide us; and how 
dangerously we act when we follow the Dictates of an ambitious Mind” (161)—reassigns 
responsibility for the transgressive narrative to the female self. While the doctrinal rigidity of 
legal coverture and the social convention of female dependence might have brought Roxana to 
the point of criminal offense, the flexibility of individual morality and the temptations of 
liberality, including the right to property and contract, are what keep her there. In this case, 
progressive marriage only proves itself to be a haven for, rather than a safeguard against, female 
lawlessness.  
Like so many novelists writing at the cusp of modernity, Defoe, in the end, employs the 
autobiographic-confessional form to explore the moral contours of modern individuality. Both 
Nancy Armstrong and John Zomchick argue that Defoe ultimately depicts his heroine as unable 
to balance liberal freedoms with, in Armstrong’s terms, the dictates of “respectable society,” and 
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in Zomchick’s, “affective” obligations.105 Similarly, Hal Gladfelder suggests that Roxana’s 
eventual “psychological excess of guilt” demonstrates “the gradual criminalization of 
[individual] subjectivity”—her story plots the failure to reconcile “inward . . . desire” with the 
responsibilities assigned by the social collective (132-33). And, indeed, Roxana is often 
constituted, through her sexuality, as a threat, not only to “Virtue and Honour,” the very essence 
of principled subjectivity, but also to the family, the very fabric of English society (29).106 Yet, 
Defoe’s mastery of the difficult relationship between the private (i.e., subjective motivation) and 
the public (i.e., institutional influence) in creating that threat complicates how we understand and 
feel about Roxana and her history. It also confuses how we perceive the legal fiction that helped 
bring about, and later sustain, the heroine’s moral devolution. Like his legal contemporaries, 
Defoe is never quite clear on whether individual and social stability is best achieved through 
staid efforts to naturalize the conservative terms of marital unity or through a liberal restructuring 
of the fiction.107 Nevertheless, that Roxana articulates the injustice of marital coverture and unity 
of person to the female subject, and that it imagines an equitable alternative, signifies the novel 
as an important contributor to the centuries-long debate on how domestic government is and how 
it should be.  
Eliza Haywood’s mid-century novel The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless echoes the 
paradoxical concerns raised by Defoe regarding the subjective constraints placed on women by 
                                                 
105 See Armstrong, How Novels Think 39, 36-42; and Zomchick 32-57. 
 
106 Shawn Lisa Maurer provides a wonderfully insightful discussion of Roxana as threat to the period’s prevailing 
marriage ideology. Maurer argues that Defoe follows “the emerging novel genre in a gender division of labor that 
militated women’s placement into a domestic sphere.” Rather than dissolve the “system” of marriage at the heart of 
this sphere, he must destroy “the very woman who attempts to function outside its boundaries” (364).  
 
107 Spiro Peterson uses other of Defoe’s writing on marriage, as well as contemporary marriage law, to contextualize 
the author’s approach to the institution in Roxana. Peterson’s conclusions also indicate Defoe’s ambivalence on 
domestic structuring (see, e.g., 182-83). 
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the terms of legal marriage. An early female bildungsroman, the novel charts the eponymous 
heroine’s psychological and moral development through the interpersonal transactions of 
courtship and marriage. In Betsy’s “slow metamorphosis from thoughtless coquette to thoughtful 
wife” (Blouch 16), Haywood explores and critically assesses the relationship between female 
individuality and marriage law—both common and equitable—and she offers a version of unity 
of person that mediates between conservative and progressive ideas about the nature of the 
spousal bond: it is an association that both disciplines and rewards women’s selfhood. Although 
this ambiguity complicates our understanding of Haywood’s ideological commitments, it allows 
for a realistic portrait of the limits imposed on revisions to marriage law’s most enduring fiction.  
Like Roxana, Betsy Thoughtless embodies a potentially threatening form of female 
liberality, her spirited independence often expressed in excessively amorous terms. Indeed, 
Betsy’s vivacity manifests itself as romantic caprice and practiced artifice, and she is rendered 
not only the subject of idle gossip, but also the victim of sexual assault. It is within the context of 
attempted rape that marriage becomes the behavioral and social panacea for the young coquette. 
Immediately following the “ugly incident” with the aristocratic charlatan Sir Frederick Fineer 
(Fineer undertakes to force Betsy into a sham marriage and then rape her) (443), Betsy’s brothers 
and her legal guardians, Sir and Lady Trusty, determine that marriage is the only “defence”—the 
only “sure guard”—for her “reputation” and “virtue” (431-31, 482-83). It is also, of course, a 
safeguard for her family’s honor, which is bound up in the public expression of proper 
femininity: Betsy’s brother, Frances, reminds her that a “blemish” on her reputation, regardless 
of its legitimacy, will “bring[] certain infamy and disgrace on yourself, and all belonging to you” 
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(384).108 Although entirely opposed to the marital condition, which she envisions as a “scene of 
disquiet,” Betsy is eventually persuaded to contract with Mr. Munden, whose “fair [settlement] 
proposals” suggest to her custodians his spousal suitability (489, 443-44). Once married, Betsy 
commits to the “strict” performance of her marital “duties,” convinced that her efforts will be 
rewarded with “honour,” “reputation,” and “peace of mind” (497). The indissoluble union is, 
therefore, projected to provide a framework for the articulation of a virtuous and circumspect 
femininity—for a female selfhood that promotes domestic stability and social welfare. 
Yet, Haywood represents this first marriage as a fractious space, and she foregrounds the 
conflict between Betsy and Munden in their disparate perspectives on marital unity. The couple’s 
ideological incongruity emerges in scenes involving the disposition of Betsy’s separate 
maintenance, which the marriage settlement establishes at 150£ per year. In one episode, 
Munden—now revealed to be a spendthrift inclined to “amusements . . . abroad” (498)—refuses 
to fund fully the domestic coffers, commanding his wife to contribute a share of her pin money:  
I know not . . . what fool it was that first introduced the article of pin-money into 
marriage-writings - nothing, certainly, is more idle, since a woman ought to have nothing 
apart from her husband; but as it is grown into a custom, and I have condescended to 
comply with it, you should, I think, of your own accord, and without giving me the 
trouble of reminding you of it, convert some part of it, at least, to such uses as might ease 
me of a burden I have, indeed, no kind of reason to be loaded with. (500) 
 
Munden’s demand, couched as it is in a speech disparaging married women’s equitable rights, is 
interpreted by Betsy as an unjust and outdated assertion of male dominance, a reversion to the 
days of “Egyptian bondage” (501). In a subsequent argument over maintenance distribution, the 
narrator confirms Betsy’s judgment with an observation about Munden’s staunchly patriarchal 
                                                 
108 Many scholars have commented on the novel’s preoccupation with social “appearance.” Lorna Ellis, for example, 
argues that Betsy’s reformative trajectory is informed by English society’s privileging of external behavior over 
internal motivation—what matters is not how virtuous Betsy is, but how virtuous she appears to be (34-35, 78). 
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“notions of marriage”: “he considered a wife no more than an upper servant, bound to study and 
obey, in all things, the will of him to whom she had given her hand; . . . his resolution [was] to 
render himself absolute master when he became a husband” (507). Uncompromising in his 
beliefs, Munden is, to borrow from Helen Thompson, “a painful and indissoluble embodiment of 
arbitrary domestic law” (112). Betsy, by contrast, is a nascent symbol of liberal contract. From 
her perspective, wifely obligation is consideration for husbandly affection—the former being 
contingent upon the latter—and the terms of equitable contract supersede the claims of domestic 
authoritarianism (497-508). Betsy refuses to “give up” the equitable rights provided “in [her] 
marriage articles”—“to recede from any part of what was her due by contract” (503, 507). This is 
not to say that Haywood’s heroine exhibits an inclination for the broad spousal agency 
contemplated by Roxana—in fact, she is generally persuaded by her mentor Lady Trusty’s 
advice to surrender and submit—but rather that she insists on a marriage defined by mutual 
respect, shared economic right, and affective concern. The consequence of such profound 
philosophical difference between the spouses is to provoke, on Betsy’s part, feelings of 
resentment and disaffection and, on Munden’s, acts of physical violence (he kills her pet 
squirrel), emotional cruelty, and sexual misconduct. 
Nevertheless, Haywood situates Betsy’s moral development within this contentious 
environment. Betsy’s transformation occurs after another experience of sexual aggression, this 
time at the hands of Munden’s benefactor, Lord ______. Betsy initially revels in the Lord’s 
attentions, “pleas[ing] herself with the thoughts of being looked upon by the adoring peer as 
Adam did upon the forbidden fruit; —longing, wishing, but not daring to approach” (545). Yet, 
the admirer does approach with a force that Betsy rightly understands as “preparing” her “ruin” 
and “everlasting infamy”; his violent intentions are interrupted only by the ringing of a servant’s 
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bell (550-51). Once free of the lordship’s “power,” Betsy permanently sheds the “excess of 
vanity,” “mistaken pride,” “imprudence,” and “caprice” that had theretofore inspired “her faults 
and her misfortunes” (550, 557-58). The narrator reports: “[S]he now saw herself, and the errors 
of her past conduct, in their true light” and “every day, every hour” worked to recalibrate her 
character (557-58). Going forward, Betsy demonstrates a heightened sexual and social 
consciousness, refusing to indulge the compliments and attentions in which she had once 
delighted and seeking to admit “those perfections of the mind” that ensure communal “esteem” 
(561). True to the bildungsroman form, she becomes a model of self-awareness and self-
discipline. 
Through Haywood’s refashioning, Betsy also becomes a composite of competing 
domestic ideologies—a complex and confused symbol of marital tradition and progression. At 
the very moment of her existential epiphany, Betsy adopts the mantle of patriarchal convention, 
identifying herself as a conjugal possession: “Am I not married?” she queries. “Is not all I am the 
property of Mr. Munden? - Is it not highly criminal in any one to offer to invade his right? – And 
can I be so wicked to take delight in the guilt, to which I am in a manner an accessory?” (557). 
As David Oakleaf observes, Betsy now “sees not just her fortune and her person but all that she 
is as her husband’s property” (125); she has, as Juliette Merritt suggests, “come to learn the full 
extent of [her] objectification” (185). While this status claim structures the heroine’s narrative 
evolution, her performance of newfound selfhood is inflected with liberal precepts that redound 
to the emerging law of contractual exchange. Once Betsy discovers that Munden is engaged in a 
“criminal correspondence” with the couple’s French houseguest, she asserts her right to 
independence through legal separation:   
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Neither divine, nor human laws . . . nor any of those obligations by which I have hitherto 
looked upon myself as bound, can now compel me any longer to endure the cold 
neglects, the insults, the tyranny, of this most ungrateful, - most perfidious man.- I have 
discharged the duties of my station . . . : wherefore then should I hesitate to take the 
opportunity . . . of easing myself of that heavy yoke I have laboured under for so many 
cruel months? (590) 
 
Even Munden’s resolution “never . . . [to] forego the right that marriage gives me over you” fails 
to return her to the marital union, as she works with the family lawyer to pursue a permanent 
estrangement (603). Betsy’s resolve to reclaim her identity and her freedom is met with the 
approval of family and friends, one ally, Lady Loveit, venturing to fashion the strong-willed 
heroine as an exemplary figure for “wives in general” (595). With this steady avowal of female 
contractual right (“I have discharged the duties of my station”),109 the nature of the marital bond 
and the roles of its constituents are once again thrown into the narrative’s critical center and the 
reader is compelled to ask, Is oneness, once contracted, indestructible or unchangeable? Is its 
female cohort bound to submit to male authority? Is she, indeed, her husband’s property?  
It is not until the novel’s end that Haywood regains some control over the narrative’s 
circuitous message. She reconciles Betsy and Munden through illness and permanently separates 
them through death, leaving her heroine to execute a marriage contract that means to propose a 
more equitable construction of unity of person.110 In fact, the heroine’s second marriage to her 
former admirer, Trueworth, makes personal compatibility and mutual affection the marital 
nucleus. Betsy observes that neither “the place of nativity, nor the birth, nor the estate” are the 
determinants of married women’s happiness; they are, rather, “the person, and the temper of the 
man” (629-30). Nonetheless, property remains a significant factor in the contractual 
                                                 
109 For another perspective on the significance of Betsy’s contractual response to Munden’s behavior, see Flint 239-
40. 
 
110 Betsy only returns to her marriage upon learning of her husband’s illness from which he soon dies. 
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arrangement. Trueworth offers to settle on Betsy an £800 annuity, which the heroine and her 
guardians consider a symbol of the hero’s “generosity” and the “proof of his affection” (632-34). 
The equitable provision also functions as a symbol of Betsy’s right to and fitness for a degree of 
marital autonomy: the disabling and corrective bonds of marital coverture are unnecessary for 
this reformed heroine. Haywood’s final domestic picture, therefore, promises to have some 
levelling effect on the dynamic of unity—readers can imagine these spouses in moments of 
democratic and mutually empowering exchange. 
Yet, even in this union, tradition exerts itself. The narrative’s concluding line, annexed to 
a brief account of “the new-wedded lovers,” evokes a conservative moral on the conditions for 
reconstituting marital unity. The narrator reflects: “Thus were the virtues of our heroine (those 
follies that had defaced them being fully corrected) at length rewarded with a happiness, retarded 
only till she had render’d herself wholly worthy of receiving it” (634). Because this parting 
observation recalls the moment of Betsy’s self-actualization, it ends up trading in both 
paternalistic legalism and the emerging discourse of bourgeois femininity. Indeed, Haywood 
seems to confirm marriage’s disciplinary function for the female subject—it is Betsy’s abusive 
and hierarchical first union that prepares and merits her for the peaceful and companionate 
second. Scholarship on the novel has suggested that Haywood’s “reformed” heroine occupies an 
interstitial space, one that can be interpreted as a capitulation to or a subversion of the patriarchal 
order.111 Whether the novel ultimately presents Betsy as a “broken . . . product of polite society 
                                                 
111 Much of the scholarship on the novel is interested in its didactic purpose, with a particular emphasis on 
Haywood’s apparent movement in Betsy Thoughtless from the amatory to the reform (or sentimental) literary 
tradition.  Does the narrative represent Haywood’s capitulation to dominant conservative notions of marriage and 
female subjectivity (i.e., and, therefore, represent a break from her earlier work)? Or, is it her attempt to subvert or 
criticize these notions (and, therefore, signify a continuation of her romance fiction)? On the novel as concession, 
see Perry 267-68; Todd, Sign of Angellica 146-51; and Spencer 147-53. On the novel as subversion or critique, see 
Jennings; Hultquist, “Haywood’s Reappropriation”; Ellis 63-87; and Nestor. 
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and integrated into a patriarchal plot,” as Shea Stuart contends (573), or as a coherent synthesis 
of “cultural standards,” “inclinations[,] and desires,” as Aleksondra Hultquist argues (“Marriage 
in Haywood,” 43), she certainly demonstrates the durability of legally-sanctioned gender norms. 
Female virtue, chastity, and passivity, Haywood contends, continue to underwrite even 
progressive marriage: spousal independence and equality are always already circumscribed by 
these qualities. Thus, unity of person is, at its best, an ideological compromise, one in which the 
socially offensive aspects of female individuality are sacrificed to achieve a limited right of self-
rule.    
Later century domestic novels continue to explore the cultural complexity of marital 
unity, with an emphasis on translating the traditional fiction into progressive truth. Two of the 
more popular of these novels are Frances Burney’s Cecilia (1782) and Jane Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice (1813). Each text presents itself as a novel of manners, examining the relationship 
among social customs and values and individual thought and action.112 While the novels attend 
to distinct social environments (Burney’s novel is set in upper-class London society and 
Austen’s work in rural gentry life), both explore the subjective dimensions of the “manners”—or 
conventions—encoded in marriage law and its unification fiction. Unlike Defoe and Haywood, 
Burney and Austen are not particularly interested in the paternalistic perplexities of coverture 
and unity of person: hierarchal marriage is not, in their work, a potential corrective for female 
moral weakness nor is it an unethical license for male despotism or neglect. Rather, these authors 
focus on marital unity’s patriarchal and patrilineal terms: their heroines, determined to rethink 
female selfhood and the system of manners by which it is encompassed, struggle against the 
                                                 
112 For a useful overview of the novel of manners genre, see Spacks, 160-90. Spacks notes that this genre reflects its 
historical context, with “the idea of manners assum[ing] both moral and social significance” (161). 
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conservative customs of commodification in and ancestral preservation through marriage. In 
Cecilia, Burney offers a conception of marital unity that, in its liberal, companionate terms, 
should provide a safe and satisfying space for its individual participants. Unfortunately, 
marriage’s enduring entanglement with legal coverture interrupts this purpose. Pride and 
Prejudice then completes Cecilia’s progressive trajectory by distancing unity of person from its 
legalistic investments in property, wealth, and inheritance and reconstituting marital oneness as a 
lateral merger of individual intentions, passions, and affections. 
Published under the guise of biography, Burney’s Cecilia chronicles the eponymous 
heroine’s difficult passage from self-sufficient heiress and legal ward to cherished wife and legal 
cipher. Similar to other domestic novels of the period, Cecilia’s narrative journey is complicated 
by the fractured ideological world in which she resides. Here, the “manners” prescribed by 
patriarchy and its laws collide with economic materialism and individual desire to lend marriage 
a discordant quality: it is simultaneously an instrument for enacting and a safeguard against the 
customary dictates of birth and wealth and the pressures of consumption. Scholarship on Cecilia 
reflects this discordance. Critics such as James Thompson argue that marriage, with its protective 
male presence, provides Burney’s heroine a “safe harbor” from the economic dangers of “the 
public sphere,” while others such as Eva König indicate that marriage aggressively—and 
somewhat destructively—visits on Cecilia the period’s “patriarchal norms.”113 Still others such 
as Melissa Ganz contend that Burney’s vision of matrimony emerges as “an affective agreement 
between two equal [and independent] agents” (“Clandestine Schemes,” 43). Following in this 
                                                 
113 J. Thompson, Models of Value 158-59, 160-62; and König 79, 79-89. Other scholars also interpret marriage in 
Cecilia as a concession (generally critical) to extant patriarchal structures and traditional feminine ideologies and, 
therefore, as a site of subjective loss. See, e.g., Campbell, “Clandestine Marriage,” 86; Klekar, “‘Her Gift Was 
Compelled,’” 125; Epstein 155-74; and Castle 280-89. 
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interpretive vein, I argue that marital unity retains an ambivalent quality in Burney’s work.114 
Although it has shed its internal masculine hierarchy for spousal equality, it remains, for the 
heroine, clouded by the legal mores of female disability.  
Like Defoe’s Roxana and Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless, Burney’s Cecilia Beverley 
seeks to exercise the right of self-government. Unlike her literary forebears, however, Cecilia’s 
choice of liberal expression is philanthropically and intellectually, rather than sexually, inscribed. 
As an orphan and heiress, Cecilia is vested at the novel’s outset with an uncommon and 
masculinized degree of autonomy, which she performs with a virtuous sensibility.115 Indeed, 
although under the age of majority (i.e., 21) and, therefore, in a state of legal guardianship, 
Cecilia enjoys considerable freedom to structure her daily life and expend her trust income. In 
her independence, Cecilia abandons the upper class conditions of immoderation and dissipation 
for a life defined by charitable and academic pursuits. The narrator explains that “[Cecilia] 
regarded herself as an agent of Charity” and a student in “search of knowledge,” fully intent on 
“mak[ing] . . . worthy use of the affluence, freedom, and power which she possessed” (56, 103, 
54-55). This self-construction bears out in the heroine’s relationships with the less fortunate, 
particularly her growing friendship with the financially distressed Belfields and her business 
partnership with Mrs. Hill, a woman who is able, through Cecilia’s investment in her 
haberdashery, to bring her family out of poverty. Cecilia’s self-identity is also validated through 
                                                 
114 Meghan Jordan similarly argues that Burney presents “[m]arriage [as] an ambivalent state for women,” and she 
reads the novelist’s equivocation as a response to the burgeoning “cult of womanhood,” which promoted women’s 
moral position as wives and mothers (568, 559-60). For Jordan, Burney’s “marriage plot” “reaffirms the cult of 
womanhood” at the same time that it recognizes the movement’s indebtedness to “old systems of protection” (576). 
In contrast to Jordan, I argue that Burney equivocates on marriage’s character—it is at one in the same time a 
liberalizing and constricting institution. 
 
115 Multiple scholars have noted the masculine nature of Cecilia’s feme sole position. See, e.g., Klekar, “Her Gift 
was Compelled,’” 117; and Woodworth 369. 
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her moments of intellectual application and reflective meditation. In fact, for brief period, Cecilia 
signifies the possibility of enlightened and productive female individualism; and because Burney 
focuses on “society’s, rather than her heroine’s, embarrassments” that individualism is morally 
grounded.116 
Nevertheless, as a propertied subject, Cecilia quickly becomes vulnerable to the social 
aggrandizement and economic aggression common in the period. Indeed, just as she establishes 
her virtuous independence, the heroine-ward falls prey to an over-stimulated culture of 
consumption and upward mobility. One of her guardians, Mr. Harrel, manipulates her into giving 
over almost all of her £10,000 fortune to settle the enormous debts he and his wife incurred 
through discretionary spending. In a series of dramatic speeches that appeal to Cecilia’s 
generosity and sympathetic understanding—speeches that include, at their most histrionic, 
threats of self-harm—Harrel convinces Cecilia to pledge her inheritance to a usurious lender as 
security for his debts. With this act, Harrel not only jeopardizes the financial independence 
Cecilia had expected to achieve in her legal majority, but also compromises the ethical principles 
upon which she had constructed her personal sovereignty.117 In fact, Harrel’s machinations 
produce in Cecilia a crisis of conscience, which she conveys in a series of fragmented 
exclamations indicating self-reproach: “to become the tool of the extravagance I abhor! to be 
made responsible for the luxury I condemn! to be liberal in opposition to my principles, and 
lavish in defiance of my judgment!” (271-72). The heroine’s potential for self-fracture is 
intensified by the possessive logic of masculine society. As Margaret Anne Doody argues, 
                                                 
116 Here, I borrow the quoted material from Doody, Frances Burney 143. 
 
117 For extended analyses of the relationship between debt and subjective value in Cecilia, see J. Thompson, Models 
of Value 156-58, 160-62; and Keohane. 
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Cecilia is never “seen as a free agent (as she imagines herself) but as a property waiting to be 
taken” (“Introduction,” xvii). In the narrator’s words, she is viewed as a suitor’s “future 
property,” “natural property,” and “the property he means to cheapen,” or, alternatively, as “the 
undoubted property of [another]” (9, 13, 34, 302). Moreover, she is treated by her three 
guardians as a commodity to be exchanged on the marriage market, with each of Harrel, Briggs, 
and Delvile negotiating her hand with men principally motivated by considerations of status and 
wealth. Although Cecilia avoids the proposed unions, she persists, while a legal minor possessed 
of property, in a state of existential and financial imbalance. Thus, self and estate, Burney seems 
to suggest, require a shoring up—a firm foundation upon which to secure their continued 
viability.  
Burney extends this argument for a protective infrastructure into Cecilia’s legal majority, 
where she and the novel’s hero, Mortimer Delvile, function as objects of transfer in the long-
standing system of patrilineal succession. Cecilia is so designated through legal testament. Under 
her uncle’s will, a married Cecilia’s right to inhabit and control the hereditary estate is 
conditioned, first on her husband adopting the Beverley surname, and second on her 
reproduction of living heirs (see 5-6, 854). As Barbara Zonitch convincingly argues, these 
limiting clauses figure Cecilia as a patrimonial “conduit” in an “aristocratic system [that] 
requires . . . women and men . . . to uphold and maintain family continuity” and that revels in 
“dynastic dreams” (60-61). Mortimer also assumes this role, his patrilineal burden emerging 
from the aristocratic demands of filial and ancestral duty. As “the last of his race” and the heir to 
a “paternal estate [that] wants repair,” he is obliged to exercise his right to marital choice within 
the strict confines of rank and fortune (499). Indeed, this patrimonial pawn is expected, through 
endogamous marriage, to facilitate a profitable merger of estates and to preserve the “ancient” 
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family’s “noble and long unsullied name” (468, 638, 640). Mrs. Delvile explains that to do 
otherwise—i.e., to marry Cecilia—would be to eradicate the extant family’s identity and to raise 
generational ire, with the patriline’s “claimants” forced to “call out for redress” (639-40). Thus, 
the novel’s hero and heroine, who wish to contract marriage together, are caught in what Zonitch 
terms “aristocratic violence” (21): each of their person and property are imperiled by the “PRIDE 
and PREJUDICE” (Burney 930-31) of their patrician forbearers and by the conservative 
ideology of the nation’s elite.118 In fact, the assault is so destructive that it is written on the 
protagonists’ bodies in the form of emotional distress for Cecilia and physical illness for Delvile.  
 Significantly, and perhaps ironically, the narrative’s proposed mode of subjective 
recovery is marriage. Burney at length invents for her hero and heroine a marital union that 
neutralizes the threat of commodification and joins romantic sentiment to an alliance of interests 
and faculties. Cecilia, in order that Mortimer can retain the Delvile name, relinquishes her estate 
and “sacrifice[s]” the “splendid” “settlements” to which its “income” would have “intitled her,” 
and Mortimer, in order to secure his mother’s consent, foregoes a marriage portion that would 
help to deliver the patriline from financial distress (807). It is a settlement that the narrator 
describes as a fair balance—“he [Delvile] g[iving] up in expectation no less than she [Cecilia] 
would give up in possession” (807). It is also an agreement that lends marriage a new moral 
value—person takes precedence over property and conjugal compatibility prevails over wealth 
aggregation. In this union, where social custom is consigned to the marital exterior and female 
individualism is imbued with ethical significance, spousal intimacy appears as Delvile had 
earlier imagined it: as a state of companionship, mutual “solace,” and “bosom” friendship (559). 
                                                 
118 Ruth Perry also examines the novel’s engagement with differing marriage types, arguing that the central 
“dilemma” in Burney’s marriage plot is presented as a contest between “loyalty to kin (marriage-as-incorporation)” 
and “loyalty to exogamous love (marriage-as-alliance)” (231). 
136 
Nonetheless, Burney’s marital ideal is soon weakened by the legal patterns of aristocratic 
inheritance and by the reality of marital coverture. Shortly after her marriage, Cecilia is forcibly 
dispossessed of her landed legacy. With Delvile on the continent, the heroine finds herself alone 
and besieged by the new Beverley heir, who has sent his attorney to threaten a lawsuit if she and 
Delvile cannot prove their compliance with the testamentary name clause. Unsure what to do or 
whom to ask for advice—and now legally impotent as a married woman—Cecilia becomes 
mired in the contradictions of her subjectivity: once “an example of happiness, and a model of 
virtue, she was now in one moment . . . an outcast from her own house, yet received into no 
other! a bride, unclaimed by a husband!, an HEIRESS, dispossessed of all wealth!” (868-69). 
Her identity thus disordered, Cecilia flees to London where, after a series of startling events, she 
falls victim to madness. As she transitions from maniacal defiance to complete insensibility, her 
perception of self and other becomes so fragmented that any emotional event is projected to 
“have fatal consequences” (915). In fact, it is not until her husband releases her to death that she 
awakens to a reasoned state, assuring Delvile—her self-professed “destroyer” and “murderer”—
that “to see you,—to be yours,—drives all evil from my remembrance” (926, 927). Cecilia’s 
experience of insanity is symbolic of the subjective liminality caused by the abundance of loss 
through marriage, and it is representative of the legal death begotten through coverture. The 
consequence of this lawful violence, therefore, is to raise doubts about the ability of private 
individuals to redefine—without compromising female subjectivity—the terms that constitute 
marriage law’s primary fiction. 
This skepticism overshadows the novel’s close, which subtly extends its critical gaze to 
the law of equitable settlement. As the narrator recites the fate of her many characters, she briefly 
sketches Cecilia’s post-marital property rights. In addition to her pre-marital settlement, which is 
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identical to that “made upon [Delvile’s] mother,” Cecilia has inherited from Mrs. Delvile’s sister 
a “fortune” without dependent conditions (823, 939).  This bequest of separate property is 
interpreted by Mortimer as a legal restorative, returning to Cecilia “that power and independence 
of which her generous and pure regard for himself had deprived her” (939). Certainly, the 
testatrix’s requirement that Cecilia take the legacy for “her sole disposal” allows the heroine to 
re-occupy her positions as proprietor of wealth and charitable agent (939). As Catherine Keohane 
argues, the female-initiated gesture accords Cecilia some “power,” at least in the sense that 
“[her] view of the world and her place in it is not defeated” (396). Still, marriage has emptied 
Cecilia of key identity markers: she is no longer a Beverley, an estate owner, or a vested lineal 
heiress. Although she enjoys some equitable property rights, she is, ultimately, a legal cipher. 
And, this institutionally-imposed vacuity provokes internal disquiet, which the narrator describes 
in the novel’s concluding lines: while Cecilia is the recipient of her mother-in-law’s “warm 
affection” and her husband’s “unremitting fondness,” her happiness is “imperfect”; infected by 
“some misery” and “partial evil,” it is a condition to be born “with chearfullest resignation” 
(941).  
Cecilia’s ambivalent ending thus reflects the difficulty that legal and literary culture had 
in re-imagining the politics of domesticity. Like Haywood before her, Burney signals marriage 
law’s extraordinary power over the individual and her private agreements—here, as in Betsy 
Thoughtless, legal convention corrupts even the most equal, liberating, and affective of domestic 
arrangements. Indeed, the autonomy offered to the feme covert through equitable property rights 
and the private liberalizing of unity of person simply are not enough to avoid entirely the internal 
strife precipitated by the law’s version of marital oneness. 
It is Jane Austen’s turn of the century masterpiece Pride and Prejudice that seeks to 
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resolve the constitutive problems of marriage law identified by its literary predecessors.119 As 
this novel of manners scrutinizes the customs and conventions of its immediate social context, it 
imagines the possibility of a domestic space detached from the juridical system by which it is 
authorized and, ostensibly, regulated. In the marriage of the novel’s hero and heroine, Austen 
removes unity of person from its legal framework and firmly situates it within the nuclear family 
structure where mutual respect, emotional compatibility, and personal well-being maintain a safe 
distance from concerns over property, wealth, and patrilineal succession. Unity, therefore, 
acquires an egalitarian value that cannot be subverted or destabilized by legal tradition.  
The novel’s opening line—“It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in 
possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife”—foregrounds the narrative’s critical 
action in the relationship between marriage and property. At the novel’s outset, the Bennet 
family of five marriageable daughters is in crisis. The ancestral estate, Longbourn, is entailed in 
the male line and, as the narrator later informs us, the Bennet marriage settlement reserves only a 
small portion—£5,000 total—for Mrs. Bennet and any future daughters and younger sons (200). 
Moreover, Mr. and Mrs. Bennet have been poor stewards of their capital estate. Operating under 
the assumption that “they were to have a son” who “was to join in cutting off the entail,” she 
failed to economize and he neglected to “la[y] by an annual sum for the better provision of his 
children” (199-200). The consequence for the Bennet daughters, who will have little in the way 
of dowries or inheritance, is that marriage within their social class will be difficult but 
                                                 
119 Phoebe Anne Smith also has undertaken an investigation of marriage and the law, including legal fictions, in 
Austen’s oeuvre. In her chapter on Pride and Prejudice, Smith argues, as do I, that “Austen challenges the 
hierarchical construction of the marriage contract and negotiates a new agreement between a man and a woman, an 
agreement based on mutuality and equal standing as individuals with autonomy” (116). Smith does not, however, 
explicitly discuss the novel in relation to the traditional fiction of marital unity (see 112-48). Additionally, Hazel 
Jones provides an extensive discussion of marriage in Austen; rather than focus on the novels’ legal contexts, 
however, Jones considers their biographical frameworks, focusing on how Austen’s experiences with and 
commentary on marriage shaped her fiction. 
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imperative. To subsist comfortably once their father dies, Jane, Elizabeth, Lydia, Kitty, and Mary 
require unions to land or wealth—they require, in other words, the maintenance that marital 
coverture promises. Nevertheless, the Bennet daughters and, in particular, the romantic Jane and 
the individually-minded Elizabeth, reject the idea of a property-centered marriage and the 
legalistic expression of marital unity that it implies. To borrow from Armstrong, these characters 
“hold out for a contract based on a certain quality of feeling” (How Novels Think 45). They 
aspire to marriages that attend to their emotional needs and personal desires: respect, happiness, 
affection, and love dominate their thoughts and discourse on the subject. The narrative conflict 
thus emerges as a contest between material and personal welfare, between familial duty and 
individual right, and between traditional and modern conceptions of unity. 
These tensions become readily apparent in the novel’s initial marriage plot. Here, the 
principal heroine, Elizabeth, is presented with a marriage proposal from distant cousin and 
Longbourn heir, Mr. Collins. Wishing to mitigate the “loss” of the family estate and “indifferent” 
as to his bride’s marriage portion, Collins has determined to “chuse a wife from among [the 
Bennet] daughters” (73). It is a union that would provide Elizabeth economic security and 
preserve the lineal estate in the Bennet bloodline; it is also, however, an alliance without the 
prospect of intellectual stimulation or emotional connection. Elizabeth, therefore, rejects the 
offer, citing the importance of personal wellbeing: “You could not make me happy,” she informs 
Collins, “and I am convinced that I am the last woman in the world who would make you so” 
(73). Rather than try his hand with another Bennet daughter, Collins proposes to Elizabeth’s 
cousin, Charlotte Lucas. Motivated “by the pure and disinterested desire of an establishment,” 
Charlotte quickly accepts the offer from a man she considers “neither sensible nor agreeable” 
(83). Unlike Elizabeth, Charlotte’s marital ethos is defined by material reality—as a “well-
140 
educated young wom[a]n of small fortune,” marriage for her is a primarily a “preservative from 
want” (83). Although based in economic circumstance and in accordance with social expectation, 
Charlotte’s utilitarian view—reflected in her decision to marry Collins—is interpreted by 
Elizabeth as a “sacrifice[] [of] every better feeling to worldly advantage” (85). And, with this 
violation of romantic ethics, comes private discord—Charlotte has “sunk in [Elizabeth’s] 
esteem” and disrupted the heroine’s faith in humanity’s “merit and sense” (85-86, 91).  
Austen continues to investigate the ideological tensions surrounding marital unity in the 
novel’s aristocratic marriage plot. In a scene reminiscent of those penned by Burney in Cecilia, 
this novel’s heroine confronts the patrician sentiment on marriage in the figure of Lady Catherine 
de Bourgh. The noblewoman challenges Elizabeth’s right to contract marriage with her nephew 
and the novel’s hero, Mr. Darcy, arguing his marriage to her daughter has been arranged since 
“their infancy” (231). When the heroine responds with a reference to the right of free choice, 
Lady Catherine applies to the aristocratic interpretation of matrimony as a foregone union of 
estates and an extension of the ancestral dynasty: 
My daughter and my nephew are formed for each other. They are descended on the 
maternal side, from the same noble line; and, on the father’s, from respectable, 
honourable, and ancient, though untitled families. Their fortune on both sides is splendid. 
They are destined for each other by the voice of every member of their respective houses, 
and what is to divide them? (232) 
 
Lady Catherine’s pretension provokes an argument that pits modern individualism against social 
tradition, with Elizabeth challenging the right of elitist rule—“you have certainly no right to 
concern yourself in [my affairs]”—and Lady Catherine arguing the corruption of both English 
manners and the great English estate: to marry Darcy is to jettison “the [upper class] claims of 
duty, honour, and gratitude” and to “pollute” the land through which those claims were 
established (233-34). Unsurprisingly, in this war of marriage philosophies, Elizabeth emerges the 
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victor—as Claudia Johnson argues, “[t]he insolence of rank and power has been chastized” (Jane 
Austen 89).120 In fact, the archaic tenets of noble marriage left unsettled by Burney are 
permanently sidelined by Austen, who scripts the narrative’s romantic climax as a consequence 
of the peeress’s antiquated views: Darcy and the narrator both point to Lady Catherine’s 
“unjustifiable” intervention as the impetus for his marriage proposal and for the couple’s “good 
understanding” of their union’s value (249, 239).   
The marriage of Elizabeth and Darcy thus provides a new marital ethos, one that 
displaces the mercenary philosophy of Charlotte and the patrimonial thesis of Lady Catherine.  
For this hero and heroine, whose courtship has been an experiment in intellectual and moral 
development, marriage is primarily a site for maintaining one’s individuality and for cultivating a 
range of social intimacies. Elizabeth, whose “former prejudices ha[ve] been removed,” and 
Darcy, whose “pride and conceit” have been tempered, will experience the nuptial union as an 
exchange of ideas and ideals, a habitat for mutual respect and affection, and an opportunity for 
practicing ethical individuality (240-41). Although we are not privy to the Darcys’ married life 
(the novel concludes with their marriage), Elizabeth envisions its potential early on: “It was a 
union that must have been to the advantage of both; by her ease and liveliness, his mind might 
have been softened, his manners improved; and from his judgement, information, and knowledge 
of the world, she must have received benefit of greater importance” (202). Moreover, the 
narrator, in her conclusory remarks, reports its substance, noting Elizabeth’s “lively, sportive, 
manner” and Darcy’s “open pleasantry,” Elizabeth’s “persuasion” and Darcy’s acquiescence, and 
the couple’s enduring commitment to each other and to family and friends (253-54). It is a 
                                                 
120 It is important to note that Johnson is more skeptical about the political significance of this chastisement. She 
argues that it is “never radical[] enough to make us doubt [aristocratic] prestige” nor it is enough to purge us of the 
desire for the social and material advantages conferred by “rank and power” (89). 
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picture of unity—authenticated in characters motivated by a complexity of genuine feeling and 
sympathetic purpose—that renders insignificant the patriarchal and patrilineal aspects of juridical 
oneness.  
Austen further pushes legal ideas about marital unity to the narrative margins in the 
novel’s engagement with equitable property rights. Although (as I address below) Austen 
employs the estate to hasten the courtship process, she ultimately excludes the mechanics of 
personal and real property from the Darcy marriage’s architecture. Not only is her narrator silent 
about settlements, dower rates, and separate estates, her heroine is adverse to such talk. When 
Mrs. Bennet celebrates Elizabeth’s future wealth and separate maintenance—“how rich and how 
great you will be! What pin-money, what jewels, what carriages you will have!”—the heroine 
responds with disdain, as if any allusion to these legal benefits will taint the progressive idea of 
unity that she and Darcy have framed (247, 48). Austen instead underwrites Lydia’s marriage to 
Wickham with legal terms. A pre-nuptial agreement, negotiated after the couple’s illicit affair, 
provides the union’s foundation—it is the incentive for Wickham’s consent to the marriage and, 
therefore, the insurance against Lydia’s impending collapse into social ruin. The bride’s uncle, 
Mr. Gardiner, writes to Mr. Bennet with the initial settlement conditions: “All that is required of 
you is, to assure to your daughter, by settlement, her equal share of the five thousand pounds, 
secured among your children . . . and, moreover, to enter into an engagement of allowing her, 
during your life, one hundred pounds per annum” (197). The bride’s aunt, Mrs. Gardiner, 
explains to Elizabeth the agreement’s supplement: “His debts are to be paid . . ., another 
thousand in addition to her own settled upon her, and his commission purchased” (211). Yet, 
these rights fail to provide domestic stability or female autonomy—the marriage is one of 
indebtedness and “indifference,” and Lydia is an unloved wife dependent on outside charity 
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(252-53).  Thus, in aligning the practice of equitable settlement with the disastrous Wickham 
union, Austen further contaminates the idea of legal unity. Separate property rights do not ensure 
marital equality, independence, and wellbeing; this can only be purchased through extra-legal 
means—i.e., through a true communion of interests, intellects, desires, and persons.  
This is not to say that the novel repudiates the value of rank and property to the marriage 
contracting process. In fact, status and estate are essential to the establishment of Austen’s 
marital ideal. It is not until Elizabeth visits Darcy’s ancestral home, Pemberley, that she sees him 
as a legitimate partner, declaring on her approach into the estate grounds that “to be mistress of 
Pemberley might be something!” (159). In the “natural beauty” of the grounds and the “lofty and 
handsome” interior of the house, the heroine comes to admire the proprietor’s “taste” (159); in 
his portrait and through his housekeeper’s “commendation,” she grows to appreciate his 
authority “[a]s a brother, a landlord, [and] a master” (162). Alistair Duckworth rightly observes 
that within this alliance of person and property “excellent aesthetic taste denotes an excellence of 
moral character” (124).121 Moreover, as Sandra MacPherson suggests, the alliance, governed as it 
is by the legal entail, demonstrates Darcy as “the exemplary ethical subject,” one who 
understands his duty of care (17, 15-18).122 Yet, these traditional indicators of marital suitability 
only abide in the courtship stage—the Darcy union appears to be void of any of the mercenary, 
elitist, or patriarchal qualities that they imply.  
For those marriages in the novel that fall outside of Austen’s ideal, material resources and 
social position are the defining qualities; nevertheless, because the unions reflect the economic 
                                                 
121 Duckworth notes that other scholars, including Walton Litz and Martin Price, also have made this connection. 
 
122 For MacPherson, Darcy represents a “willed” as opposed to “willing” “model of obligation”—he acts based on 
social or familial responsibility (willed to him through the entail), rather than on individual feeling (17-18, 2). While 
I agree that the entail helps to structure Darcy’s morality, I don’t believe that we can dismiss the significance “of 
affiliation and of affect” (15) to his character’s ethical sentiment. 
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and social realities of Austen’s historical moment, they retain a degree of validity. For example, 
Charlotte’s marriage, while unfortunate, is not the disaster we might have anticipated from 
Elizabeth’s earlier judgment. Elizabeth herself is forced, upon visiting Charlotte at the Collins’s 
parsonage, to “meditate upon [her cousin’s] degree of contentment” and to recognize the 
“charms” in “her home and her housekeeping, her parish and her poultry, and all their dependent 
concerns” (105, 142). She is also inclined, in a conversation with her aunt, to acknowledge that 
the line “between the mercenary and the prudent [matrimonial] motive” is often indistinct: 
“Where does discretion end, and avarice begin?” she wonders (102). Moreover, Lydia’s 
marriage, though “unsettled” (253), is never presented as anything but a social and familial 
mandate. This younger sister’s participation in Wickham’s “scheme of infamy” requires a legal 
corrective: “[T]hey must marry” Elizabeth avers to Mr. Bennet. “Yes, Yes, they must marry. 
There is nothing else to be done,” he affirms (189, 197). In these vignettes, Austen suggests that 
poverty, age, and social advantage are rational, though not particularly admirable, motives for 
contracting marriage. What the novel does in the Darcy union, then, is to draw a valuable 
alternative to marriages that are primarily legal (as opposed to affective) in quality. Indeed, 
Austen offers a prototype for which readers can strive, one in which the law serves only an 
authorizing, rather than constitutive, function. 
While Austen’s model of marital unity promotes many of the principles that informed the 
burgeoning code of liberal contract, its constituents remain accountable to their social context. 
As numerous scholars have argued, Pride and Prejudice reads as a sort of ideological 
compromise, with the bourgeois individual, as represented most overtly in the novel’s heroine, 
coming through courtship and marriage to identify with certain social rights and obligations, and 
the conservative social, as represented in the novel’s hero, coming to understand the limitations 
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of rank, property, and class as moral signifiers. Duckworth, for example, contends that the 
novel’s “solution” to competing ideas about the individual and the social “is neither society 
alone, nor self alone, but self-in-society” (142), and Armstrong maintains that the novel’s socio-
political contribution is its creation of a “subtle synthesis” of moral codes that “enhances” 
individual “value” (How Novels Think, 47-48). Additionally, Michael McKeon argues that 
Austen’s is a “conflationary project” of “the individual and the social,” a project that promotes 
“both self-knowledge and ethical sociability” by “requir[ing] the sympathetic internalization” of 
diverse perspectives (Secret History, 715-17).123 Continuing in this critical direction, I want to 
suggest that by abstracting issues of (or concerns over) property ownership, separate 
maintenance, and legal identity from the novel’s marital ideal, Austen dismisses key mechanisms 
of patriarchy, paternalism, and patrilinealism to the legal sphere, while maintaining within the 
conjugal family a moral perspective that advocates a firm, but disciplined, individualism and a 
socially-minded, yet egalitarian, domestic government. The law and its marriage fiction do not, 
therefore, disappear; rather they operate tangentially to—and, we are encouraged to believe, 
abide passively with—the heart of this most important of social contracts. 
Conclusion 
“Unity of person” is one of the law’s most enduring and controversial legal fictions. For 
centuries, the doctrine operated as the foundational justification for marital coverture, 
authorizing the common law’s abrogation of married women’s legal identity and the rescission 
of their property and contract rights. It also ensured that marriage, once executed, lost its 
contractual character. In the eighteenth-century, equitable legal culture sought to remedy some of 
                                                 
123 For additional interpretations of the novel’s ideological messaging through its depiction of marriage, see M. 
Butler, 197-218; and Poovey 194-207. Both Butler and Poovey argue that the marriage between Elizabeth and Darcy 
and, therefore, the politics of Austen, tilt toward the conservative.  
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the disabilities engendered by the fiction in the form of married women’s separate property 
rights; however, these efforts were limited and indefinite, suggesting the law’s institutional 
ambivalence on the nature of the marriage contract and the relative competencies of its 
participants. Literary culture also became attentive to the common-law invention, the period’s 
domestic novels operating as cultural courtrooms in which the paternalistic, patriarchal, and 
patrilineal assumptions that controlled marital oneness were tried and, in general, found to be 
transgressive of individual subjectivity, particularly women’s. Moreover, literary fiction 
persisted beyond the cross-cultural trial to arbitration, ultimately isolating the legal fiction to its 
institutional sphere and creating for the domestic space a progressive alliance. Under novelists’ 
juridical superintendence, unity of person acquired an egalitarian and democratic quality, and the 
married female subject became reacquainted with her individual selfhood.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE FICTIONS OF MARRIAGE-CONTRACT DISSOLUTION 
The vast majority of eighteenth-century domestic novels are focused on constructing the 
happy, affective marriage. Yet, there is a subset of this literary form that is also concerned with 
the bad marriage—i.e., the unhappy, unfulfilling, or unworkable marriage—and the politics of its 
(de)construction. In these novels, the domestic space is fractured by economic demands, social 
pressures, ideological conflicts, and educational deficiencies, and there is little prospect for relief 
outside of spousal death. Indeed, husbands, wives, and their children live in a perpetually liminal 
state, one that is often marked by infidelity, bastardy, cruelty, and neglect. Of particular interest 
for this project are the splintered families of Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722), Eliza 
Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless (1751), Elizabeth Inchbald’s A Simple Story (1791), and Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Maria (1798); the project also briefly addresses the marital failures represented 
in Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1811) and Mansfield Park (1814).  As representatives of 
their authors’ legal-historical contexts, these domestic units reflect the presumptions and fictions 
by which the period’s marriage dissolution policy was established and sustained. Moreover, they 
allow us to better understand the practical and ethical impact of this policy on the private sphere 
and, in particular, its female and adolescent constituency. 
This chapter, therefore, examines the foregoing novels’ engagement with their immediate 
legal culture on issues of separation, divorce, and the parent-child relationship. Part I describes 
the theological and philosophical foundations for England’s marital permanence doctrine, a 
policy seemingly at odds with the idea of marriage as a “civil contract.” It also outlines the 
doctrine’s ecclesiastical exceptions and its common law correlates in the areas of illegitimacy 
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and child custody. This contextual framing demonstrates the law’s investment in the notion that 
marriage is a universal good, its permanence essential to individual, private, and public welfare; 
it also shows the law’s commitment to the assumptions of heritable bastardy and paternal right. 
Part II examines the jurisprudence surrounding two significant developments in eighteenth-
century dissolution law, parliamentary divorce and private separation. On the one hand, this 
examination reveals that these ostensibly progressive exceptions to the law’s anti-dissolution 
doctrine were either directed or constrained by the conservative precepts that informed England’s 
extant divorce policy. On the other hand, it demonstrates a larger, and generally progressive, 
cultural shift in how people understood and wanted to live out their marital rights and 
obligations. Part III then investigates the literary response to conventional and developing legal 
doctrine on marital and familial breakdown. I argue that novelists writing about domestic conflict 
use a variety of forms and genres, including the fictional autobiography and the sentimental and 
the gothic narrative, to challenge and, especially at the period’s end, to advocate for reform of 
the law’s utilitarian assumptions about dissolution, illegitimacy, and paternal authority. I further 
argue that these writers expose the way in which legal fictions, such as the fiction of filius 
nullius, escape their lawful boundaries, to the prejudice of the eighteenth-century family. Finally, 
I contend that, while Defoe, Haywood, Inchbald, Wollstonecraft, and even Austen generally fail 
in their novels to envision revolutionary legal change on the issues of divorce, separation, and 
child welfare, their work legitimates those texts that seek to re-structure, in more progressive 
terms, the processes of marriage formation and unification.  
Part I: The Immutability of Status 
For much of England’s history, marriage was a permanent status—the legal bond of unity 
of person could be broken only through spousal death. During the medieval period, the principal 
justification for this strict interpretation of the marriage contract was Catholic doctrine that 
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identified marriage as a sacrament, an inviolable covenant between the wedded couple and God 
(Witte 94-6; Gibson 10-11). A form of this reasoning survived the sixteenth-century Protestant 
Reformation and found expression in the 1604 Anglican Canons, which continued to interpret 
marriage as a divine institution fixed in its permanence (Witte 255-56; Stone, Road 351). In the 
mid-seventeenth century, theologians looking to reinforce the idea of indissolubility 
supplemented religion with socio-political philosophy. John Witte explains their argument:  
The domestic commonwealth was the foundation of the English commonwealth. . . . Its 
definition and discharge of duties was essential for civic order, liberty, and rule of law. . . 
. To break marriage [outside of the canons] . . . was, to act ‘against nature,’ ‘against the 
church,’ ‘against the commonwealth,’ indeed, ‘against the whole state of mankind’” 
(265).124  
 
Although perhaps compelling during the Interregnum, this rationale was eventually subverted by 
Enlightenment arguments that found an inextricable link between the marriage contract and the 
social contract. Rather than an institution of divine law and sovereign authority, marriage now 
was a private agreement with a strong “natural, social, and spiritual” substructure—its 
indissolubility was sanctioned by the dictates of “nature, reason, fairness, prudence, utility, 
pragmatism and common sense” (Witte 291 and 300).  
Witte locates the eighteenth-century shift on marriage dissolution theory in Locke’s 
philosophy of the conjugal estate, and in particular, his “‘impious hypothesis.’” Witte argues that 
Locke’s idea that that the marriage contract existed prior to and outside of divine authority and 
church government—that it was a “simple bi-lateral contract” between equal persons—provided 
a more flexible framework for Enlightenment intellectuals to theorize on the creation and 
implementation of the marital bond (289-90). Locke himself used this framework to deliberate 
on the possibility of a dissoluble union in Second Treatise:  
                                                 
124 Here, Witte quotes Bishop Lancelot Andrews. 
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[O]ne [has] reason to inquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are 
secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, 
or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, 
there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should 
always be for life. (134-35; sec. 81) 
 
As Witte demonstrates, this radical recalculation of marriage’s immutability did not redound to 
the work of Locke’s successors, but it did support their secular justifications for indissolubility. 
Thus, David Hume in “Of Polygamy and Divorces” (circa. 1741) argues against divorce on the 
grounds of child welfare, marital affection, and domestic peace: he writes, for example,  
[N]othing is more dangerous than to unite two persons so closely in all their interests and 
concerns, as man and wife, without rendering the union entire and total. The least 
possibility of a separate interest must be the source of endless quarrels and suspicions. 
The wife, not secure of her establishment, will still be driving some separate end or 
project; and the husband’s selfishness, being accompanied with more power, may be still 
more dangerous. (sec. 20) 
 
Adam Smith presents a similar argument on divorce as productive of domestic disorder in his 
1766 Lectures on Jurisprudence: “[I]t is always better that the marriage tye should be too strait, 
than that it should be too loose. . . . When both parties have the power of divorce they can have 
no mutual trust nor dependence upon each other, but their interests are quite separate” (445; 
para.118). Moreover, William Paley in his Principles represents the utilitarian view: because 
divorce endangers children, upsets spouses’ “common interest” and “mutual compliance,” 
jeopardizes the wife’s economic and social security, and promotes “libertinism,” it is “contrary 
to the law of nature” and inimical to “the general happiness of married life” and to the 
“happiness of the community” (186-90; bk. 3, pt. 3, ch. 7).125 In these men’s minds, therefore, 
marriage, though now patently contractual, continued to deserve strict regulation and theirs were 
                                                 
125 For a more in-depth discussion of the philosophies of Hume, Smith, and Paley on the issue of divorce, see Witte 
294-300. 
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the presumptions on which marriage law must operate to protect the public and the private 
spheres from the devastation wrought by divorce. 
Notwithstanding the general prohibition on marital dissolution, there were limited 
opportunities for legal annulment and separation, neither of which purported to violate historical 
arguments for permanence.126 From the twelfth to the mid-nineteenth century, Anglican canon 
law and the ecclesiastical courts admitted two causes of action for relief from the marital bond. 
The first cause, divorce a vinculo, operated as an annulment and recognized the right to remarry. 
It required the petitioner to prove that “the putative marriage had been void from its 
commencement by reason of a ‘dirimentary impediment’” (Baker 491). Such impediments 
related to the putative spouses’ consent or capacity to contract and included age, duress, insanity, 
precontract, consanguinity, affinity, and impotence (Baker 491-92). While a dissolution decree 
released the parties from the state of coverture, it had the potential effect of binding their 
children to the condition of bastardy. According to canon law, unless at least one parent could 
demonstrate ignorance of the “illicit connection,” any child born prior to the annulment would be 
deemed illegitimate and subject to canonical disabilities (Baker 489). Moreover, under the 
“coldly logical view” of the common law, “bastardy . . . was indelible,” there being no 
exemption from its attendant legal disabilities (Baker 489-90).127 Thus, in its connection to 
marital formation, divorce a vinculo had the effect of reinforcing the absolute indissolubility of 
                                                 
126 In addition to the scholars cited herein, Hazel Lord offers a nice, succinct overview of early modern divorce law 
(12-18). 
 
127 See also Helmholz for a description of the difference between canonical and common law on determinations of 
bastardy (198). 
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the marital union: rather than obtain divorce in the modern sense, couples simply received legal 
confirmation that they were, in fact, never married.128 
The second canonical cause for marital relief—termed divorce a mensa thoro (or 
separation from bed and board)—operated as a judicial separation and prohibited remarriage. 
The principal petitionary grounds were adultery and, to borrow from Stone, “life-threatening 
cruelty” (Road 192).129 Because the parties remained in the state of marital coverture post-
decree, their common law and equitable property rights were unchanged by their physical 
separation—the husband retained his interest in the wife’s personal and real property, and the 
wife stayed vested in her separate estate (if any); however, his maintenance obligation depended 
on the court’s findings of fault—an innocent (i.e., non-adulterous) wife was entitled to alimony, 
while a guilty (i.e., adulterous) wife was left to fend for herself (Stone, Road 193). Coverture 
also defined the parties’ custody rights—in the absence of clear evidence of paternal violence or 
severe neglect, he had all and she had none (Wright, “Custody,” para. 9). Divorce a mensa thoro, 
therefore, sustained enough of the original character of marital unity to avoid the large cultural 
problem of indissolubility.     
It is important within this discussion of divorce law to consider for a moment the 
jurisprudence of bastardy and child custody. Illegitimacy arguably became a social pathology in 
eighteenth-century England. According to Peter Laslett, the “illegitimacy ratio” steadily 
increased from just under two (1.779 in 1700-04) to just over five (5.307 in 1800-04) percent in 
the period’s course (14 [table 1.1(a)]). Historians have posited a multitude of theories on the 
                                                 
128 As Baker puts it: “[Couples] could not break the chains, but they could declare that the chains were never there” 
(491). 
 
129 Baker contends that ecclesiastical courts also would consider sodomy, heresy, and fear of future injury as 
grounds for divorce a mensa thoro (493). 
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origins of this rise, including the passage of The Matrimonial Duty Act (1694) and Hardwicke’s 
Marriage Act (1753), both of which, Laslett observes, had strict recording requirements (51) and 
both of which had the potential to increase informal unions.130 What is significant to this project, 
however, is not the legal cause of, but the legal response to, pre-nuptial or adulterine births. 
Blackstone provides the definition for illegitimacy: “A bastard, by our English laws, is one that 
is not only begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony” (1: 442).131 This included children born 
after nine months of a husband’s absence from the country and children born during a divorce a 
mensa thoro, as in both cases the husband was presumed to have “no access” to his wife. It also, 
as earlier noted, included children born to a marriage declared null and void by a divorce a 
vinculo (Blackstone 1: 445). While bastards were entitled to parental maintenance, they were 
prohibited from common law inheritance by operation of the legal fiction filius nullius 
(Blackstone 1: 446-47). This fiction, which Blackstone translates to “son of nobody,” 
presumably preserved one principal aim of marriage—the “procreati[on] of lawful heirs” 
(Blackstone 1: 447, 443)—and one principal aim of patriarchal society—the primogenitive and 
patrilineal distribution of landed estates (see Stone 350-52). The fiction also made ecclesiastical 
divorce or separation a risky venture, especially for couples in a propertied union. 
The presumptions and restrictions of child custody law certainly had an impact on 
whether couples pursued legal estrangement. Under the common law, wives, because they lived 
in a state of coverture, had “no [legal] power” over their offspring (Blackstone 1: 441). 
Children’s maintenance, education, and protection were the sole duties, and their custody the 
                                                 
130 The essays that form Part I of Laslett, Oosterveen, and Smith’s Bastardy and its Comparative History provide a 
variety of potential causes for bastardy in pre-industrial and industrial Britain. In addition, see Stone, Family, Sex 
and Marriage 382-404.  
 
131 As a point of clarification, this rule differs from that of canon law, which conferred legitimacy on children whose 
parents subsequently married (see Baker 489-90). 
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sole right, of the father. He even had the ability through guardianship law to “dispose of . . . 
custody” to someone other than the mother (Blackstone 1: 450).132 While eighteenth-century 
courts heard a multitude of cases challenging the father’s custodial right, including cases that 
purported to contemplate the child’s best interests, none were interspousal (i.e., between husband 
and wife) and most acted to reinforce a presumption of natural paternal guardianship.133 In fact, 
Danaya C. Wright demonstrates that at the same time the period’s custody jurisprudence 
indicates an increasing interest in “litigating the scope and [moral] quality of paternal right,” it 
also shows a developing “rhetoric of strong presumptions and rights” in the father’s favor 
(“Rethinking the Birth,” 283-84). This rhetoric, Wright argues, continues through the first 
custody case brought by a mother against a living, but estranged, father. Although determined on 
standing grounds (the court found that the wife did not have standing to sue in Chancery), De 
Manneville v. De Manneville (1804) came to represent, in later jurisprudence, “the principle that 
paternal rights to custody were nearly absolute,” particularly against maternal claims (Wright, 
“Rethinking the Birth,” 284).134 Thus, divorce and judicial separation had ramifications beyond 
                                                 
132 Danaya C. Wright observes that “the state gave to a father the right to appoint by will a guardian for his children, 
and he could certainly appoint his widow their guardian”; however, “the courts would not allow him to contract out 
of his paternal duties by giving custody of his children to their mother while he was still alive” (“Rethinking the 
Birth,” 256-57). 
 
133 According to Wright, most cases involved fathers and male family members or appointed male guardians, or 
fathers and the state; mothers were primarily implicated in cases brought after the husband’s death where 
guardianship of the surviving minor children was at issue (“Rethinking the Birth,” 275-84). 
 
134 In De Manneville v. De Manneville, Mrs. De Manneville sued her estranged emigrant husband in Chancery for 
custody of their eleven month old daughter, alleging, among other claims, “ill usage” and “threats to carry her and 
the child out of the kingdom” (763). Lord Chancellor Eldon recognized the court’s duty to “do what is for the 
benefit of the infant,” but denied the mother custody, arguing “[t]his is an application by a married women living in 
a state of actual, unauthorized separation to continue . . . that separation, which I must say is not permitted by law” 
(765-66). In other words, Eldon did not deny the existence of maternal custody rights, but rather suggested that 
Chancery could not contemplate such rights unless and until the mother had secured a divorce or judicial separation 
from the ecclesiastical courts. Eldon did, however, grant Mrs. De Manneville’s petition to “restrain[]” Mr. De 
Manneville “from taking the child out of the kingdom” (768). For two excellent analyses of the De Manneville case, 
see Wright, “Rethinking the Birth” and “Crisis of Child Custody.”  
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the economic for early modern married women and men, who also had to consider the impact of 
maternal loss on their children.  
Notwithstanding the opposition to, and restrictions on, marital dissolution, there were, 
over the course of the early modern period, religious and political efforts at divorce reform. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive of these efforts occurred in 1552 when state, civic, and church 
leaders undertook to revise canon law, including the law on divorce. The new code, Reformatio 
Legum Ecclesiasticarum, sought to abolish divorce a mensa thoro and to expand the grounds for 
divorce a vinculo to include adultery, desertion, deadly hostility, and prolonged ill-treatment.135 
Yet, the Reformatio was never officially adopted; instead, the traditional restrictions on divorce 
were re-affirmed in the 1604 Anglican Canons.136 The issue of reform gained prominence again 
in middle of the seventeenth century with John Milton’s radical argument for “easy divorce” in 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643, rev. 1644).137 Milton relies on Mosaic Law and New 
Testament Scripture to argue for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, in what 
has been termed the “Indisposition Passage”:  
[I]ndisposition, unfitnes, or contrariety of mind, arising from a cause in nature 
unchangable, hindring and ever likely to hinder the main benefits of conjugall society, 
which are solace and peace, is a greater reason of divorce than naturall frigidity, 
especially if there be no children, and that there be mutual consent. (242) 
 
For Milton, domestic discontent and the restrictive ecclesiastical divorce law had a direct and 
negative effect on the civil rights and religious liberties owed the English citizenry. An 
                                                 
135 The relevant Reformatio provisions are found in the section titled “Concerning Adultery and Divorce”: chapter 
19 abolishes divorce a mensa thoro and chapters 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 recognize expanded grounds for divorce 
(Reformatio, 99-106). In addition, the title of chapter 12—“Slight Disagreements, Unless Permanent, No Ground for 
Divorce”—suggests sustained irreconcilable differences might also warrant dissolution (Reformatio, 103).  
 
136 For a detailed explanation of the obstacles to the Reformatio’s passage, see Spaulding. 
  
137 Here, I borrow the term “easy divorce” from Witte who, along with other scholars, uses the term to refer to 
divorce on grounds other than adultery, desertion, and cruelty. 
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individual forced by positive human law to remain in a state of domestic tyranny experienced not 
only personal, but also religious and political oppression: his was a state of persecution that 
“s[at] . . . heavy on the Common-wealth” and made impossible “all hope of true Reformation in 
the state” (Milton 229-30). In general, Milton’s arguments for divorce were seen as incendiary 
and extremist, and they were censured by theologians, politicians, and civilians alike.138 
Nevertheless, these ideas, which were soon followed by Locke’s proto-liberal meditations on 
dissolution, provoked a cultural discussion that, prima facie, helped to instantiate two important 
legal changes in the long eighteenth century: the introduction of the parliamentary bill of divorce 
and the development of the private deed of separation.  
As we shall see, although of limited application, these legal inventions are significant for 
thinking about the ways in which the law responded to the advancing notion of marriage as a 
civil and secular contract, as well as to the idea that the parties thereto are individuals vested with 
the right to determine for themselves the nature and scope of domestic government. To what 
degree do these developments signal an attempt to either modify or reinforce the presumptions 
that underlie arguments for marriage as a permanent status? Is the law attentive to the possibility 
that the foundational arguments against dissolution are themselves fictions with indeterminate 
utility? Do the public and private measures reconceive of wives, mothers, and children in more 
liberal terms—i.e., with rights and duties that extend beyond that of husband and father? Do the 
measures in any way challenge the utility and ethics of the fictions and presumptions that inform 
the jurisprudence of parental responsibility and authority?   
  
                                                 
138 For a discussion of contemporary responses to Milton’s work on divorce, see van den Berg and Howard. 
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Part II: Domestic Happiness, Public Welfare, and Key Developments in Divorce Law 
Historical scholarship on divorce and separation in eighteenth-century England often 
focuses on the social or legal forces that informed two prominent exceptions to the 
indissolubility doctrine, specifically parliamentary divorce and private separation. With respect 
to the former, most historians agree that the legislative action was initially instituted as a way for 
those in the upper classes to protect family name, power, and estate.139 Parliamentary divorce 
allowed for remarriage in cases of wifely adultery, thereby helping to ensure the legitimacy of 
the paternal heir and the longevity of the patrilineal empire. Historians also tend to agree that 
divorce petitioners’ motivations were changing in the latter part of the century. Lawrence Stone, 
for example, argues that the extra-judicial action became a way for wealthy couples to extricate 
themselves from unhappy unions, “the objective now being the pursuit of happiness and the 
replacement of lost marital comfort” (346); while Colin Gibson suggests that it was a means for 
male petitioners to enforce the “chaste morality” of the bourgeois class, which placed particular 
emphasis on “[t]he pleasures, satisfactions, and rewards” of domestic life and on the virtuous 
wife’s place within it” (38). Most likely, it was a combination of patrilineal, individual, and 
moral concerns that made parliamentary divorce a viable option for a range of fractious unions.  
Historical accounts of private separation generally hold that it was established by legal 
practitioners as a means to provide an affordable and discreet remedy for marital grievance (e.g., 
adultery or cruelty) or no-fault spousal discord. Although the dissolution method did not allow 
for remarriage, it did contemplate, in the form of a contractual deed, physical estrangement, 
wifely maintenance, and freedom from certain of coverture’s disabilities. Historians interested in 
this ostensibly liberal reimagining of the marriage contract, most prominently Stone and Susan 
                                                 
139 See, e.g., Gibson 29; and Stone, Road 312, 346. 
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Staves, have demonstrated that the judicial response was inconsistent and often hypercritical, 
particularly of the notion of inter-spousal contracting (marital unity, remember, prohibited 
husbands and wives from contracting between themselves) and the idea of female independence. 
Stone observes the judiciary’s reluctance to enforce these agreements at common law and in 
equity and argues that the trajectory of jurisprudence on the matter was regressive—the leniency 
of the eighteenth-century courts on the rights and liberties provided in the separation deed was 
confronted with a conservative reaction at the century’s turn (see Road 151-56). Staves presents 
a similar developmental course in her comprehensive review of the period’s case law on the 
matter. She argues that “after an initial period of pursuing and developing a contract logic in 
dealing with separate maintenance contracts [i.e., private deeds of separation], in the later 
eighteenth century the courts attacked the relevance of this logic in domestic cases and 
repudiated some of the earlier decisions” (167).140 The consequence, Staves argues, was a return 
to juridical patriarchy in the form of restrictions on the right of private separation, as well as the 
terms under which it was to be conducted (178-95).141  
This chapter’s analysis of the law’s dissolution jurisprudence, including divorce acts, 
parliamentary debates, model separation deeds, and case law, tends to confirm these historical 
accounts of the development of parliamentary divorce and private separation. More importantly, 
it demonstrates that the traditional presumptions and stated fictions that had sustained the legal 
doctrine establishing marriage’s indissolubility continued to have a controlling influence within 
the law’s discourse on this doctrine’s exceptions. Indeed, the notion that marriage is fundamental 
                                                 
140 Stone and Staves disagree, however, on the significance of the private separation deed to the bond of patriarchy 
(Staves 166-67). 
 
141 For another discussion of private separation’s treatment in the courts, see Peaslee. Pearlston also addresses 
private separation agreements and provides an in-depth discussion of their treatment by the eighteenth-century 
English judiciary (e.g., 112-163 and 220-316).   
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to public and private stability, and the idea that its unified structure must be constituted as a 
gendered hierarchy, remained central to legislative and judicial decision-making on divorce bills 
and separation deeds. Additionally, the presumption of paternal right, as well as the fiction of 
filius nullius, persisted within this body of marriage law to the detriment of maternal right and 
child welfare.  Ultimately, the primary materials reveal a system so deeply invested in 
conservative dogma that the explicit and implied fictions surrounding marital permanence 
assumed a legal reality.  
Parliamentary Divorce 
Parliamentary divorce originated in the late-seventeenth century and became, in the 
eighteenth century, an attractive alternative to judicial separation (divorce a mensa thoro) and 
ecclesiastical divorce (divorce a vinculo). The three earliest cases for parliamentary divorce 
established the action’s pleading and procedural requirements, all of which remained in place 
until its mid-nineteenth-century demise. The Lord Roos case (1670), Duke of Norfolk case 
(1691; granted 1700), and Earl of Macclesfield case (1698) extended divorce a vinculo (i.e., 
divorce with the right of remarriage) to instances of wifely adultery, and they initiated the 
custom of procuring a judicial separation and proving a case of criminal conversation (i.e., a civil 
action for damages against the wife’s seducer) prior to the divorce bill’s submission.142 In the 
two hundred years that followed, Parliament enacted a total of 324 bills for divorce, or 28 
between 1700 and 1759 (0.5 per annum), 102 between 1760 and 1799 (or 2.5 per annum) and 
194 between 1800 and 1857 (3.3 per annum).143 While these figures appear relatively low by 
                                                 
142 For an extended discussion of the legal origins of parliamentary divorce, including a detailed overview of the 
three early cases, see Couch.  
 
143 These numbers are derived from Colin Gibson’s work on parliamentary divorce (28 [Table 3.1]), and they are 
supported by Sylvia Wolfram’s research (157). To be clear, the 324 total excludes the Roos, Norfolk, and 
Macclesfield cases.  
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today’s standards, their trajectory demonstrates an impressive uptick in the number of petitions 
for absolute divorce in the long eighteenth century, with the “peak decades” at 1770-1780 
(approximately 38 petitions) and 1790-1800 (approximately 45 petitions)  (Anderson 423, 415 
[Table 1]).  The data also suggests that parliamentary divorce was not merely a remedy for the 
aristocracy or the gentry and professional classes, especially in the latter half of the period. 
Sylvia Wolfram finds that the number of acts granted non-upper class petitioners (e.g., clergy, 
doctors, merchants, members of the armed forces) in the years 1750-1857 averaged 32.5 percent 
(164 [Table 3]); while Stuart Anderson provides a more robust figure of approximately 50 
percent for the years 1750-1780 (419-22).144 My own research has revealed numerous bills 
proposed by merchants, surgeons, and military officers, as well as by a farmer, a clerk, and a 
butcher, in addition to those submitted by men denoted as “gentleman” or “esquire.” This is 
somewhat surprising given the total cost for pursuing an Act, including the preliminary 
expenditures for a divorce a mensa thoro and a criminal conversation lawsuit, could be hundreds 
of pounds, or higher (Wolfram 166-72; Anderson 436-43). Nevertheless, parliamentary divorce 
became increasingly popular, such that in 1857 Parliament passed the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
which “created a new secular Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes” and codified the 
parliamentary grounds for divorce (Lord 16-17).  
In order to understand the legal framework for this nascent, but powerful, revision to the 
nation’s long-established divorce law, it is necessary to examine the proposed Acts themselves, 
as well as to review the mechanism’s legislative history. This fragmentary historical record 
suggests that Parliament’s decision to circumvent ecclesiastical law was informed by domestic 
                                                 
144 The discrepancy between Wolfram’s and Anderson’s statistics is likely due to a number of factors, including 
different date ranges, larger/smaller geographical scope (Anderson’s numbers reflect the entire British Isles, while 
Wolfram’s do not clearly do so), and differences in the way each scholar categorized social class. 
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and national concerns, particularly as regarded the apparent increase in extra-marital 
relationships.145 Indeed, house journal entries on divorce bills indicate that Parliament perceived 
itself as both an equitable force charged with “supply[ing] the defect of law” in specific cases 
(Cobbett’s 23:710) and as a social authority obligated to act as a “guardian[] of the public 
morals” (Hansard 5:428-29).146 Moreover, the legal archive demonstrates that the lawmakers’ 
intentions were simultaneously punitive, restorative, and protective.  In any particular case, 
Parliament looked to punish adulterers—i.e., wives—for their sexual transgressions, to 
reconstitute the “innocent” spouse—i.e., the husband—as a viable marriage partner, and to 
safeguard the estate against claims by illegitimate children. In a more comprehensive manner, it 
looked to deter extra-marital sexual activity, promote monogamous legal unions, and preserve 
the longstanding system of patrilineal and primogenitive inheritance. In other words, 
parliamentary divorce was not so much a product of modern progressive politics—as represented 
in the notion that marriage was an equable and free-willing civil contract—as it was a 
reinforcement of existing ideas about marriage as the locus of individual and collective stability, 
the embodiment of public and private morality, and the custodian of female weakness and male 
authority. 
Parliamentary divorce’s traditionalist undercurrent is implied in the content and form of 
the dissolution acts, which changed minimally over the century’s course. The standard format for 
the legislative petitions includes three sections: the prefatory recitals, enacting terms, and 
concluding qualifications. The recitals are commonly of four parts: an introductory statement 
                                                 
145 The parliamentary divorce record is spotty in places—only some of the acts appear in the parliamentary debates, 
and the act database does not clarify whether a particular instrument is merely a bill or passed legislation. 
  
146 The first quoted reference (it appears) is to Hon. Charles James Fox’s remarks during debate on the Williams 
divorce bill (1783), and the second quoted reference is to the Bishop of St. Asaph’s remarks during the debate on the 
Teush divorce bill (1805). As noted in Chapter 1, the debate records do not always supply the first name or title of 
the speaker. Where possible, I have provided this information based on The History of Parliament’s online database. 
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that sets forth the party names, the marriage date, and the number and sex of children; a 
procedural statement that confirms the petitioner has secured the requisite ecclesiastical and 
common law orders; a description of the adulterous incident(s); and a declaration and prayer for 
absolute divorce. The latter two parts centralize the wife’s culpability and the husband’s injury, 
such that a myopic and highly-gendered version of the marital breakdown emerges. Her 
“adulterous Behavior,” whether a short affair or long-term cohabitation, has “dissolved the Bond 
of Marriage”; and his being “deprived of the Comforts of matrimony” and vulnerable to the 
claims of “spurious Issue” requires “the . . . Marriage be declared void.” The document’s 
enacting section outlines the legal effects of the wife’s offense in rhetoric that emphasizes male 
right and female disability: “[I]t shall and may be lawful . . . for . . . [the husband] to contract 
Matrimony . . . with any other Woman or Women,” to inherit from and provide dower rights to 
his future wife, and to legitimize and make his heirs any future children; while the present wife 
“shall be barred and excluded from all Dower and Thirds” (i.e., her common law inheritance), 
from claiming property or inheritance rights under the parties’ marriage settlement, and from 
legitimizing children ostensibly born outside the lawful union. The patriarchal bias of these 
enactments, and the strength of the fictions through which that bias wielded power, are further 
intensified in the act’s so-called “bastardy clause.” This provision, a model of excessive legalese, 
not only renders children born post-separation filius nullius, declaring them “Bastards” and 
“spurious Issue,” but also, in its silence on the inheritance and custody of lawful children, 
exhibits unconditional fidelity to patrilineal descent and paternal right. In fact, it is only in the 
final section, a short and conditional provision recognizing the wife’s right to any “Maintenance, 
Support, or Benefit” established after the ecclesiastical separation order, that the text extends 
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equitable consideration outside of the masculine sphere.147 What the parliamentary divorce act 
signifies, therefore, is the interdependence between law and male-centered ethics: divorce 
becomes the natural remedy for female misconduct and the best practice for conserving 
patriarchal hegemony. 
The legislative history on parliamentary divorce, and specifically the record on female-
sponsored petitions, makes explicit the relationship between England’s divorce law and the 
country’s longstanding conservative domestic agenda. The raw data on bills proposed by wives 
is in itself revelatory. Wolfram and Anderson both show that, in its almost two centuries as a 
substitute divorce court, Parliament received only seven bills from female petitioners, the first 
submitted in 1801; and Wolfram demonstrates that just four of those bills were subsequently 
enacted, all on aggravated grounds, including incest and bigamy (Wolfram 174-75; Anderson 
415 [Table 1]). Moreover, the debates on the initial two bills from wives—Addison (1801) and 
Teush (1805)—demonstrate the role of the sexual double standard in the legislature’s appraisal 
of women’s divorce rights. Indeed, conventional presumptions about female chastity and 
domestic duty clearly direct Parliament’s policymaking on the matter.  
In the Addison case, the petitioner wife sought marital dissolution on the grounds of 
incestuous adultery, her husband having carried on an affair with her sister. The bill’s skeptics, 
although sympathetic to Mrs. Addison’s situation, emphasized the problem of public morality 
and the prevailing code of domestic conduct. The Duke of Clarence, for example, cited, without 
elaboration, “the effects the practice [of divorce for husbandly adultery] would have on the 
morals of society” (Cobbett’s 35: 1429), and Lord Chancellor Eldon suggested its detrimental 
                                                 
147 Here, I use the 1755 An Act to Dissolve the Marriage of Richard Glover, with Hannah Nunn his now Wife as the 
legislative model. The majority of acts that I consulted for this project follow the form, rhetoric, and structure of the 
Glover-Nunn Act. 
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impact on “the morals of the public” (35: 1433). Further, Eldon spoke candidly about the 
manifest difference between male and female infidelity and the moral obligation of wronged 
wives: 
The adultery of a wife might impose a spurious issue upon the husband, which he might 
be called upon to dedicate a part of his fortune to educate and provide for; whereas no 
such injustice could result to his wife, from the adultery of a married man; and in many 
cases, not only a reconciliation might be brought about, but it became the especial duty of 
a wife to forgive her husband’s misconduct from motives of tenderness, and concern to 
the interests of his innocent children. (35: 1433) 
 
For these parliamentarians, women bore the burden of communal rectitude and domestic peace, 
and legal intervention in their marital affliction would pose a troublesome challenge thereto. 
While Clarence and Eldon eventually voiced support for Addison’s petition, their consent was 
strictly based on the rationale of aggravated circumstance: in their estimation, the depraved 
nature of the husband’s extra-marital activity prohibited marital reconciliation. This notion of 
special circumstance also surfaces in the rhetoric of the bill’s more ardent supporters, thereby 
perpetuating the idea that only wifely adultery is a particular threat to the common good. Lord 
Auckland, for instance, argued that it would be an “injustice” to require Mrs. Addison to “return 
to the incestuous bed of [her] husband” (35: 1435), but conceded to the “truth” that, in general 
and “for obvious reasons, conjugal fidelity on the part of the men is less essential to the interests 
of society than it is on the part of the women” (35: 1434). The larger legislative body appears to 
have accepted these qualified arguments for wifely divorce, as it enacted Mrs. Addison’s bill and 
provided her relief from the corrupted marital bond.  
 Four years later in the Teush case, Parliament confirmed its position that simple adultery 
does not warrant female divorce. Mrs. Teush, although deemed a “well-deserving woman” and 
victim of the “grossest infidelity,” was unable to secure a permanent dissolution of her marriage 
because her husband’s extra-marital sexual activity was not “something peculiarly strong and 
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striking” (Hansard 5: 429).148 In opposing her petition, debaters compared the adulterous 
circumstances before them to those of Addison. The Bishop of St. Asaph and Lord Hawkesbury 
both argued that the comparison revealed, to borrow from Hawkesbury, a “material distinction”: 
whereas (Hawkesbury argues) in the Addison case spousal reconciliation “was totally out of the 
question”—or, in the Bishop’s words, a “moral impossibility” given the “wife herself would be 
guilty of incest, if she returned to her husband”—here, “it was merely improbable” (5: 429-430). 
Moreover, Lord Chancellor Eldon returned to the idea of wifely divorce as inimical to the 
common good: “on those general grounds of public morality,” he “fe[lt] it his painful duty to 
give a negative to the farther progress of the bill” (5: 431). Only the Earl of Carnarvon is 
recorded has having objected to this reasoning: “He would ask . . ., whether it was necessary to 
the public morals, that the husband to the lady in question should be suffered to do every thing 
that could disgrace her, and deprive her of the comforts of life?” (5: 429-30). Thus, the overall 
tenor of parliamentary discourse on the issue of marital dissolution by wives signals a deep 
disconnect between conceptions of the public interest and the reality of women’s personal well-
being.  
Parliament was not, however, entirely indifferent to women’s welfare in the context of 
marital breakdown. Between 1771 and 1800, Parliament voted down three legislative attempts to 
prevent remarriage by the offending spouse—i.e., the adulterous wife.149 Supporters of the 1771 
Divorce Bill argued, among other points, that such punitive action would deter female seduction 
and curb the climbing adultery rate: “[T]his Bill would in some degree check the frequency of 
adulteries, as no lady could rely on the promises of a lover to marry her in case of a divorce” 
                                                 
148 This is a specific reference to the remarks of the Bishop of St. Asaph. 
 
149 Both Gibson (31) and Anderson (423-24) attend briefly to these House of Lord’s initiatives, noting that the bills 
always failed in the House of Commons.  
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(Cobbett’s 17: 185). Similar arguments arose in debates over the 1800 Adultery Prevention Bill. 
Lord Eldon, for example, claimed that a prohibition on re-marriage would enlighten and 
discourage the “simple and silly woman” who otherwise would have “surrendered her virtue” for 
a promise of marriage (Cobbett’s 35: 233). And, Lord Auckland, who introduced the bill, argued 
that “the prohibition of eventual marriages cannot fail to operate as a strong prevention of the 
crime [adultery] in question” (35: 227). In contrast, the 1771 bill’s opponents argued that the 
proscription would have a negligible effect on the adultery rate: “[T]his [bill] would by no means 
stop the frequency of adulteries, as the prospect of future marriage was too distant a temptation 
to the commitment of it, present passions being evidently the cause” (Cobbett’s 17: 185). 
Moreover, critics expressed concern about the 1700 and 1800 legislations’ inequitable impact on 
the female sex.150 The Duke of Clarence, for instance, argued the errant wife’s well-being:   
When he considered that the consequences that would follow the operation of such a bill, 
he could not but consider it as a measure of the most fatal nature, to that description of 
persons who from the amiableness of their sex, were best entitled to compassion and 
liberality. His main objection to the bill was, that it contained no provision for the poor 
unfortunate female who should fall a victim to her own vanity, or weakness. (Cobbett’s 
35: 232) 
 
Furthermore, Lord Mulgrave contended that the proposed statute was not only “oppressive and 
impolitic in [its] punishment” of his “countrywomen,” but also liable to produce “the most 
dangerous and scandalous of prostitutes,” an anathema to “the public morals” (35: 256, 258). 
The significance of this oppositional discourse lies in its protective sentiment. Like its overtly 
conservative counterpart, this conversation trades in the traditional ideology of female weakness, 
                                                 
150 For a summary of the 1771 objections, see Cobbett’s 17: 185-86:  
It was urged . . . that [the bill] was levelled against the ladies, and would leave those who were so 
unfortunate as to be seduced in the worst situation possible, in so bad a one, that declaring she should not 
marry the person she had sinned with, it must either follow, that she would cohabit with him, to the scandal 
of society, or else must be debarred society, and be deemed improper to marry at all, as none else would 
probably marry her.  
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conceit, and passivity, such that the process of marital dissolution, while inflected with concern 
for the adulteress, was always a forum for male empowerment and female subordination.  
 Notwithstanding Parliament’s accommodation of male-sponsored divorce claims in the 
eighteenth century, this legal body vacillated on the propriety of dissolution, and it sought, at the 
period’s end, to restrict its legislative application. The principal source of Parliament’s late-
century unease was the perceived uptick in the number of divorce petitions. The Bishop of 
Durham, during a speech objecting to the Esten divorce bill (1798), averred the action’s 
pernicious rise: “[T]he evil [of divorce] had . . . increased to such an alarming pitch, that . . . its 
progress and corrupting influence appeared to be undiminished” (Cobbett’s 33: 1308). 
Parliamentarians were particularly concerned about spousal collusion—the idea that husbands 
and wives were manufacturing adulterous circumstances in order to procure a divorce for 
irreconcilable differences shaped the discourse on many proposed bills and orders after 1780. As 
one example of several, the 1781 Gooch bill debates concentrated on the issue of marital 
contrivance. Here, evidence was presented to suggest that the petitioner and his wife had 
premeditated her adultery in order to secure a permanent dissolution—specifically, the House of 
Lords heard testimony that indicated the couple had arranged for the family cook to witness Mrs. 
Gooch “in bed with a French officer” (Cobbett’s 21: 1207). Lord Chancellor Thurlow then 
articulated the legislature’s grave objections to such “fictitious” cases: “Were the present bill to 
pass upon the idea of redress, where the injury preceded from a preconcert between the parties 
themselves, and had been committed by previous consent, it would open a door to every species 
of immorality, to private criminal gratification, to public prostitution, and open seduction” (21: 
1211). In response to the apparent escalation of collusive divorce, the House of Lords in 1798 
adopted a standing order with three defensive provisions: petitioners would be required first, to 
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submit documentation of their divorce a mensa thoro (judicial separation); second, to submit to a 
veracity examination; and third, to clarify spousal living conditions “at the time of such adultery” 
(i.e., whether husband and wife were living separately or cohabitating) (Cobbett’s 33: 1360). 
While this may seem like a simple case of procedural fine-tuning, the order was clearly 
undertaken with the intention of halting what Parliament understood to be a growing social, 
moral, and legal threat. 
 Moreover, the debates on this order suggest that the legislative impediments to “easy 
divorce” were, in substantial part, a reaction to large-scale national security concerns. Indeed, 
numerous parliamentarians related marital freedom to the emergence of political revolution, 
particularly the turmoil in France. The Bishop of Rochester, for instance, argued that the seeds of 
the French Revolution were sown in its liberal attitude toward divorce: “They had all seen that 
the first step taken in a neighbouring country to break down the fences of law, religion, and 
morality, and to introduce that violence, insubordination and anarchy, . . . was the open and 
daring profanation of marriage sanctity” (Cobbett’s 35: 1557). Thus, many policymakers 
believed that a steadfast commitment to the general principle of indissolubility would protect the 
nation from a similar fate. In his advocacy of the standing order, Lord Auckland noted the 
subversive “system of legalized prostitution and profligacy” that operated in France; he then 
contended that it was Great Britain’s determination to be “a little less irreligious and less 
immoral” that had “preserved her existence amidst the paroxysms, and convulsions, and 
downfalls of nations” (Cobbett’s 34: 1560). Similarly, Lord Grenville argued that strict 
adherence to English law on divorce was necessary to avoid the “fatal consequence” that had 
befallen other countries—marriage, he reasoned, was “the best bond of public morality and 
manners,” and, thus, a necessary foundation for a peaceful and prosperous nation (34: 1560-61). 
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These arguments demonstrate that parliamentary divorce was not intended to be, nor did it 
become, a progressive legal abstraction—a modern reorientation of the marriage contract—in the 
long eighteenth century; rather the legislative procedure came to symbolize the conservative 
values that had for centuries (albeit in distinct iterations) fortified the idea of marriage as a 
permanent status. 
Parliamentary records also reveal that the legislative action for divorce strengthened the 
paternalistic fictions of domestic governance. Like the standard divorce acts themselves, the 
debate journals rarely mention child custody or well-being. Presumably, the legislators resolutely 
adhered to the notion of absolute paternal right. There was, however, a critical discussion of 
illegitimacy in the deliberations on the Williams divorce bill (1783). Here, the debate was over a 
bastardy clause that required children born post-separation “to prove their legitimacy” (Cobbett’s 
23: 710). In support of the clause, Edmund Burke focused on “justice” to Mr. Williams, the 
“much-injured husband”: “Would [Parliament] oblige him to take home to his parental arms the 
bastards of his most mortal enemy?—to have them for 21 years under his eye, the monuments of 
his shame, the pledges of his disgrace!” (23: 713-14). Burke also speculated on the impact of a 
general prohibition on “bastardizing clauses” in divorce bills: such a measure “would nearly 
oblige the husbands to a state of celibacy all the remainder of their lives,” for how could they re-
marry if they were forced to maintain illegitimate children (23: 714)? In opposition, M.P. 
Charles James Fox spoke of the children’s hardships, expressing at one point “how extremely 
hard it would be to suffer children to be bastardized, deprived of their right, and rendered 
infamous, merely because their father and mother had obtained a legal divorce” (23: 712). 
Nevertheless, Fox’s principal objection was to the presumptive nature of the provision; rather 
than have their illegitimacy assumed, Fox argued that children of parliamentary divorce had a 
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fundamental right to offer evidence against a claim of bastardy in a court of law (23: 710-12). 
The outcome of this debate is unclear from the legal record, and historians have suggested that 
the custom of bastardy clauses in divorce bills eventually fell out of favor (Stone, Road 327-28; 
Wolfram 161). Nonetheless, eighteenth-century lawmakers consistently privileged paternal 
authority and patrilineal purity and, in so doing, they reinforced historical fictions about maternal 
right and responsibility, about the markers of child welfare, and about the propriety of legal 
bastardy. 
Private Separation 
Like parliamentary divorce, private separation emerged in the seventeenth century as an 
alternative to canonical dissolution options. Disaffected couples who wished to protect their 
domestic life from public scrutiny or who did not meet the strict pleading requirements for 
ecclesiastical or legislative intervention (i.e., adultery and/or cruelty) could execute a private 
deed of separation, which established the parties’ right to live apart from one another and, as I 
shall consider in more detail, set forth the terms of their estrangement, including the wife’s 
maintenance. The effect of these agreements to separate for what were essentially irreconcilable 
differences was limited: the legal bond remained intact, rendering remarriage impossible, and the 
principle of sexual non-access was inapplicable, such that the estranged husband continued in the 
role of presumptive father. While the number of private separation deeds commissioned in the 
long eighteenth century is unknown—there being no registration requirement or other form of 
legal record—it is likely that they were an increasingly popular way for unhappy couples to 
avoid the severity of England’s divorce law.151  
                                                 
151 For a discussion of private separation’s Interregnum origins, its development, and its advantages and 
disadvantages, see Stone, Road 149-82.  
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 The substance and development of private separation and its authorizing deeds is perhaps 
best understood within the context of the period’s conveyancing manuals. One example of 
several is Edward Wood’s A Compleat Body of Conveyancing, in Theory and Practice, a three-
volume text that ran through six editions from 1749 to 1792-93 and that includes a sampling of 
model covenants, provisios, and full deeds related to spousal separation.152 These exemplary 
clauses and instruments, which contemplate a mutual right of marital renegotiation, demonstrate 
that legal practitioners and their clients were working to re-interpret marriage as bona fide civil 
contract—as a voluntary agreement subject to the will of the parties.153 Moreover, this 
reproduction of commonplace provisions suggests that the private sector found it necessary to 
manipulate the fiction of unity of person in order to accommodate the reality of domestic 
discord. An escape from the “divers Disputes and unhappy Differences” occasioned by the 
marital bond required the agreements restore to wives a legal identity and remove from husbands 
certain of coverture’s rights and obligations.154  
 This is not to say that the form and rhetoric of model separation deeds materialize as 
liberal discourse nor that they enact a fully modern agenda for domestic governance; rather it 
appears that attorneys and their clients often worked within the institution’s traditional 
parameters to achieve legal progress, as opposed to legal revolution. The best indication of this 
reserve is that private separation never evolved into an attempt at private divorce—the deed’s 
                                                 
152 Note that Wood’s treatise is in three volumes: Part I; Part II, Vol. 1; and Part II, Vol. 2. I reference only Volume 
3 (otherwise known as Part II, Vol. 2). 
 
153 Susan Staves makes a similar point: “Separate maintenance agreements constituted an attempt to make marriage 
more genuinely contractual, to make it less a status and more a contract, to subvert the rights and obligations of 
married persons implied in law” (168). 
 
154 The sections of import from Wood’s manual are as follows: “Covenants concerning Marriages, husbands and 
Wives” (19-24), indemnification provision (345-46), and “Deeds of Separation on Various Occasions” (403-16). 
The quoted language appears in the initial deed (403). 
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objective always terminated before the point of full dissolution. Another indication is that the 
typical separation agreement included a third party male trustee to covenant and receive 
covenants on the wife’s behalf. This addition helped to avoid the problem of coverture’s 
restriction on the wife’s contractual rights, while also subjecting her to another form of male 
authority. In a further nod to coverture’s dominion, the documents tend to articulate marital 
separation and female independence in the language of male consent and forbearance. Thus, one 
of Wood’s representative covenants includes language by which the husband alone sanctions the 
spousal separation and his wife’s legal capacity:  
[H]e the said [husband] shall . . . permit and suffer her the said [wife] . . . to live separate 
and apart from him . . . as the said [wife] . . . at her Will and Pleasure (notwithstanding 
her present Coverture, and as if she were a Feme Sole and unmarried) shall think fit; and 
that he the said [husband] shall not . . . sue her . . . in the Ecclesiastical Court, or with any 
other court, for living separate and apart from him; or compel her to cohabit with him; or 
to sue, molest, disturb or trouble her for such living separate and apart from him . . .; nor 
shall . . . without the Consent of the said [wife] visit her, or knowingly come into any 
House or Place where she shall or may dwell, reside or be; nor send . . . any Letter or 
Message to her; nor shall . . . at any Time hereafter claim or demand any of the [personal 
property] . . . which she . . . now hath in her Custody, Power or Possession, or which she 
shall . . . at any Time hereafter buy or purchase, or which shall be devised or given to her, 
or shall otherwise acquire; and that she shall and may enjoy, and absolutely dispose of the 
same as if she were a Feme Sole and unmarried. (20) 
 
Nonetheless, standard covenants, such as this one, are conscious of female liberty: for separation 
to be equable and valuable, a wife must be free from her husband’s ability to sue for the 
restitution of conjugal rights, to forcibly compel marital reconciliation, and to claim an interest in 
her personal property. Indeed, although inflected with the force of male right, the private 
separation deed contemplates its female party as an individual subject vested with an 
unprecedented degree of physical, economic, and sexual freedom.   
Of course, private separation’s contractual rhetoric does not guarantee that the parties 
acted voluntarily or that the estranged wife achieved economic and personal stability. While 
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many of the agreements stipulate the “mutual consent” of the husband and wife to the separation, 
they do not detail the circumstances under which the document was executed. Moreover, 
although Wood’s models include a variety of separate maintenance options—such as a lifetime 
annuity payable by the husband, the couple’s house and certain of the personal property 
contained therein, and the wife’s separate estate, as it was constructed in the parties’ original 
marriage settlement or other legal document—none of the provisions include figures that help to 
appraise the financial condition of women post-separation (20-21, 403-04). Additionally, most 
deeds incorporate a debt indemnification clause intended to eliminate the husband’s 
responsibility under coverture for his wife’s debts or other unpaid expenses.155 Her exposure in 
this manner could—and did—lead to serious financial and legal complications. Finally, the 
deeds’ silence on child custody and visitation suggests that the wife was more often than not 
deprived of the domestic connection that she most cherished—motherhood, it appears, did not 
regularly survive the transition to female self-governance.156 Interestingly, the only clear 
indications of stability in the practice of private separation are the deeds themselves, which 
appear to have become conventional by the mid-eighteenth century. Notwithstanding that 
Wood’s latter editions promise to be “revised and corrected” versions of the first, there are no 
material content changes on this particular contractual arrangement between 1749 and 1793.157  
                                                 
155 For an example of this indemnification language, see Wood 22. 
 
156 Of the numerous model and archived separation deeds that I reviewed for this project, only one late-century 
indenture included a clause for child custody. Yet, Stone argues “many deeds contained a clause which transferred 
the custody of one or more of the younger children from the father to the mother” (Road 153). 
 
157 A few notes on my review of conveyancing manuals: First, I reviewed the separation sections of the first and fifth 
editions (1749 and 1790-93, respectively) in detail. The sixth edition (1792-1793) was a poor digital reproduction; 
however, it too appears to include the same material. Second, I reviewed two additional conveyancing manuals, one 
of which—Frederic Coningesby Jones’s The Attorney’s New Pocket Book (1794)—included only deeds that 
appeared in Wood’s text. Third, there were very few separation deeds featured in these manuals (anywhere from 
three to seven), especially as compared to the number of marriage settlement agreements included in the 
conveyancing manuals that I reviewed for Chapter 2 (in the dozens). Fourthly, my own archival research of private 
separation deeds held by the British National Archives further suggests there was contractual stasis in the period.  
174 
Stasis was not, however, the state of private separation in the judiciary. For much of the 
period, common law and equity courts found themselves entangled in a contest among the right 
of free contract, the appeal of judicial progress, the demands of public policy, and the primacy of 
legal precedent. In the Court of King’s Bench, this controversy culminated in a series of late-
century debt cases: separated wives, who had overextended themselves, were sued by their 
creditors for non-payment of debt; rather than accept liability, the defendants’ pled marital 
coverture. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in a trio of holdings interpreted by some of his 
successors as judicial activism, argued against coverture’s application on the grounds, as he 
writes in Corbett v. Poelnitz (1785), of “justice and convenience” (942). For Mansfield, the 
cultural phenomenon of private separation required progressive legal change. “[A]s the usages of 
society alter,” he argues in Barwell v. Brooks (1784), “the law must adapt itself to the various 
situations of mankind. . . . The fashion of the times has introduced an alteration, and now 
husband and wife may, for many purposes, be separated, possess separate property,” and be 
severally liable for third party claims (703). Marriage law’s evolution accordingly encompasses 
judicial recognition of inter-spousal contracts and of separated wives’ legal capacity. In fact, 
Mansfield earlier employed these principles in Ringsted v. Butler (Lady Lanesborough) (1783) to 
establish the wife’s debt liability: 
The agreement of separation [binds] both the parties in the same manner as if they had 
been sole, and the Court will not suffer either of them to break through it. Under this 
agreement the wife possesses a separate property. [The wife] is no longer under the 
control of her husband, and creditors even for necessaries have no remedy against him. 
(613)  
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Thus, Mansfield’s jurisprudence constitutes a public attempt to authenticate the notion of 
marriage as a civil contract—to reinvest the idea of domestic exchange with the liberal properties 
of individualism, equality, and free will.158  
By the turn of the nineteenth century, however, the progressive charge issued by 
Mansfield on the legalities of private separation had decelerated in the common law courts. The 
debt case of Marshall v. Rutton (1800) reversed twenty-five years of precedent on the issue of 
women’s legal identity post-separation. Here, the Court of King’s Bench held that an inter-
spousal covenant to live separate and apart did not exempt husbands and wives from the bond of 
marital coverture: he remained liable for her debts and she continued subject to his economic 
authority. Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, opining on the court’s behalf, argues that Ringsted, 
Barwell, and “some subsequent cases” do not constitute viable law: “[W]e find no authority in 
the books [prior to these cases] to shew that a man and his wife can by agreement between 
themselves change their legal capacities and characters; or that a woman may be sued as a feme 
sole while the relation of marriage subsists, and she and her husband are living in this kingdom” 
(1539). Kenyon also has recourse to the public interest, which he contends is threatened by 
private contracts that contravene the common law of marriage. By treating spouses as both single 
and married, the justice reasons, the separation deed “introduce[s] all the confusion and 
inconvenience which must necessarily result from so anomalous and mixed a character” (1539). 
For this chief justice, then, the court had a duty to retreat from what he considered an illegitimate 
                                                 
158 Another important case coming out of the Mansfield court to address the validity of private separation 
agreements is Rex v.Mead (1758). Here, the allegedly abusive husband sued to have his estranged wife returned to 
his custody. The court held that the couple’s separation agreement, which included a covenant by the husband 
“‘never to disturb [the wife] or any person with whom she should live,’” amounted to “a formal renunciation by the 
husband, of his marital right to seize [his wife], or force her back to live with him” (440). 
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and unprincipled juridical approach to the doctrine of coverture and its underlying fiction of 
marital unity.  
Importantly, the Marshall ruling was not interpreted as a prohibition on private 
separation agreements, but rather as a limitation on their enforceability, particularly in cases 
involving third party lawsuits (Macqueen 366). In fact, there was a smattering of cases that used 
the doctrine of stare decisis to uphold the right of inter-spousal separation in the early-nineteenth 
century.159 In the case of Rodney v. Chambers (1802), for example, Lord Chief Justice 
Ellenborough laments the permissive trajectory of dissolution law, but concedes the legitimacy 
of the private deed:  
If it were now a new question, whether any contract could by law be made which tended 
to facilitate the separation of husband and wife, I should have thought that it would have 
fallen in better with the general policy of the law to have prohibited any such contract: 
but they are now become inveterate in the law. . . .  [I]t has been so long established, and 
by so many decisions, that the Courts will give effect to contracts for separate 
maintenance, that it cannot now be called in question; and those cases, I think, govern the 
present. (381) 
 
Precedent, it appears, prevailed over judicial sentiment, at least on the general issue of marital 
separation. Nevertheless, as Eldon’s and Ellenborough’s rhetoric confirms, the conception of 
marriage as a permanent and hierarchical union, as well as the idea of the law as the nation’s 
moral authority, never lost its juridical power in the common law courts. 
 The controversy over private separation also arose in the Court of Chancery. In the 
leading case of Fletcher v. Fletcher (1788), the court refused to enforce a separation deed where 
evidence, primarily a chain of letters among spouses, family members, and friends, suggested the 
possibility of marital reconciliation. Justice Buller indicated that while equity retained “general 
jurisdiction” over the enforcement of separation agreements, “public policy” required the court 
                                                 
159 Black’s Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as follows: “To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” 
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to refuse “to permit a separation to take place on too easy terms, or without a very sufficient 
cause” (47-48). However, just four years later in Guth v. Guth (1792), Chancery upheld a 
separation agreement on the wife’s petition, despite the husband’s offer to reconcile. The Master 
of the Rolls rejected the idea that the public interest necessitated an extensive inquiry into the 
spousal relationship, and specifically, the circumstances of the parties’ separation. What mattered 
for enforcement was the mutuality of the exchange and the petitioner wife’s compliance with the 
agreement’s terms. Opining on the husband’s, respondent’s, contractual position, the Master 
wrote: “if [the contract] binds his wife, it must bind him, as a mutual agreement; it was his 
contract as much as hers, and he shall not avoid it, unless he can show a direct violation of it on 
the part of the plaintiff” (731). Such a liberal view was disappointing to Lord Chancellor Eldon, 
who took the opportunity in St. John v. St. John (1803, 1805) to descry equity’s decision to 
legitimize contractual separation. According to Eldon, marriage is a “sacred contract,” and one 
that “cannot not be affected” by a post-nuptial agreement (1194, 1195); to hold otherwise is to 
repudiate the law’s longstanding policy on indissolubility, the foundation of which is the national 
interest in “keeping together individual families, constituting the great family of the public” 
(1195). Nonetheless, Eldon concedes public policy to legal precedent, concluding that “if . . . 
decision has followed decision, to the extent of settling the Law, I cannot upon any doubt of 
mine . . . shake what is the settled law upon the subject” (1197). Once again, the judiciary’s 
reverence for stare decisis won the day, as the equity courts adopted a regulatory, rather than 
prohibitory, attitude toward deed enforcement.  
Nonetheless, as Staves argues, the rules for private separation instituted by the late-
century court system, signal “a reimposition of deep patriarchal structures on a field of law 
where those structures had been weakened by contract ideas” (184) From the requirement that a 
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wife be represented by trustees in the separation agreement to directives against clauses for 
future separation and against provisions allowing for the wife’s assignment of separate 
maintenance payments, the jurisprudence of private separation was re-shaped to fit more 
squarely within traditional ideas about marriage and the family (Staves 184-95). In fact, one can 
argue that with these restrictions the law took the opportunity to reinforce its sustaining 
fictions—i.e., marital unity, marital permanence, female subordination, and male control. 
One of the most onerous “regulations” on private separation involved the issue of child 
custody and the presumption of paternal right. As earlier mentioned, the first inter-spousal 
custody case was heard in Chancery toward the end of the long eighteenth century. In 
DeManneville v. DeManneville (1804), the plaintiff wife sued her estranged husband for custody 
of their infant child. Despite evidence of ill-usage toward the plaintiff and indications that the 
child was in danger of being illegally removed from the country (defendant being a French 
citizen), the court upheld the defendant’s paternal right. This “early” judicial reticence to 
recognize maternal authority later extended to cases in which the spouses had voluntarily agreed, 
through a private deed of separation, to an arrangement of maternal custody and/or care. As John 
Fraser Macqueen observes in his nineteenth-century family law treatise: “By law the custody of 
the children belongs as of absolute and exclusive right to the husband; and so strong is this right, 
that a covenant by the husband to resign the care of the children to this wife is void as contrary to 
public policy, except where the control of the father would be clearly injurious” (384). Thus, in 
the leading case of Vansittart v. Vansittart (1858), a Vice-Chancellor’s Court refused to enforce 
a comprehensive contractual provision regarding child residence, education, and maintenance on 
the grounds that “the privilege of the wife to contract as a feme sole” in a separation agreement 
did not extend to the issue of child custody and the husband’s “right to bargain” did not permit 
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relinquishment of his paternal duty (31, 32).160 Public policy and child welfare was judged best 
served by the tradition of domestic paternalism, rather than the modern liberal ethos of individual 
choice and contractual exchange.  
Yet, as Macqueen’s commentary suggests, the court did revisit its hard line approach to 
custody when there was evidence of fatherly abuse or misconduct. Therefore, in Swift v. Swift 
(1865), the Rolls Court upheld a separation deed clause whereby the husband, who had been 
accused of criminally assaulting his seven year old daughter, transferred custody to his wife: 
The reason why a covenant to this effect is bad is, because it is found, both by nature and 
the policy of the law which follow it, to be beneficial to the child that such influence and 
superintendence should be exerted; but if a case occur, in which this is manifestly the 
reverse . . . then . . . the same policy which renders such a covenant bad in all other cases 
makes it good in the particular case supposed. (639)    
  
Finally, a court had recognized a circumstance in which a contractual provision for maternal care 
served the child’s best interests. Although Vansittart and Swift fall well outside the temporal 
scope of this project, the two cases are significant for understanding the durability of 
paternalistic thought in marriage/divorce jurisprudence: at no time in the long eighteenth century 
and within the context of inter-spousal dissension, did the judiciary consider that the presumptive 
equation of paternal control with child welfare might be a disastrous fiction, both for the public 
and the private spheres.  
In general, the period’s dissolution discourse demonstrates a strong reticence to reassess 
those presumptions and fictions that had sustained centuries of legal stagnation on the issue of 
divorce and separation. Even as they developed and sanctioned new mediums for marital 
disunion, policymakers and adjudicators clung to doctrinal norms that posited marriage as a 
                                                 
160 This case was specific to children over the age of seven, as the Custody of Infants Act of 1839 had opened up the 
possibility of maternal custody rights for children under seven. For an in-depth discussion of this Act and the events 
leading to its passage, see Wright, “Crisis of Child Custody.” 
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moral mandate and a domestic and national imperative, and they continued to embrace maxims 
that conceived of wives and children as subordinate subjects, dependent upon and inseparable 
from the patriarch and his ancestral or capital estate. Yet, the innovative work of legal 
practitioners and their clients, particularly in the areas of collusive divorce and private 
separation, indicates a cultural shift regarding dissolution—a burgeoning movement to eradicate 
the dogmatism that informed those legal conventions surrounding marital permanence. To better 
understand this shift, it is necessary to return to the domestic novel, which operated as both a 
participant in and representative of the movement’s objectives, contradictions, and confusions. 
Indeed, the novel form, with its protracted interest in the marriage contract’s inner-workings, 
provided an ideal space within which to promote, interrogate, and revise indissolubility’s legal 
foundations. 
Part III: The Domestic Novel and the Fictions of Dissolution 
Although the eighteenth-century domestic novel is primarily interested in establishing the 
proto-modern marriage, it is also concerned with marital breakdown and dissolution. Imagining 
the experience of marital discord within the rigid contours of divorce and custody law becomes 
another way for novelists to represent, appraise, and reinvent the private sphere and its often 
tenuous relationship to public institutions. Here, I examine the ways in which early- and late-
century literary narratives of domestic conflict contend with the presumptions and fictions on 
which the period’s dissolution law was founded. I argue that, unlike contemporaneous legal 
discourse on parliamentary divorce and private separation, these texts do not equivocate on the 
abstract notion that marriage is a universal good, nor do they register ambivalence toward the 
ideas of paternal sovereignty or lawful bastardy; rather, the novels challenge these conceptions 
and, in so doing, confront both the doctrine of marital permanence and its legal exceptions. 
Indeed, separation and divorce are drawn as complex processes, entangled with social, economic, 
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and educational forces, and their severe inflexibility, especially for the female sex and their 
children, is revealed to be in need of reform. Yet, the novels do not envision large-scale systemic 
change, nor do they imagine a course of reconciliation or of separation that is both realistic and 
fully satisfying. This failure of literary innovation, while perhaps an immediate frustration for its 
readership, is nonetheless a self-authorizing move, pointing us back to the novels on marriage 
formation and unification for guidance on how to circumvent the sort of conflict that threatens to 
destabilize marriage and the family. 
In the first half of this discussion, I want to return to the mid-century work of Daniel 
Defoe and Eliza Haywood. Defoe’s The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders 
(1722) and Haywood’s The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless (1751), each presented as a 
didactic biographical history, narrate female subjectivity through experiences of sexual infidelity, 
marital rupture and, for Moll Flanders, maternal hardship. What emerges from these texts is a 
picture of dissolution law as potentially adverse to individual development and stability, and 
consequently, to communal welfare. In Moll Flanders, the eponymous heroine must circumvent 
the law’s conservative domestic doctrine in order both to protect the self against moral and 
material collapse and to construct a happy domestic space. In Betsy Thoughtless, by contrast, the 
eponymous heroine must learn to operate within the law’s confines in order not only to secure 
her moral position, but also to rewrite the feminine ideal in more liberal terms. To be clear, these 
early novelistic representations of marital discord do not deny the personal and political 
significance of marriage and the family nor do they reject the developing body of dissolution law 
in its entirety. Rather, the novels serve to remind us that domestic conflict does not happen in a 
legal vacuum—that there is a multitude of factors influencing the troubled marriage-family 
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dynamic, and those factors often fly in the face of the doctrine of marital permanence and its 
foundational or contingent fictions.  
Modeled after the period’s popular criminal autobiography genre, Moll Flanders 
chronicles the eponymous heroine’s seventy years of lawless adventure and moral repentance. 
This private history of economic and sexual misconduct is intended, so the Preface avers, to 
“recommend Vertue, and generous Principles, and to discourage and expose all sorts of Vice and 
Corruption of Manners” (3, 3-4). The novel arguably succeeds in this enterprise as far as its 
depiction of Moll’s property crimes, for which she is eventually imprisoned and transported; 
however, the text’s didactic representation of marital and parental transgressions, specifically 
bigamy, adultery, and child abandonment, is more complicated. The novel’s moral register 
recognizes the public and private problem of domestic disorder, particularly among the lower 
classes, but it resists the idea that formal marriage and a strict dissolution policy are 
incontrovertible defenses against such disorder or antidotes thereto. In fact, Defoe’s pragmatist 
narrative, with its emphasis on the realities of economic and social disadvantage, as well as its 
interest in female self-government, most often posits marital separation, infidelity, and familial 
neglect as normative and necessitous conduct. England’s exacting divorce law thus becomes a 
cipher for a range of domestic fictions.  
 The chief domestic crime in Moll Flanders is bigamy, or the act of contracting marriage 
while lawfully espoused to another.161 Moll commits the offense no less than three times in the 
                                                 
161 Melissa Ganz provides a useful overview of early modern bigamy law in her essay on marriage and divorce in 
Moll Flanders. She explains that the Bigamy Act of 1603 exempted from criminal punishment those persons who 
remarried after seven years of uninterrupted spousal desertion and silence; similarly, the canon laws of 1604 
“mitigated the punishment” in such cases (“Moll Flanders and English Marriage Law,” 174). Nevertheless, the 
Church courts continued to deny the legal validity of a deserted spouse’s subsequent marriage (174-75). Therefore, 
Moll’s bigamous conduct, which proceeds throughout her history, is technically criminal only through her third 
marriage, which occurs one year after her second husband’s desertion, but all of her subsequent unions are legally 
invalid, as evidence never surfaces of that husband’s demise.  
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novel’s course, as the second of her five marriages remains a lawful bond through to her 
history’s end. Indeed, this second union, while disrupted by financial disaster and experienced as 
a permanent estrangement—Moll’s tradesman husband, the Linen-Draper, absconds to France 
after being imprisoned for debt—is never formally dissolved. As Moll reflects, “I was a widow 
bewitch’d; I had a Husband and no Husband, and I could not pretend to Marry again” (64). Yet, 
“pretend” she does. Feeling the pressures of economic instability, Moll enters into subsequent 
marriage contracts without reservation or remorse, at one point musing “[h]e [her estranged 
husband] was effectually dead in Law to me, and had told me I should look on him as such, so I 
had not the least uneasiness on that score [i.e., subsequent marriage]” (94). Even for the 
reformed autobiographer, this brief second union has no binding authority, and the heroine has 
little culpability for acting outside of its legal confines. The Linen-Draper’s necessary and 
prolonged absence, as well as his permissive attitude toward her remarriage, “freed” Moll from 
“all of the Obligations . . . of Wedlock”—“no Body could blame me,” she implicitly reasons, for 
“thinking my self” at liberty to “marry again” (126). Moll’s rationale, which substitutes contract 
logic for criminal and moral liability, purports to rewrite marriage as a negotiable compact, one 
contingent upon material and temporal circumstance.  
 This liberal perspective recurs throughout the novel, further authorizing informal 
dissolution procedures and authenticating the idea of autonomous private exchange. Thus, Moll’s 
third marriage, an incestuous union entered into through “no Fault of [hers] nor of his” (342), is 
dissolved, not by ecclesiastical decree as required, but by informal spousal consent (104). This 
private democratic action preserves the parties’ reputations, protects their children’s legal 
legitimacy, and obviates the expense of judicial intervention (96). Moreover, Moll’s fourth 
marriage, a financial disaster, is terminated by the husband’s written notice: “Our Marriage is 
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nothing,” he writes to Moll; “I here discharge you from it; if you can Marry to your Advantage, 
do not decline it on my Account” (153). Initially skeptical of the dissolution’s validity, Moll is 
quickly persuaded by the rhetoric of liberal contract (voiced by Moll’s “Governess,” Mother 
Midnight)—“as we were parted by mutual consent, the nature of the contract was destroyed, and 
the obligation mutually discharged”—of her right to marry again (172-73). This contractual 
perspective then paves the way for a fifth marriage of economic security and moral stability, a 
union memorialized by Moll in the sentimental terms of “Virtue and Sobriety,” “safe Harbour” 
and “Deliverance,” and “Ease and Content” (188-89). The progressive attitude also secures 
Moll’s final reward: a legally bigamous, but morally irreproachable, re-union with her beloved 
fourth husband, Jemy. 
Defoe’s failure to indict or punish Moll’s illicit conduct, and his proleptic references to 
marriage as a secular and severable contract suggest, not a radical or corrupted view of the 
nuptial bond, but rather a realistic and pragmatic understanding of its vicissitudes. Indeed, the 
author represents marriage as a primarily economic union and uses contemporary market 
conditions (immanently favorable to men and attuned to each party’s fortune) and the truth of 
female dependence to establish its necessity and to justify its fluidity (see 20-21 and 67-68). 
Moll’s very survival depends on her sexual autonomy and, in particular, her ability to make or 
break marriage contracts at will: the life “Circumstances” that “ma[ke] the offer of a good 
Husband . . . the most necessary Thing in the World to [Moll]” (76), also require the right of 
withdrawal when the economic or social expectations of the union are breached. It is, after all, 
the case that poverty and vice are constant threats in Moll’s commonplace world—perpetual 
hazards to which marriage often provides only a temporary defense. As critics have noted, 
Defoe’s approach to domesticity in his fiction complicates his traditionalist non-fiction writing 
185 
on marriage and the family.162 In Conjugal Lewdness: A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse 
of the Marriage Bed (1727), for example, Defoe promotes the ideal marriage as an affective 
institution, and he employs the public welfare doctrine and religious ideology to argue against 
Milton’s idea of marriage as “a stated Contract” dissoluble by “mutual Agreement” (118). 
Nonetheless, in this novel, Defoe subordinates moral and legal questions of marital permanence 
to the systemic realities of economic disadvantage and social marginalization.163 
Defoe (as novelist) is not, however, indifferent to the period’s patriarchally-inscribed 
marital ethics nor is he entirely dismissive of the law that seeks to remedy their violation. Moll’s 
history is replete with narratives of and critical reflections on “the Wickedness of the times” (22), 
as it is expressed in extra-marital sexual activity. Indeed, adulterous behavior infects every 
regional corner and social class of Defoe’s fictional world; its victims both the virtuous wife and 
the honest husband (see, e.g., 64-67; 108-09; and 134-38). The novel attends to the problem of 
adultery and the solution of divorce most notably in the subplot involving Moll’s fifth husband, 
the bank trustee, and his first wife, a serial adulteress. The short narrative begins with the 
                                                 
162 Some scholarly investigations into the apparent disconnect between Defoe’s fiction and his domestic treatise-
writing have produced arguments of inter-textual reconciliation. David Blewett, for example, works to unite Moll 
Flanders with Defoe’s Religious Courtship (1722) and Conjugal Lewdness, or Matrimonial Whoredom (1727): 
“Moll Flanders . . . in no way contradicts the principles that we find in Defoe’s moral treatises,” he argues. “Rather 
it illustrates one of his central moral doctrines, the utter wrongfulness of marriages of expedience” (87). 
Additionally, Melissa Ganz reads the novel as an extension of Defoe’s argument against Milton’s liberal 
construction of marriage in Conjugal Lewdness, a perspective that contributes to her conclusion that Defoe’s 
position on divorce law reform was limited to prolonged instances of spousal desertion (“Moll Flanders and English 
Marriage Law,” 167-73). In contrast, scholars such as Watt and Richetti treat the two categories of Defoe’s writing 
as distinct in purpose and premise: Watt argues that, in comparison to his “didactic works,” Defoe’s “novels reflect 
not theory but practice” (66) and Richetti contends that Defoe’s fiction “generates an institutional force of its own,” 
one that can be distinguished from that of his instructive material (“Family, Sex, and Marriage,” 23). For a 
description of additional scholarship in this vein, see Campbell, “Strictly Business,” 66n.9. 
 
163 Maximillian Novak offers another possible explanation for Defoe’s non-traditionalist approach to marriage and 
divorce in his fiction. Novak argues that Defoe applied to natural law, which took a more liberal perspective on the 
notion of marital permanence (Defoe and the Nature of Man 88-112). In the novel’s representation of adultery, 
divorce, and bigamy, Novak writes, “Defoe was treating a situation in which the positive laws failed to satisfy the 
demands of nature and reason” (106).  
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“Circumstances of his [the trustee’s] Case,” which include multiple affairs, two bastard children, 
and an unrepentant spouse (135), and it concludes with a final judgment, which appears as 
dissolution and decease, the (now) remorseful wife committing suicide upon notice of the 
husband’s divorce decree (171). What is significant about this vignette is the way in which it 
reflects the partisan treatment and punitive rhetoric of parliamentary divorce. The cuckolded 
husband is given a narrative voice and a legal platform upon which to air and vindicate his 
grievances, while the adulterous wife is denied any such voice or agency. She is forcibly 
consigned to the position of “dishonest” “Whore,” condemned by a “final Sentence of Divorce,” 
while he enjoys the status of “Injur’d and Abus’d” husband, liberated by the wheels of “Justice” 
(135-38, 171).  Even the wife’s death is drawn less as a tragedy than as an unfortunate 
consequence of the husband’s legitimate legal claim (171). Compare this fate to that of Moll’s 
married lover, the Gentleman from Bath, who, after recovering from a life threatening illness, 
simply releases Moll from their arrangement and returns to his marriage with the purpose of 
“Repentance” and “Reformation” (125, 120-26). Neither divorce nor death is even a remote 
possibility for this adulterer. With the differential treatment of wifely and husbandly adultery, 
then, Defoe reflects the contemporary code of marital conduct and its gendered fictions—the 
code that demanded women’s chastity but excused male vice; the code that presumptively treated 
wifely adultery as a pernicious moral disease; and the code that that prohibited women’s freedom 
from marriage but acknowledged men’s right of release. 
Yet, as he does with bigamy, Defoe exhibits through his heroine a willingness to concede 
women’s sexual integrity and the law’s patriarchal and punitive force to the paradigm of 
necessity. Moll herself participates in the nation’s pervasive sexual corruption, acting the role of 
mistress and the bearer of bastards multiple times in the novel. These intimate relationships, 
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forged with the knowledge of their immorality, do arouse the heroine’s self-censure and motivate 
her contrition: the autobiographer recalls, “the Reproaches of my own Conscience were such as I 
could not express, for I was not blind to my own Crime” (124), which promised “more Work for 
Repentance” (238). Nonetheless, Moll is neither punished at law nor publicly chastised for her 
conduct—her personal narrative is devoid of lawsuits for criminal conversation and free from 
threats of divorce, separation, or conjugal restitution. In fact, Moll’s affairs, which are 
accompanied with financial benefits, allow her to avoid the grievous clutches of property crime 
and to attain the religious maxim “Give me not Poverty lest I Steal” (191). Moll is, therefore, 
representative of those women for whom sexual immorality occurs “by Necessity,” women 
whose culpability is distinguished from that of the adulterous wife who acted “a Whore . . . by 
Inclination, and for the sake of Vice” (135). It is this latter embodiment of female moral 
corruption, Defoe seems to suggest, that poses the most powerful threat to public and private 
well-being and that accordingly warrants legal and literary discipline; in contrast, Moll and her 
disadvantaged sort deserve sympathetic treatment and an exculpatory hearing.164 Thus, in this 
world, the social and legal presumptions limiting women’s sexual agency are reserved for a 
certain class—for all others, those presumptions are unjust and counterproductive fictions. 
Defoe extends the novel’s critical investigation of domestic vice and its juridical 
outcomes to the issues of parental duty and child welfare. Moll’s history encompasses six 
distinct family systems, each of which collapses at the moment of marital, or in one case, extra-
marital, disunion. Indeed, once the family unit is disrupted by spousal death, desertion, or mutual 
detachment, its constituent parts are, with one exception, permanently separated. Four of Moll’s 
                                                 
164 See Novak for a useful discussion of the way in which Defoe implicates natural law and, in particular, the 
doctrine of necessity, in his treatment of Moll’s sexual crimes (Defoe and the Nature of Man 81-82).  
 
188 
eight surviving children remain in the custody of paternal caretakers, while the other four are 
given over, at Moll’s election, to third party custodians, whose role is principally justified by the 
heroine’s economic distress and social displacement (see, e.g., 123-25). Only one child, 
Humphrey, is provided a name and a voice—the others are erased from the narrative design and 
the heroine’s criminal history almost as quickly as they were introduced. These unidentified, 
unclaimed, and generally illegitimate progeny thus move silently through the memoir as 
incorporeal symbols of the legal fiction of filius nullius, their very selfhood appropriated by the 
failure of marital unity and parental obligation. Through their silencing, these characters testify 
to the deep existential pain of familial estrangement, and they challenge the propriety of a legal 
construct that promotes filial erasure. Their testimony is only strengthened by the named child’s 
highly-sentimentalized reunion with his mother—the kiss, the embrace, and the “heave and 
throb” of unremitting “Sobs” (333) giving clear expression to the suffering and injustice born by 
all. 
Notwithstanding the novel’s preoccupation with familial strife, the theme of child 
abandonment and neglect, like that of marital indiscretion, remains outside of the protagonist’s 
repentance narrative. Once again, misfortune and hardship rationale negate the autobiographer’s 
penitential compulsion. Moll’s own experience of abandonment at just six months old is 
presented early on as justification for her unlawful and immoral behaviors: born in Newgate 
prison, deserted by her criminal mother upon a sentence of transportation, and left unprotected 
by the state, she was “brought into a Course of Life . . . which . . . tended to the swift Destruction 
both of Soul and Body” (8). The memoirist’s astute (and tendentious) observation signals a 
transfer of responsibility that permeates every aspect of the protagonist’s “criminal” career. As 
Hal Gladfelder argues,  
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Moll carries Newgate with her as an inheritance and a contagion. . . . Like her mother, . . . 
[she] is led along her own moral itinerary by social and material pressures: above all by 
poverty and the absence of institutional supports. Her mother’s crime, itself the effect of 
material desperation and a corrupting environment, is passed onto Moll in the form of 
social dislocation and dependency. . . (115-16) 
 
This dislocation and dependency manifests itself not only in criminal behavior, but also in 
maternal incapacity, or, in Toni Bowers’s terms, “maternal monstrosity” (98).  
We see this “monstrosity” unfold most profoundly in a transitional anecdote where Moll, 
estranged from her fourth husband and engaged to the fifth, must decide the fate of her newborn 
child, whose very existence jeopardizes her chance at economic security through marriage. The 
scene begins with a disquisition, presented by Moll, on the social problem of maternal desertion, 
as it is accomplished through illegal—i.e., unsanctioned and unmonitored—third party 
guardianship. Moll equates the action with criminal homicide and emphasizes the culpability of 
the morally compromised mother: “I wish all those Women who consent to the disposing of their 
Children out of the way, as it is call’d for Decency sake, would consider that ‘tis only a contriv’d 
Method for Murther; that is to say, a killing their Children with safety” (173). From Moll’s 
perspective, the “helpless and uncapable” child is merely a collateral obligation to its “poor” 
caretakers whose “gain consists in being quit of the Charge as soon as they can” (173, 175). 
Nevertheless, Moll is quickly persuaded by the conditions of convenience—a term which, for 
her, “encompasses” the idea of “dire need” (Bowers 107)—and constraint (i.e., by the very 
promise and necessity of marriage itself) to surrender her infant to a rural nurse (Defoe, Moll 
Flanders, 177). Neither the autobiographer nor her protagonist subject again address the 
abandoned child or indicate feelings of guilt or shame for its fate. Bowers contends that this 
scene represents the deep division between Augustan norms of “‘natural’ or ‘virtuous’ 
maternity” and the realities of social class: “In Moll Flanders, virtuous motherhood begins to 
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look impossible except for women with the leisure, means, and desire to ‘give themselves up’ to 
the care of their children” (98, 111). I would add to this that the novel’s failure to place non-
virtuous motherhood within the protagonist’s self-reproach plot is an omission that troubles the 
law’s paternalistic presumptions about child custody, suggesting as it does that external 
influences, rather than internal weakness, are to blame for maternal failure.165  
Critics of Moll Flanders have offered a variety of explanations for Moll’s marital and 
maternal infractions, as well as for Defoe’s reluctance to censure them. The most common 
account invokes the notion of liberalism individualism and Defoe’s interest in exploring and, in 
some views, expanding, the boundaries of women’s economic, sexual, or legal freedoms. Lois 
Chaber, for example, has argued that Moll’s domestic trials are an expression of the novel’s 
capitalist-feminist critique. Through them, Defoe demonstrates that “bourgeois marriage” is a 
state of “economic inadequacy” for wives and that children are “yet one more economic 
handicap for women” (Chaber 218). More recently, Ann Campbell has argued that Moll’s lack of 
matrimonial and maternal affection reflects her economic and social ambitions—the protagonist 
recognizes that to become a profitable individual, she must trade the biological and the conjugal 
family, with their immense “impositions,” for the “surrogate family” and its financial benefit 
(“Strictly Business,” 52).166 Whether we are intended to read Moll’s individualism as literary 
ideal or cultural tragedy is unsettled, but certainly Defoe leaves us with the sense that his 
heroine’s survival—and even the survival of her progeny—is contingent upon a more flexible 
and pragmatic construction of the legal ties that bind. To borrow from John Richetti, at the very 
                                                 
165 For an interesting reading of the novel within the context of the eighteenth-century “infanticide prevention 
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166 For other such critical accounts, see, e.g., Watt 93-118; Armstrong, How Novels Think 36-42; Scheuermann 12-
35; and Glover 117-23. 
 
191 
least, Moll’s “narrative[] … practice[s] and sometimes clearly articulate[s] a feminist 
individualism that subverts or at least qualifies the validity or binding finality of marriage and 
the family” (“Family, Sex, and Marriage,” 23), the institutions by which women’s identity and 
liberality is circumscribed in the eighteenth century.  
Therefore, as it does in the period’s legal and philosophical thought, marriage in Moll 
Flanders retains a crucial position within the politics of domestic order, but that position is 
precarious. While the moral and social value of the family and the individual are often contingent 
upon the establishment and continuity of the marital bond, that bond is never certain and its 
protective capacity always conditional. After all, even Moll’s fifth marriage to the bank trustee 
ends in debt and death, and it is only when Moll receives an inheritance that a final union with 
Jemy becomes practical and productive.  Divorce and adultery thus appear in the novel as 
pragmatic solutions to economic, social, and even moral hardship, and maternal disability 
becomes their unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence. If we can pinpoint any clear argument 
from Defoe, it seems to be that national and domestic wellbeing depend, not so much on marital 
permanence and the enforcement of dissolution law’s presumptive fictions, but on economic 
independence, social mobility, and institutionally-supported female autonomy.  
 Haywood, writing a quarter of a century after Defoe and in a period increasingly 
interested in establishing the feminine ideal as a figure of virtue and passivity, artfully follows 
Defoe’s relatively candid criticism of the law’s prejudice in matters of marriage and divorce. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Betsy Thoughtless is an early female bildungsroman in which marriage 
functions as the catalyst and the reward for the eponymous heroine’s moral and social 
development. Her subjective evolution is not, however, fostered through models of marital 
contentment, but rather through episodes of inter-spousal conflict. Indeed, Haywood’s failed 
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marriage plots offer Betsy a meaningful context within which to observe and negotiate the 
tension between individual desire and social expectation, eventually ushering her into a happy 
and affective nuptial union. Moreover (and of particular interest in this chapter), these plots, 
which explore the legal mechanics of divorce and separation, contribute to the period’s literary 
jurisprudence on marital dissolution. 
 The novel’s first failed marriage plot dramatizes the early stages of judicial and 
parliamentary divorce for wifely adultery. Betsy’s benevolent guardian, Mr. Goodman, plays the 
role of “much-injured husband” and her female chaperone, Lady Mellasin, performs that of 
“guilty and unfortunate” wife (390). Once having discovered his wife’s infidelity, Goodman 
evicts Lady Mellasin from their home and, in consultation with legal counsel, secretly begins 
divorce proceedings (390). The exiled wife only learns of her husband’s plans when she is served 
with “a citation to appear before the doctors of the civil law” in a criminal conversation lawsuit 
(a crucial step in proving divorce) (391, 391-92). As we shall see, this legal action and the 
divorce that it anticipates do not extend beyond the petitionary stage; nevertheless, the novel’s 
partial sketch provides critical insight into the motivations, intentions, and anxieties that 
precipitate and follow marital breakdown. As the novel’s heroine, Betsy is brought to understand 
the problem that wayward female sexuality poses to the domestic space; and as its readers, we 
are invited to see the complexity of domestic relationships, as well as to assess the propriety and 
utility of the body of jurisprudence by which they are regulated.   
Reflecting her legal-historical context, Haywood presents the Goodman-Mellasin divorce 
as a punitive action instituted by the persecuted husband against the licentious wife. Indeed, 
Goodman, who was a loving and tender spouse, acts with “his whole mind [bent] on doing 
himself justice” (265) and threatens Lady Mellasin with “the punishment her crimes deserved” 
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(391). Notably, the rationale behind Goodman’s legal prosecution is not the early modern 
concern for patrilineal preservation, but rather its late-century replacement—the husband’s right 
of domestic comfort. Lady Mellasin’s illicit behavior is interpreted by Goodman as an assault 
both against the marriage’s affective bond and his emotional self—as a near criminal erosion of 
partnership and person. Goodman posits that the only remedy for this marital offense is a 
permanent disunion: “[T]he most terrible vexation I endure dwells in the consideration that she is 
still my wife;—were once that name erased, I think I should be easy” (266). Yet, this husband’s 
well-warranted cause is interrupted when his legal anxieties bring him to physical collapse. In 
fact, so great is his fear of the social scrutiny and public censure occasioned by a divorce 
proceeding—of being the “talk of the town,” the subject of “whispers,” “grimaces,” “ridicule,” 
“pity,” and “contempt”—that he dies before his case can be adjudicated (301, 301-03). What is 
significant about this sketch is not so much Haywood’s apparent concern for a husband’s right to 
seek marital dissolution, but rather the skepticism with which she approaches his ability to 
pursue that right successfully. In this literary world, the law is not an isolated institution working 
objectively to redress legal wrongs; rather its doctrine and its processes are always already 
entangled with external moral policy and the practice of social judgment. Divorce (even for the 
cuckholded husband) is, therefore, a chaotic procedure, one that, like the opposing doctrine of 
marital permanence, is not always well-positioned to advance individual and domestic welfare.  
 Haywood’s critical account of eighteenth-century divorce law is further developed in her 
representation of the novel’s female domestic offenders—and Betsy’s narrative foils—Lady 
Mellasin and her daughter, Flora.167 These morally and sexually transgressive characters, while 
                                                 
167 For an insightful discussion of Flora (and other of the novel’s female characters) as a foil for Betsy, see Hultquist, 
“Haywood’s Reappropriation,” 149-56. 
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symbols of female corruption, are also, much like Moll Flanders, memorials of the hardships to 
which many women were subject in the period. The pair is introduced into the novel with a brief 
description of the dire economic circumstances by which they were brought into a domestic 
compact with Goodman: She, Lady Mellasin, was the “relict of a baronet, who having little or no 
estate, had accepted of a small employment about the court, in which post he died, leaving her 
ladyship and one daughter, named Flora, in a very destitute condition. Goodman, however, had 
wealth enough for both, and consulted no interest other than that of his heart” (33-4). How were 
these women to survive, the narrator seems to suggest, if not through the mother’s strategic and 
mercenary marriage?  
Haywood extends the sentimental and political undertones of this very practical query 
into the characters’ secondary narratives of sexual impropriety and, in Lady Mellasin’s case, of 
testamentary fraud (she forges Goodman’s will to better provide for herself and Flora). Indeed, 
Lady Mellasin’s story is predicated on her experiences as the object of men’s avarice and 
artifice—she is romanced and blackmailed into marital deception by a mercenary lover (258-64), 
fleeced and then “cruel[ly]” “left alone to bear the brunt of all the offended laws inflict on 
forgery” by her lawyer and his accomplices (513), and deceived into a sham reconciliation by 
Goodman and his lawyer (390-91). Her behavior is, therefore, just as much a consequence of 
external coercion as of internal degeneracy. Correspondingly, Flora’s narrative is informed by 
the sexual double standard.168 She is conscripted into the role of fallen maiden by a poor 
education and a lack of fortune, and she is confined to this desperate condition by her lover’s, 
Mr. Trueworth’s, romantic indifference. He perceives of their affair as “a transient pleasure” 
(396) that is easily abandoned for a more virtuous and affluent formal union, while Flora 
                                                 
168 For an extended discussion of the sexual double standard in Betsy Thoughtless, see Oakleaf. 
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understands the illicit relationship as a binding precursor to the couple’s eventual marriage (or, at 
the very least, the beginnings of a permanent affair) (395-400). When she learns of his decision 
to marry another, this ruined figure undergoes emotional and psychological breakdown, 
vacillating among the “the lethargy of silent grief,” “the wildness of . . . fancy,” and the furies of 
artful stratagem (398, 398-400, 448-54). Importantly, both mother and daughter share in the fate 
of other despoiled women, as their narratives conclude with exile from home and homeland. 
Lady Mellasin negotiates her “banishment” to Jamaica where “reputation was a thing little 
regarded,” and Flora, living in London “without reputation,—without friends,—without money,” 
realizes her impossible position and reluctantly follows (522-23). It is a conclusion that bespeaks 
England’s inability, even unwillingness, to resolve the variety of circumstances by which women 
are driven, and then confined, to the country’s moral, social, and geographical margins. 
In fact, the entire narrative arc for these corrupted figures attests to the nation’s 
institutional shortsightedness on issues of domestic—i.e., marriage and the family—policy. The 
law, in particular, emerges as a fundamental component of England’s large-scale failure to 
regulate the private sphere in a discerning and just manner. With Lady Mellasin, Haywood 
complicates the one-dimensional adulteress of the period’s legal writing, and in so doing, 
emphasizes the ethical tensions that underlie judicial and parliamentary divorce doctrine: 
specifically, the problem of adjudicating or legislating wifely adultery from a gendered, 
generalizing, and disciplinary perspective. Similarly, with Flora, Haywood undermines the law’s 
conviction that women’s moral/sexual weakness is the principal factor in domestic breakdown, 
subtly pointing instead to economic necessity, educational inequity, and male prerogative. In 
fact, Haywood’s depiction suddenly, albeit indirectly, renders the law’s punitive and patriarchal 
divorce policy of uncertain institutional and cultural value.  
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 Haywood continues to undercut England’s divorce law in the novel’s second failed 
marriage plot, which dramatizes another common ground for marital dissension, husbandly 
cruelty and infidelity. Here, the “much-injured wife” is Betsy herself; and the “tyrant” husband is 
the profligate Mr. Munden (568). As discussed at length in Chapter 2, Betsy and Munden’s 
marriage is doomed from its inception: his staunchly patriarchal view of marital unity clashes 
with her egalitarian perspective, and the two live in either a state of intense hostility or one of 
total apathy. After a series of abusive confrontations, one of which ends in the “massacre” of 
Betsy’s beloved pet squirrel, Betsy and her former guardian, Lady Trusty, discuss the possibility 
of a legal estrangement (509, 509-12). Rather than concur with the mistreated wife’s inclination 
to be “separated forever, from a person, who, she was . . . convinced, had neither love nor esteem 
for her” (512), the pragmatic mentor argues a wife’s conciliatory duties and her disabled socio-
legal position: “all you can accuse him of will not amount to a separation;—besides, consider 
how odd a figure a woman makes who lives far apart from her husband” (511). It is not until 
Betsy discovers Munden guilty of an extra-marital affair that separation materializes as a viable 
option in so far as it receives the support of the heroine’s brothers and former guardians.  
What follows is a private legal battle informed by the parties’ conflicting attitudes on 
marriage. The legal hostilities begin with a letter wherein Betsy announces her decision to leave 
the marriage in terms that imply a breach of contract and irreconcilable differences:  
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Sir,  
 
As you cannot but be sensible, that the mutual engagements between us have been strictly 
adhered to on my part, and almost in every particular falsified on yours, you ought not to 
be surprised, that I have at last resolved to put a final end to a way of life so unpleasing in 
the eyes of Heaven, and so disagreeable to ourselves . . .; I therefore fly for ever from 
your ill-usage, and once more put myself under the protection of my friends, to whom I 
also shall commit the care of settling with you the terms of our separation. . . . 
 
   Your much-injured wife, 
             B. Munden (594) 
 
In response, Munden advances the body of rights granted husbands under legal coverture and 
reminds Betsy that “a wife who elopes from her husband forfeits all claim to every thing that is 
his, and can expect nothing from him till she returns to her obedience” (596). Munden’s 
intransigence prompts the Thoughtless family to engage the services of the family lawyer, Mr. 
Markland. This forthright legal advocate is skeptical of Betsy’s claims under “the letter of the 
law”: “the ill-usage she had sustained,” he warns, is, in all probability, insufficient to warrant the 
legal intervention—i.e., judicial separation and “separate maintenance”—that she “certainly 
deserve[d]”; however, Markland expresses “hope [that] there may be means found to bring 
[Munden] to do [Betsy] justice” (597).  Accordingly, he proposes to Munden that the parties 
execute a private separation deed (598). When Munden refuses to countenance the proposal, 
Markland appeals to his vanity, pride, and ambition, cautioning him about the “publick talk” and 
the social “ridicule” that often accompanies legal proceedings on domestic matters and arguing 
“the unreasonableness, the injustice, [and] the cruelty” of a husband’s refusal to negotiate private 
terms (598-99). In fact, Markland maintains, “denying” one’s wife separation maintenance “[is] 
altogether unprecedented among persons of condition” (599). Yet, Munden’s contempt for 
Betsy’s position is unyielding and, rather negotiate an amicable settlement, he threatens to 
“procur[e] a warrant . . . to force [Betsy] immediately home” (598; see also 603). The contest of 
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rights continues until Betsy is coaxed out of her self-imposed exile and into marital 
reconciliation by Munden’s sudden and fatal illness. 
As earlier suggested, placing this dissolution storyline in its legal context reveals the 
novel as deeply critical of the period’s separation law. In Betsy’s struggle to achieve an equitable 
estrangement and recover her individual selfhood, Haywood both records the subjective impact 
of bad marriage and attacks the limited grounds on which wives are lawfully able to extricate 
themselves therefrom. Indeed, her portrayal of Betsy’s suffering not only challenges the idea that 
husbandly adultery is somehow different—less traumatic, less repugnant—than wifely adultery, 
but also criticizes the notion that a wife’s duty is either to pacify or patiently endure marital 
conflict. Moreover, the certainty which Haywood vests Munden’s favored legal position 
confirms that the law is not a wife’s protector, as Blackstone would later assert, but rather a 
husband’s enforcer. Equity’s private separation doctrine, with its lack of clear and authoritative 
precedent, cannot protect estranged wives against the common law processes that would return 
them to violent and licentious domestic spaces. Yet, perhaps the most salient critique that 
Haywood offers involves the law’s failure to provide a safe, confidential, and respectable forum 
for wives and husbands to arbitrate their differences and renegotiate their contracts. As in the 
Goodman-Mellasin divorce plot, Haywood here identifies the social problem of legal remedy: 
separation, when pursued in the courts, promises public shame and communal reproach. 
Additionally, while Haywood projects the normative quality of private separation “among 
persons of condition” (599), her inability to imagine such an intimate process for her heroine 
indicates its dubious social authority. Even the law’s private workaround is not, it seems, the 
liberating possibility that it appears in certain histories of eighteenth-century divorce law. 
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Notwithstanding that the novel’s failed marriage plots diverge from their early legal 
intentions, each is important for shaping the heroine’s subjective development and for cultivating 
the reader’s legal sensibilities. The Goodman-Mellasin divorce provides a structure for exploring 
traditional conceptions of female vice and for articulating the antithesis into which the novel’s 
heroine is to evolve. As Christopher Flint argues, the unreformed Betsy has a “symbolic 
connection” to the wicked Mellasin women and it is one “that [s]he must consciously exorcise in 
order to save herself” (217).  But, the narrative also urges us to consider the ways in which the 
law’s juridical and ethical purpose—its apparent commitment to the social good, both private 
and public, and to fair judgment—is compromised by its messy relationship with prevailing 
codes of conduct. The Munden-Thoughtless separation, on the other hand, provides a framework 
for articulating the bourgeois feminine ideal and for stipulating the moral limitations to the 
heroine’s evolution. Indeed, Betsy’s experience of failed marriage and, specifically, her 
voluntary movement into the role of separated wife re-orients the meaning of paradigmatic 
womanhood, such that passive submission to active misconduct acquires a negative moral value. 
Of course, Betsy does reconcile with her estranged husband, and it is a narrative choice that 
some scholars have viewed as a re-capitulation to bourgeois sentiment on proper femininity. 
Chris Roulston, for example, argues that “Miss Betsy’s new authority lies specifically in her 
return to marriage, not in the seeing through of her legal separation. It is ultimately Miss Betsy’s 
loyalty to her bad marriage that makes her fit for her good one” (165). While Roulston’s 
assessment is certainly valid, it is crucial to point out that Betsy’s loyalty is engendered both by 
her distinctly feminine feelings of “compassion” and “duty” and by Munden’s request for 
forgiveness and “solemn protestations of future amendment” (614-15). Thus, Betsy’s insistence 
on her legal rights has, to some measurable degree, shifted marriage’s dynamic away from the 
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despotic toward the contractual. That said, this shift is not responsible for advancing Betsy 
toward her happy ending; rather, a marriage of love and contentment comes about only through 
Munden’s death and Betsy and Trueworth’s romantic restraint. The reader is, therefore, invited 
to understand separation law as being of limited application—here, it functions only as an 
inducement to a marital reconciliation that is, at best, tolerable. It is only an informed and 
rational courtship process, Haywood suggests, that guarantees a good marriage.  
 The revelatory purpose that guides Defoe and Haywood’s domestic novels acquires an 
intensely reformative value in the work of later-century novelists. Elizabeth Inchbald’s A Simple 
Story (1791) and Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria. A Fragment (1798) 
continue to examine the problems that England’s developing body of dissolution law poses to the 
private and public good, but they do so within a distinctly subversive agenda. Written during the 
French Revolution and within the Jacobin literary tradition, these texts interpret the domestic 
sphere as an oppressive, tyrannical, and entirely masculine space—a space authorized by the 
conservative fictions and presumptions that inform extant law on marriage, divorce, and child 
custody. Inchbald’s and Wollstonecraft’s masterful renderings of the despotic household and its 
legal underpinnings lends their work a sort of remedial urgency: we are called, with exigence, to 
witness the suffering of its female inhabitants and to recondition the legal framework that 
facilitates male tyranny in progressive and rational terms. While neither A Simple Story nor 
Maria itself represents the process of legal revolution, each text offers a compelling argument for 
substantive change.  
A Simple Story, like other domestic fiction of its generation, is ostensibly a novel about 
female education; however, as Terry Castle argues, it is also “a story of law and its violation” 
(294). The narrative’s mother and daughter heroines—Miss Milner, later Lady Elmwood, and 
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Mathilda, respectively—represent opposing educational systems, and the novel’s plot of 
domestic discord and legal divide functions as the flash point between those systems. Lady 
Elmwood’s extramarital affair and the ensuing separation of wife and daughter from husband 
and father engender a transition of genre and pedagogy: the narrative moves from the sentimental 
cultivation of the mother to the Gothic discipline of the daughter.169 Within this frame, Inchbald 
both recalls and challenges the presumptions—or, the fictions—that accompany eighteenth-
century legal discourse on divorce and separation. Even more significantly, she poignantly 
contests the disabling fiction of filius nullius to which children implicated a marriage’s demise 
could be subject.  
The first half of Inchbald’s novel explores the effects of a traditional upper-class—or 
“improper”—female education. Its heroine, Miss Milner, is an orphaned heiress living under the 
guardianship of her father’s most “intimate” friend and a Catholic priest, Mr. Dorriforth (59-60).  
“[I]ndulged” from an early age “in all her wishes to the extreme of folly,” and instructed “in all 
the endless pursuits of personal accomplishments” (69, 60-61), Miss Milner exhibits the 
paradigmatic qualities of unruly liberal subjectivity: she is independent and willful, witty and 
proud, vain and incautious. She is also, as other critics have noted, suffuse with sexual desire and 
inclined toward romantic love.170 She revels in the attentions of many suitors—“some coxcombs, 
some men of gallantry, some single, and some married” (65)—and steadfastly abides by the 
principle of affective marital choice: “I shall . . . not consent to marry a man whom I could never 
love” (77). Like so many of her literary predecessors who, to borrow from Jennifer Golightly, are 
“embodiments of the [intellectual and sexual] potential of woman” (40-41), Miss Milner 
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threatens the conservative masculine space in which she resides. The novel’s male authorities, 
Dorriforth and his mentor Sandford, therefore, agree that “a proper match should be . . . sought 
out for her, and care of so dangerous a person [as she] given into other hands” (92). Marriage, 
the novel suggests, is the best corrective for an education too free, too permissive, too generous.  
The marital union that Inchbald imagines for the “dangerous” Miss Milner purports to 
fulfill both her heroine’s amatory inclinations and Dorriforth’s reformative agenda. Indeed, 
Inchbald writes Dorriforth himself as the object of Miss Milner’s desire—“I love him with all the 
passion of a mistress, and with all the tenderness of a wife” (117)—and she returns her heroine’s 
devotion by conceiving of this hero as an “impassioned” guardian-lover (172). After a sequence 
of narrative conveniences, confusions, and entanglements, which includes Dorriforth’s 
inheritance of the Elmwood title and estate and subsequent dispensation from his monastic vows, 
Inchbald unites guardian and ward in a marriage projected to be “for the welfare of . . . both” and 
for the improvement of the latter (218). The ceremony’s Catholic officiant, Sandford, presents 
the heroine’s “marriage vows” as “sacred” and “binding” “promises of her reform,” and he 
pledges to Miss Milner that her submission to “the dominion of those vows [and] to a husband of 
sense and virtue” will ensure that she is “all that [Sanford], [Dorriforth], or even heaven can 
desire” (218). Although Miss Milner does not verbally acquiesce to these conditions, we have no 
reason to suspect that she stands in objection to them (219). Thus, the marriage contract that 
concludes Volume II has a distinctly hybrid quality: it an affective, egalitarian arrangement 
underwritten by terms both paternalistic and authoritarian.   
Although calculated to promote individual welfare, the marriage that closes Volume II 
opens Volume III irreparably broken. Within the span of one narrative page and seventeen 
unrecorded years of conjugal life, the union has been destroyed by wifely adultery and husbandly 
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despotism. Lord and Lady Elmwood, the narrator reveals, have lived for ten years in a state of 
uninterrupted estrangement, their separation occasioned by Lady Elmwood’s affair with a former 
suitor and maintained by Lord Elmwood’s incapacity for forgiveness. He is now “a hard-hearted 
tyrant” ensnared “in the deep torments of his revenge” (222, 224); she is a wasted adulteress 
shattered by “her guilt” and steeped in “her shame” (224); and their daughter, Mathilda, is a 
“perpetual outcast” forced to share in the pain and punishment of “her mother’s crimes” (224, 
222). Although the collapse of this once happy domestic unit is never formalized—Lord 
Elmwood is apparently “prevented” from seeking a divorce by his regard for Lady Elmwood’s 
father (234)—it is experienced as an unconditional dissolution. Mother and daughter are 
physically, financially, and emotionally cut off from husband and father until Lady Elmwood’s 
much anticipated death in the volume’s second chapter.  
Although brief (only two short chapters), Inchbald’s sentimental-Gothic dissolution 
narrative complicates and humanizes the experience of marital breakdown, and in so doing, 
implicitly targets the ethics of parliamentary divorce. The Elmwoods’ marital history and Lady 
Elmwood’s present suffering invite the reader to identify her character as a victim of education 
and circumstance, rather than an agent of sexual vice. We learn from the narrator that the 
heroine’s infidelity occurred during the hero’s extended expedition to the West Indies. She 
recalls, “The dear object of [Lady Elmwood’s] fondest, truest, affections was away, and those 
affections painted the time so irksome . . . so wearisome that . . . she flew from the present 
tedious solitude, to the dangerous society of one, whose every care to charm her, could not repay 
her for a moment’s loss of him, whose absence he supplied” (223-24). This absence, the narrator 
suggests, “provoked” that restless and impassioned “disposition” inculcated by Lady Elmwood’s 
early education and unsuccessfully corrected by her eventual marriage: this female “heart” 
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simply “was never formed” for the “anger” and “indifference” produced through marital 
separation (223).171 Inchbald’s decision to foreground these external influences in her 
representation of wifely adultery facilitates a deeply sympathetic response to her heroine. Lady 
Elmwood’s emotional pain and physical demise, as consequences of behaviors ill-advised but 
practically inevitable, engage the reader’s ethical sensibilities, marking the heroine’s deadly fate 
as unjust punishment: it is eminently clear, as Mr. Sandford pronounces, that “[she] was not born 
to die the death of the wicked” (227). Jo Alyson Parker argues that the narrative’s “asyndetic leap 
from wedding to deathbed”—its great (and somewhat inexplicable) shift in time and tone—“is 
indicative of Inchbald’s attempt to wrestle with a culture that both castigates women for their 
frailty and disallows them the means to improve their lot” (265). I want to suggest that with this 
sentimental leap, Inchbald advances a larger institutional issue for cultural judgment, specifically 
the ethical authority of a legal divorce process determined by patriarchal politics and motivated 
by a sexual double standard. Where is the moral and social value in a system that always already 
presumes the immorality of wifely adultery, the corrupted culpability of its female agent, and the 
propriety of punitive action? 
Inchbald sustains the dissolution episode’s sympathetic register, as well as its critical 
legal resonance, through the Gothic convention of the despotic husband. Rather than an innocent 
victim of female corruption, Lord Elmwood is cast as a figure of “implacable rigour and 
injustice” (222).172 Indeed, the “shades of evil” that had forever impressed his “nature,” often 
manifesting themselves in the form of a dark obstinacy, proliferate in the wake of Lady 
                                                 
171 Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the Elmwoods’ marital breakdown. For example, Eve Tavor 
Bannet focuses on Lord and Lady Elmwood’s “struggle for power” (80); Eun Kyung Min looks to the characters’ 
differing views on “language, commitment, . . . love,” and “the marriage vow” (120); and John Morillo argues Lord 
Elmwood’s  “failure to satisfy [his wife]” emotionally and sexually (221). 
172 For a more sympathetic reading of Lord Elmwood, see Breashear’s essay on the novel as a reflection of 
contemporary gender constraints on men. 
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Elmwood’s sexual misconduct (85, 222). The narrator explains that he is uncompromising both 
in his hatred for his wife and in his conviction against marital reparation. Not only does he refuse 
to forgive Lady Elmwood when “prevail[ed] upon” by “his dearest, most intimate, and most 
respected friends,” but he seeks to deny her very existence, as well as that of their daughter: 
“Beholding himself separated from [Lady Elmwood] by a barrier never to be removed, he vowed 
. . . not to be reminded of her by one individual object; much less by one so nearly allied to her 
as her child” (224-25). Lord Elmwood’s informal efforts to erase the domestic contract 
encompass extreme acts of paternal hostility. He determines “never to see, [nor] hear of” Matilda 
again (228), and he divests her of her ancestral title and estate, designating in her stead his 
nephew Henry Rushbrook. Importantly, Inchbald does not implicate the logic of patrimony in 
her thorny hero’s dissolutive resolutions—Lord Elmwood is not, for example, interested in 
remarriage or in reproduction—nor does she give a compelling voice to the cuckholded 
husband’s domestic discomfort (see 222-42). As Golightly observes, any “hints that Lord 
Elmwood’s reserve and distance as well as his severed ties with his daughter are the result of a 
need on his part to protect himself from being hurt again do little to sway the reader in his favor” 
(69). In fact, Inchbald invests Elmwood’s motivation with such resentment and retribution that 
marital dissolution for wifely adultery becomes an unwarranted and excessive expression of male 
authority. The ethical sentiments and social rationale that validate parliamentary divorce 
doctrine—justice to the injured husband, patrilineal preservation, and domestic wellbeing—are 
themselves revealed to be fictions.  
These fictions resonate throughout the novel’s second half where Inchbald offers an 
alternative story of female education, one informed by both the tragedy of marital dissolution 
and the collateral experience of parental abandonment and neglect. Volumes III and IV focus on 
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the experience of the Elmwoods’ daughter Matilda, who unlike her mother, is “[e]ducated in the 
school of adversity” (244). This heroine’s difficult story of maturation commences after Lady 
Elmwood’s death, by which she is “abandoned of every support but through [her estranged 
father]” (229).  Lady Elmwood, in a final act of self-recrimination and (Sandford speculates) in 
the “distant hope” of establishing “some little tie between [Lord Elmwood and Matilda],” has 
disavowed the maternal bond (229). Rather than execute a testamentary will that secures her 
separate estate for the legitimate daughter, the disgraced and dying wife pens a request to the 
estranged husband and father that relinquishes his parental right (and arguably hers) and petitions 
his goodwill: “Be her host; I remit the tie of being her parent.—Never see her—but let her 
sometimes live under the same roof as you” (236). Lord Elmwood, moved by his “reverence” for 
Lady Elmwood’s father, agrees “to suffer [Matilda] to reside occasionally at one of [his] seats” 
on the condition that she “avoids [his] sight, or the giving [him] any remembrance of her” (238). 
Thus, Matilda develops under the shadows of her mother’s dishonor and her father’s enmity. 
Removed from society, silenced into submission, and dispossessed of property and identity, she 
grows into the bourgeois feminine ideal, a model of passivity, virtue, and chastity.173  
Inchbald’s second education narrative is not, however, an endorsement of Gothic 
discipline; rather, it is a scrupulous investigation into the burdens imposed on children of marital 
conflict and, in particular, the pressures and pains associated with filial erasure. Virginia Cope 
convincingly interprets Matilda’s experience of displacement and dispossession within the 
context of Robert Miles’s work on “the Gothic [as an] investigation of fragmentary subjectivity”: 
“Stripped of economic and social identity even as she inhabits unseen her father’s castle, Matilda 
                                                 
173 For a compelling argument about the relationship among property (dis)possession, female education, and the 
novel’s form, see Cope 65-85. 
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is that being Miles describes as the ultimate Gothic: ‘the self finding itself dispossessed in its 
own house, in a condition of rupture, disjunction, fragmentation’” (70).174 This “condition” 
manifests itself in emotional distress, psychological trauma, and physical decay. Matilda is 
frequently described as being afflicted with, or in states of, “awe, and terror,” “fear and anxiety,” 
“dread,” “melancholy,” “dejection,” “misery,” and “despair.”175 Moreover, her corporeal person 
is said to suffer from a “decline[]” in “appetite” and a “los[s] [of] all . . . colour” (245)—to be 
“very thin” with a “complexion . . . of a deadly pale” (313-14). The injustice of Matilda’s 
dislocation—and, in particular, of her involuntary and fictional transition from legitimate heir to 
filius nullius—is further recognized in the figure of her male substitute. Rushbrook, the narrator 
confides, understands that “in reality he was the dependant, and she the lawful heir” (275, 
emphasis added). It is a truth by which this beloved nephew-son is deeply troubled: “Lady 
Matilda . . . is an object that wrests from me the enjoyment of every blessing your kindness 
bestows,” he informs Lord Elmwood. “I cannot but feel myself as her adversary . . . who supplies 
her place, while she is exiled, a wanderer, and an orphan” (301). Lord Elmwood is not, however, 
to be moved; and the transgression of Matilda’s displacement plagues the novel’s second half, 
revealing with distressing clarity the broad expanse of the law’s filius nullius doctrine. Indeed, 
with her Gothic story of informal bastardy, Inchbald demonstrates the way in which this legal 
fiction has breached its institutional boundaries to become a punitive measure in the private 
system of domestic justice.   
                                                 
174 Other scholars likewise have emphasized Matilda’s spectre-like existence, finding it to represent the period’s 
gender politics. Candace Ward, for example, argues that Matilda’s “invisibility” reflects her position “as the product 
of reactionary attitudes towards sensibility and sexuality” (“Inordinate Desire,” 13); and Eva König (who cites 
Cope’s use of Miles) contends that it “indicates the diminishing place of women in patriarchal society” (134-35). 
175 See, e.g., 242, 249, 246, 263, 292. 
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The oppressive educational system that Inchbald introduces in Volumes III and IV also 
confronts the common law presumption of paternal right. Lord Elmwood’s initial repudiation of, 
and later restrictions on, his legal duties to protect, maintain, and educate Mathilda raise doubts 
about the legal doctrine that establishes child custody solely in the father. Those doubts are only 
intensified by Inchbald’s haunting depiction of the disowned figure’s vulnerability to sexual 
corruption and violence. Lord Elmwood’s decision to dispossess Mathilda of title, estate, and 
parental guardianship exposes her to male perfidy in the form of the villainous Viscount 
Margrave. This Gothic figure, motivated by Mathilda’s displacement, proposes a sexual contract, 
which includes a provision granting “the discarded daughter” access to the would-be lover’s 
“whole fortune” (310-11). It is a fair proposal, Margrave reasons, given Mathilda is no longer 
“acknowledged, and under the protection of her father” (311). Mr. Sandford, to whom the 
contract is presented, rejects the offer with the suggestion that it is “better [to] remain in poverty” 
than to be “conspicuous only for . . . vice and folly” (311). Margrave is not, however, deterred. 
He and his companions recognize that Mathilda is “a defenceless woman” and, as such, they 
determine to use “open violence” against her (326). What follows is the classic Gothic plotline of 
kidnapping, attempted rape, and heroic rescue—in this instance, the forsaken daughter is saved 
from ruin by the despotic father. Although the violent episode concludes with filial 
reconciliation—Inchbald restores Mathilda and Lord Elmwood to the condition of “love and 
duty” (335-36)—it is impossible to disregard the problems of bastardy and of unregulated 
paternal power. In fact, with the conventional Gothic plot of sexual coercion, Inchbald not only 
further challenges the acknowledged legal fiction of filius nullius, she also destabilizes, arguably 
to the point of falsifying, the legal premise that fathers are the best guardians of their children’s 
welfare.  
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Inchbald’s critical outlook on these fictions survives even to the novel’s remarkably 
ambiguous close. Here, we find Matilda “treat[ed] . . . with all the easy, natural fondness” of 
parental affection, but still subject to the partisan dictates of paternal authority: Lord Elmwood 
will not, the narrator observes, “indulge … the idea of replacing her in exactly that situation 
[(i.e., as to property and title)] to which she was born” (338). Her security, therefore, lies in a 
marriage to Rushbrook, whom she “love[s] as her friend, her cousin, her softer brother, but not as 
a lover” (339). It is not clear whether Matilda acquiesces to the proposed union with 
Rushbrook—the narrator leaves it to “the reader . . . to surmise” (341-2); yet it is clear that, 
unlike her mother, this heroine’s emotional and sexual development has been arrested.176 Thus, 
when the narrator prompts the reader, in the novel’s concluding lines, to weigh “the pernicious 
effects of [Miss Milner’s] . . . improper education” against the “hope[s]” of Matilda’s instruction 
in the “school of prudence—though of adversity,” it is difficult not to consider the request as 
satirical. The reality of women’s position and, in particular, the disabling truth of the fictions and 
presumptions by which they are defined or regulated, render “A PROPER EDUCATION” (342) 
itself a fiction in the advancement female welfare. 
A Simple Story does not discuss, in openly critical terms, the period’s marriage and 
divorce law; however, as Terry Castle and Janet Todd have argued, it is (in Castle’s words) 
“restlessly anti-authoritarian” (292).177 A large part of its anti-authoritarianism is reserved for the 
law, both as a professional institution and as set of jurisprudential principles and assumptions. 
                                                 
176 Amy Pawl and König similarly suggest that Matilda’s emotional and sexual maturity is complicated by her 
relationship with her father and, in Pawl’s terms, the presence of “pure filial love” and, in König’s, “an oedipalized 
[female desire]” (Pawl 125, 125-29; and König, 136, 136-7). 
  
177 Todd argues that the novel offers, “by implication[,] . . . a biting attack on authoritarian patriarchy” (Sign of 
Angellica 228). For other feminist readings of the novel, including those that interpret the second half as “an attempt 
to cancel out the boldness of the first” (Spencer 160), see Pawl; Haggarty; Parker; and Spencer 158-60. 
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Indeed, Inchbald’s poignant depiction of domestic disorder implicitly contests the traditional 
legal presumptions or fictions that privilege patriarchal, patrimonial, and paternal values in cases 
of marital dissolution and child custody. Moreover, at the same time that it recognizes marriage 
as a critical to England’s social and economic welfare, it substantiates, in the autocratic figure of 
Lord Elmwood, the threat that the law, with its cold and uncompromising positions on wifely 
adultery and child welfare, poses thereto. In fact, Inchbald’s narrative memorializes the messy 
“truth” of dissolution—its complications, its tragedies, and its traumas—and, thereby, prompts a 
reassessment of the institutional and doctrinal barriers to marital and familial rehabilitation.  
This truth and its literary representation are intensified in one of the period’s most 
polemical novels, Wollstonecraft’s Maria. As many scholars have noted, this fragmentary text is 
a fictional reworking of Wollstonecraft’s protofeminist treatise, A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman (1792). As such, its narrative of female “misery and oppression” is delivered through 
both the popular tropes of late-century fiction and the conventional mechanics of political and 
moral philosophy.178 Indeed, Wollstonecraft unites the sentimental and the Gothic with the 
rational and the ethical to offer, as her preface indicates, a deeply critical analysis of “the partial 
laws and customs of society” that authorize and enforce women’s subjugation (73). Fundamental 
to Wollstonecraft’s examination is a conviction that marriage, and most notably its legal 
underpinnings, is an oppressive institution for the entirety of the female sex. Thus, this novel, 
which grafts one story of woman’s abjection onto multiple others, is, as Gary Kelly argues, “a 
tale of universal human relevance” (Introduction, xvii) and a tale, as Wollstonecraft herself 
posits, that bespeaks “the history . . . of woman, [rather] than of an individual.”179  
                                                 
178 The quoted material is from Wollstonecraft’s preface to Maria (73). 
 
179 Once again, the quoted material is from the novel’s preface (73). 
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The ubiquity of the bad—i.e., oppressive—marriage is revealed in the eponymous 
heroine’s eight-chapter memoir, penned while she is unjustly imprisoned in an insane asylum. 
The memoir’s principal story is one of domestic tyranny, recording as it does the heroine’s 
experience as the wife of a “heartless, unprincipled wretch” (138). We learn of Maria’s 
husband’s, George Venables’s, financial profligacy (he squanders her dowry and his 
inheritance), his “brutal” and extra-marital sexual “indulgences” (146), and his attempt to 
prostitute Maria to a friend (161). We also learn of her flight from the marriage and his dogged 
pursuit (she is “hunted out like a felon” (173)), of their daughter’s birth and inheritance, and of 
the father’s greed, the infant’s abduction, and the mother’s institutionalization: Venables forcibly 
removes the couple’s daughter from Maria’s care and commits his wife to an asylum in order to 
secure the child’s estate (183-84).  
Woven into this tragedy are multiple “bad marriage” subplots, each of which follows the 
sentimental-Gothic formula of tyrannical husband and abused wife. Maria’s memoir first 
chronicles her parent’s union, which, though an affective (as opposed to arranged) match, is 
structured as a strict hierarchy (125). Here, “the tyranny of [the] father” bound the domestic 
space, “undermin[ing] [the] mother’s health” and reconditioning her “temper” into a disposition 
“intolerably peevish” (128). The autobiography then recounts the domestic violence, sexual 
infidelity, and financial abuse enacted against two laboring women, each of whom provides 
temporary sanctuary to the ill-treated Maria. One wife, her face prematurely marred by “a 
thousand haggard lines and delving wrinkles,” is, Maria observes, no better off than a “slave in 
the West Indies” subject to the most “despotic” of masters—her desperation poignantly revealed 
in the trenchant belief that “when a woman was once married, she must bear every thing” (170-
71). The other wife, twice “reduced to beggary” by her husband’s dissipations, is similarly 
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resigned to wives’ fate: “I know so well, that women have always the worst of it, when law is to 
decide” (178). These incidental anecdotes of female suffering confirm the comprehensive nature 
England’s marriage problem, and, with Maria’s story, authorize the novel’s radical domestic 
agenda. Indeed, Wollstonecraft’s aggressive layering of marital violence calls English society 
either to account for or reform the institutional mechanisms that have been allowed both to 
determine and to eclipse women’s reality.  
Central to the novel’s systemic critique is the law governing marriage, divorce, and child 
custody. Nancy Johnson correctly argues that Wollstonecraft “exposed [this legal canon] as the 
chief civil force that defines, isolates, and persecutes the female sex” (141). Wollstonecraft 
manages her critical assessment through the sentimental discourse of affective consciousness and 
the rational rhetoric of Enlightenment philosophy. Maria’s memoir, for example, balances 
visceral storytelling with reasoned argument to declare the law’s destructive effect on female 
subjectivity. In one representative passage, the heroine personalizes the constitutive impact of 
marital permanence: “[W]hen I recollected that I was bound to live with such a being for ever—
my heart died within me; my desire of improvement became languid, and baleful, corroding 
melancholy took possession of my soul. Marriage had bastilled me for life. . . . [F]ettered by the 
partial laws of society, this fair globe was to me an universal blank” (154-55). This intimate 
testament to the horrors of dispossession and displacement soon shifts to the logic of collective 
experience, as Maria observes the ubiquitous and disabling condition of female coverture:  
The tender mother cannot lawfully snatch from the grip of the gambling spendthrift, or 
beastly drunkard, unmindful of his offspring, the fortune which falls her by chance; or . . . 
what she earns by her own exertions. No; he can rob her with impunity, even to waste 
publicly on a courtezan; and the laws of her country . . . afford her no protection or 
redress from the oppressor, unless she have the plea of bodily fear. (159) 
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By uniting private testimony with civic-minded commentary, Wollstonecraft judiciously engages 
the reader’s sympathies and her intellect on the issue of legal “truth.” We are invited into a world 
where a keen awareness of self and other reveals the law’s institutional insensibilities—a world 
where the utopian-utilitarian version of marriage that underwrites the period’s legal thought is 
disarticulated, only to be replaced by its ostensibly truth-bearing and dysfunctional alternative.    
 Importantly, the novel extends its revelatory function to that of revolution and 
reformation when the rational propertied male intervenes to confront and privately reconcile the 
inequities of the period’s separation and divorce law. Maria’s uncle and benefactor is the first to 
contest the practical utility of and ideological justifications for the legal doctrine of 
indissolubility:  
I am far from thinking that a woman, once married, ought to consider the engagement as 
indissoluble (especially if there be no children to reward her for sacrificing her feelings) 
in case her husband merits neither her love, nor esteem. . . . The magnitude of a sacrifice 
ought always to bear some proportion to the utility in view; and for a woman to live with 
a man, for whom she can cherish neither affection nor esteem, or even be of any use to 
him, excepting in the light of a house-keeper, is an abjectness of condition, the enduring 
of which no concurrence of circumstances can ever make a duty in the sight of God or 
just men. (157) 
 
This speech, reminiscent of Milton’s “Indisposition Passage,” is a radical one for the period, but 
the discerning patriarch’s attention to legal pragmatism (“utility”) and the authority of divine 
(“God”) and natural (“just men”) law, lends his argument for divorce significant cultural 
capital.180 The text’s subversive potential grows as Maria’s uncle argues, and condemns, the 
gender bias that attends marital separation. He emphasizes how the estranged husband, “with 
lordly dignity,” is protected from social censure by the law’s maintenance requirement, while the 
estranged wife “is despised and shunned, for asserting the independence of mind distinctive of a 
                                                 
180 For a brief, but informative, discussion of the intertextuality between Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce and Wollstonecraft’s Maria, see Keymer. 
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rational being, and spurning at slavery” (157-58). It is a portrait of institutional sexism that re-
organizes the domestic hierarchy, placing the independent, rational, and rebellious female in a 
position of ethical authority. Her right of domestic freedom—her right to incite an insurrection 
against marital tyranny—is, thereby, given moral force. 
The rebellious possibility imagined by the reasoned male quickly evolves into the novel’s 
core conflict, as Wollstonecraft begins to envision her heroine as a domestic insurgent. Maria 
assumes this position when she discovers her husband’s attempt to prostitute her. With “hands 
and eyes [lifted] to heaven,” she renounces the marriage: “as solemnly as I took his name, I now 
abjure it” (162). Venables is quick to remind Maria that, without evidence of physical violence, 
she has no lawful grounds for such “threats” (163). But, this wife is not interested in seeking 
legal sanction; rather, individual moral judgment suffices to authorize the dissolution. “Was I 
indeed free?,” she asks. “Yes; free I termed myself, when I decidedly perceived the conduct I 
ought to adopt” (163, emphasis added). Maria’s decision to abandon the marriage without the 
law’s consent is provided a rational foundation in the philosophical writing of the novel’s other 
reasoned and propertied male, Maria’s lover, Henry Darnford. Having read Maria’s memoirs, 
Darnford condemns the law’s non-dissolution policy and declares the right of similarly 
enlightened individuals to perform acts of private resistance: those “minds governed by superior 
principles,” he argues, “[a]re privileged to act above the dictates of laws they had no voice in 
framing” (187). Maria, who ostensibly meets the intellectual and circumstantial threshold for 
such defiance, is thus positively confirmed in her role as domestic dissident. Her prior effort 
toward informal dissolution and her subsequent entry into a bigamous marriage with Darnford 
become natural and just consequences of her individual liberal rights.  
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This outlook on divorce and dissent does not, however, survive the narrative without 
legal challenge. In fact, Wollstonecraft’s final completed chapter stages a trial that pits oppressed 
and resistant individual against oppressive system. Here, Maria undertakes to defend Darnford 
against a criminal conversation lawsuit initiated by Venables and adjudicated in civil court. In a 
written statement read to judge and jury, Maria challenges the fundamental element to this cause 
of action—an extant marriage. She begins by outlining the various ways in which Venables 
violated the marital bond, and she follows this sympathetic narrative with an appeal to liberal 
contract: “I consider all obligation as made void by his conduct; and hold that schisms which 
proceed from want of principles, can never be healed” (196; see also 197). To support her 
argument for marital breach and dissolution, Maria presses the natural law right of private action 
in the face of legal prejudice: A wife “must be allowed to consult her conscience, and regulate 
her conduct, in some degree, by her own sense of right. . . . [I]f laws exist, made by the strong to 
oppress the weak, I appeal to my own sense of justice, and declare that I will not live with the 
individual, who has violated every moral obligation that binds man to man” (197). She then 
concludes her remarks with a “claim” to “divorce” and a petition that strikes at the heart of legal 
fictions: “I appeal to the justice and humanity of the jury, . . . whose private judgment must be 
allowed to modify laws, that must be unjust, because definite rules can never apply to indefinite 
circumstances” (198). The very notion that the general cannot, in the realm of universal justice, 
eclipse the particular evokes the problem of using fictions to circumscribe domestic reality, and 
the idea that the lay juror has an ethical obligation to revisit and, if warranted, rescind such 
fictions boldly extends Wollstonecraft’s earlier call for private resistance into the public sphere.  
Because it strikes such a revolutionary tone, Maria’s defense is subject to intense legal 
scrutiny. The trial judge, acting in accordance with contemporaneous legal doctrine on marital 
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dissolution, denies the heroine’s claim to full divorce (although he does admit that her 
circumstances might “entitle” her to a judicial separation in ecclesiastical court) (198-99). His 
opinion is founded, not on formal legal precedent, but on the law’s informal suppositions—i.e, 
its authorizing fictions. In fact, the judge foregrounds his appraisal of Maria’s defense in 
presumptions about female weakness, wifely duty, and the perils of French mores:  
[He] . . . alluded to ‘the fallacy of letting women plead their feelings, as an excuse for the 
violation of the marriage-vow. For his part, he had always determined to oppose all 
innovation, and the new-fangled notions which incroached on the good old rules of 
conduct. We did not want French principles in public or private life—and, if women were 
allowed to plead their feelings, as an excuse or palliation of infidelity, it was opening a 
flood-gate for immorality. What virtuous woman thought of her feelings? — It was her 
duty to love and obey the man chosen by her parents and relations, who were qualified by 
their experience to judge better for her, than she could for herself. (198-99) 
 
Moreover, he reinterprets Maria’s zealous advocacy as an expression of madness, commenting 
that “the conduct of the lady did not appear to be that of a person of sane mind” (199). The 
jurist’s address, in exploiting cultural concerns about the relationship between excessive female 
sensibility and unrestrained sexuality, as well as about French manners and female insanity, 
seeks to destabilize Maria’s position as a credible witness to the injustice of marriage and 
divorce law, just as it attempts to re-stabilize the fictions on which that law depends—to reinstate 
the traditional ideas and ideologies about domesticity so lately eroded (as the law believed) by 
Enlightenment radicalism. The judge’s conclusory statement, and the novel’s last line, 
concentrates this restorative effort into a sweeping utilitarian argument redolent of parliamentary 
and judicial discourse on divorce and separation: “Too many restrictions could not be thrown in 
the way of divorces, if we wished to maintain the sanctity of marriage; and, though they might 
bear a little hard on a few, very few individuals, it was evidently for the good of the whole” 
(199). Dissolution poses no public benefit; rather, it can only lead to national insecurity and 
social corruption. 
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Notwithstanding this final appeal to legal tradition—it encompasses, quite literally, the 
formal narrative’s last word—Maria’s progressive argument maintains its persuasive and 
revolutionary force. As Miriam Wallace points out, Maria’s “move to claim her adherence to a 
kind of platonic or universal law is the kind of move that trumps tradition” (79). It is a strategy, 
as R.S. White suggests, that insists on the natural law principle that “a positive law which 
offends against the conscience and shared moral obligations, is no law at all” (115). Moreover, as 
numerous scholars have argued, the mere act of Maria’s juridical speech is in and of itself a 
radical exercise. Under the eighteenth-century rules of civil procedure husbands and wives were 
prohibited from testifying in criminal conversation cases, and a wife’s “status” in such a case 
was not as defendant or witness, but “as disputed property” (Wallace 77).181 Thus, the 
evidentiary value given Maria’s experience and perspective—and her positioning as legal 
deponent—lends this fantastical scene, as Elaine Jordan suggests, a “prophetic” and 
optimistically performative power (224).182 With her recited letter, the rebellious female 
visionary steps out of the private shadows into the public conscience to offer a set of arguments 
sure to resonate with emerging and established modern readerships—readerships increasingly 
interested in the conditions of individual autonomy, private judgment, social equality, and legal 
equity. 
                                                 
181 A number of scholars, including Miriam Wallace, Marie Hockenhull Smith, Adam Komisaruk, and Elaine 
Jordan, have read the novel in light of eighteenth-century criminal conversation jurisprudence. One critical interest 
in this body of scholarship is Wollstonecraft’s departure from legal procedure: for instance, Hockenhull Smith 
considers Maria’s written speech act as representative of “Wollstonecraft’s own fantasy of intervention” (sec. 3, 
para. 11) and Jordan designates it “a silent and fantastic (im)possibility” (224). For another useful discussion of 
Maria’s legal undertones, see Gladfelder, who reads the novel in relation to non-fiction “criminal narrative” (211-
18). 
 
182 For an excellent discussion of the significance of testimonial writing versus speaking in Wollstonecraft’s trial 
scene, see Wallace 77-79. 
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This is not to say that Wollstonecraft’s criticisms and innovations enacted meaningful 
legal change in the eighteenth century. Christine Krueger rightly observes that “[n]arratives in 
which women perform their rationality in order to demand equal treatment under the law are 
constructed by patriarchal authority as evidence of irrationality because their authors lack legal 
status to act as rational agents” (120). But, she also notes that “as a key example of women’s 
unprecedented participation through literary means in the rational discourse of the public sphere, 
The Wrongs of Woman contributes to a feminist-aesthetic revision of the legal agent as man of 
property” (121). This is true, I would argue, despite the fact that Wollstonecraft does not, in the 
novel’s conclusory fragments, imagine a happy, stable marital union for her legal activist 
heroine, or that Maria, at times, appears to yield rational thought to romantic sensibility, a 
problem for some critics interested in the success of Wollstonecraft’s political or moral 
agenda.183 Indeed, I follow Patricia Spacks, Anne Mellor, Claudia Johnson, and others who find 
narrative power in the author’s anti-romantic conclusion, as well as in her complex threading of 
rational thought and excessive sensibility.184 It is only through these generic shifts that we can 
begin to identify and decry the law’s shortcomings and, specifically, its failure to understand that 
it is not marital permanence that guarantees female morality, private welfare, or public stability; 
                                                 
183 See, e.g., Poovey 83-113. For other discussions of the problematic relationship between reason and sensibility in 
Maria, see Todd, “Reason and Sensibility,” and Cove. 
 
184 Spacks argues that Wollstonecraft uses “antiromance” to foster an awareness of “the true nature of women’s 
situation” (242, 245-7), and Mellor suggests that, over the novel’s course, Wollstonecraft transforms Maria’s 
excessive sensibility—“passionate erotic love”—into a “powerful sympathy for other people’s feelings,” a sympathy 
that “acts in harmony with reason” and that guides “a representation of truth superior to that found in the 
philosophical tract [i.e., Vindication]” (418-19). Claudia Johnson and S. Candace Ward also argue that 
Wollstonecraft reconditions sensibility or sentimentality as rational, sympathetic feeling and that this emotive model 
is realized in the fragmentary ending that imagines Maria and Jemima in a domestic bond (Johnson, Equivocal 
Beings 63, 67-9; and Ward, “‘Active Sensibility,’” passim).  
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rather education, economics, and gender equality are the fundamental structures for constructive 
domesticity.  
The primary fictions of dissolution law are not, however, Wollstonecraft’s only political 
target; the novel also addresses those presumptions or fictions incidental to the period’s 
dissolution jurisprudence. The presumption of paternal right, for instance, is strongly disputed in 
the novel’s fathers, who are abusive at worst and neglectful at best, as well as in its heroine 
mother, who is motivated to fight female oppression by the bond of motherhood, which she 
describes as an “unutterable pleasure” (154). In fact, the fate of Maria’s and Venables’ daughter 
testifies to the violence perpetrated through the law’s gendered assumptions. The infant’s 
apparent death, which occurs after Venables forcibly removes her from Maria’s care, is the 
culmination of paternal avarice and indifference—Venables perceives the child as a commodity, 
so much so that his parental concern is entirely directed to her inheritance. Wollstonecraft sets 
this failure of paternal obligation in contrast to the strength of maternal sensibility.185 It is 
Maria’s love for her daughter that impels her to abandon Venables and to undertake his legal 
duties (as laid out by Blackstone) of maintenance, protection, and education. In this case, the best 
interests of the child clearly lie in a near legal impossibility—the mother’s custody. The novel 
does not, however, ignore the case of maternal corruption, as bad mothers and step-mothers 
permeate the novel. Yet, Wollstonecraft connects their failures to the larger problem of 
patriarchal despotism, which denies women the education to understand and freedom to enact 
responsible, affective parenting. Child custody is, thus, a cultural dilemma and, Wollstonecraft 
                                                 
185 Other scholars have offered persuasively nuanced accounts of Maria’s maternal commitments, see, e.g., Nixon, 
“Order in the Family Court.” 
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suggests, a legal issue to be determined, not through paternalistic convention, but rather 
independent and particularized review. 
The relationship between legal tradition and child welfare also enters into Maria in the 
form of the bastard child. The heroine’s memoir includes a stirring anecdote about one of 
Venables’ illegitimate children, a “squalid object” so weak that she “tottered along, scarcely able 
to sustain her own weight” (149). The child’s mother, “a country girl” seduced and abandoned 
by Venables, died soon after childbirth, leaving her infant to the charge of an underpaid parish 
guardian (150). Venables is completely apathetic to the little girl and her suffering—“So much 
the better” is his response to news of her impending death (149). Yet, Maria is not, and her 
description of the child’s “sallow” complexion, “inflamed” eyes, wrinkles, and “bent” legs gives 
voice to the cruelty of paternal disassociation (149-50). Indeed, in this brief narrative interlude, 
Wollstonecraft imprints the fiction of filius nullius all over the child’s wrecked body. It is a 
material image of legal and social violence from which the reader’s sympathies cannot escape, 
and through which the country’s inflexible definitions of marriage and the family are further 
contested. 
The harsh reality of legal illegitimacy grounds another of the text’s memoirs—that of 
Maria’s asylum guard, Jemima. Like Maria’s autobiography, Jemima’s is a generic hybrid: 
sentimental narrative is blended with politicized commentary to reveal the truth of female 
oppression. Indeed, Jemima recounts in excruciating detail the physical, emotional, and sexual 
abuse to which she was subject by parents and guardians, masters and mistresses, fellow servants 
and communal relations; and she philosophizes on her enslavement by and alienation from 
familial and social systems. Within this moving portrait of female abjection is a particular focus 
on the affliction wrought by bastardy. Jemima is also a child of seduction, abandonment, and 
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maternal death, and her illegitimacy both dehumanizes and “benumb[s]” her (120). She is not a 
daughter, but “a creature of another species,” a “curse entailed on [her father] for his sins” (104-
05); she is not a servant, but a “filching cat,” a “ravenous dog,” “an obstinate mule” (105); she is 
not an innocent girl, but sexual “prey” (107); she is not an autonomous individual, but “a slave, a 
bastard, a common property” (109). Wollstonecraft draws these debasements as the catalysts for 
Jemima’s criminal vice and general insensibility—prostitution, thievery, and hardheartedness are 
logical outcomes for a person shamed by “the appellation of bastard” and denied acceptance as 
“a fellow-creature” (105, 106). Nevertheless, by granting this figure of illegitimacy a 
sympathetic story and rational speech, Wollstonecraft reinvests her not only with humanity but 
with filial and social meaning—she is, in fact, a child of someone and a member of something. 
Thus, just as the novel contests the notion that marital indissolubility is a social and political 
benefit, it also challenges the idea that filius nullius, a potential consequence of dissolution, is 
merely a legal convenience. Rather, it is, as Inchbald earlier suggested in A Simple Story, an 
individual, familial, and social injustice—a burden on England’s private and public spaces that 
needs to be alleviated. 
By the end of the long eighteenth century, the subversive polemics of Inchbald and 
Wollstonecraft have been replaced by the subtle social commentary of Jane Austen. Although 
Austen’s oeuvre focuses on the courtship process and the establishment of a progressive marital 
union for hero and heroine, most of her novels are energized by a range of bad marriages. For 
example, Pride and Prejudice’s central romance—that of Elizabeth and Darcy—develops 
against the intramarital contempt of the Bennets, the incompatibility of the Collinses, and the 
insensibility of the Wickhams. And, Persuasion’s domestic ideal—represented in Anne and 
Wentworth—evolves within an environment shaped by the incongruity of the Sir Walter Elliots, 
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the simmering hostility of the Mr. Charles Musgroves, and the antipathy of the Mr. William 
Elliots. With each collateral representation of marital discord, Austen not only reinforces the 
propriety and the stability of her principal domestic creations, she also verifies and humanizes 
the difficult reality of marital rupture and marital permanence.  
Austen’s representation of domestic dissonance becomes most overtly critical in the two 
darkest of her novels of manners, Sense and Sensibility and Mansfield Park. In these texts, 
subplots of infidelity, divorce, and female ruin cast an ominous shadow over the happy courtship 
narrative, memorializing the gendered inequities that too often attend the experience of marriage 
and dissolution. Indeed, the protagonists of these dissolution plots, the Eliza Brandons (mother 
and daughter) in Sense and Sensibility and Maria Rushworth in Mansfield Park, come to embody 
the injustice of social convention and legal doctrine on divorce. The elder Eliza, “married against 
her inclination” to a man with mercenary motives, is destroyed by her marriage’s breakdown 
(145). When her unfeeling husband divorces her for infidelity, she is left impoverished—“[h]er 
legal allowance was not adequate to her fortune, nor sufficient for her comfortable 
maintenance”—and friendless, eventually succumbing to the ravages of consumption (146-47). 
Her daughter, the younger Eliza, also suffers a difficult fate—she is abandoned by her father, 
victimized by a libertine lover, and expelled, along with her illegitimate child, from polite 
society. Maria Rushworth, also an adulteress, cuts a less sympathetic figure than the elder Eliza, 
as her marriage is neither coerced nor actively oppressive. But her domestic lot is nevertheless 
unduly punitive. For being married to a man she “despised” and seduced by one she “loved,” 
Maria is divorced and then exiled, along with an aunt for whom she had “no affection,” to a 
place “remote and private” (315). As Austen’s narrator starkly observes, the cuckolded (and 
stupid) husband, though now “mortified and unhappy,” will have another opportunity for marital 
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bliss, “while she [his unfaithful wife] must withdraw with infinitely stronger feelings to a 
retirement and reproach, which could allow no second spring of hope or character” (315). It is a 
depressing and seemingly cruel ending for a young girl whose education had not taught her how 
to navigate courtship and marriage successfully—how to either choose properly or live 
dispassionately.  
What Austen offers in these brief tales of divorce is not so much a call for legal reform or 
for social change, but a reminder that public and private welfare in the modern era depend on the 
individual’s capacity for rational, informed choice and her right to equal and compatible unity. 
Austen’s fictions, along with that of her literary predecessors, provide the necessary instruction 
to facilitate the development of these capabilities and rights. Thus, while Defoe, Haywood, 
Inchbald, Wollstonecraft, and Austen may not have imagined how to effectively upend the legal 
system’s treatment of marriage and divorce and to eradicate its corrupting fictions, they and all 
other writers represented in this work provide the means for helping readers to identify legal 
untruths and redress, privately, their very real impact. 
Conclusion 
Eighteenth-century divorce law (under which I include child custody law) operated 
according to a set of presumptions that made marital dissolution an undesirable, even 
threatening, action: to allow husbands and wives to divorce and remarry was to destabilize the 
private sphere, assail the public’s moral values, and undermine England’s national security. 
Nevertheless, this period saw the development of two significant exceptions to the doctrine of 
marital permanence, parliamentary divorce and private separation. While neither process enjoyed 
broad legal support, nor clearly altered the patriarchal norms on which dissolution law was 
founded, their records do indicate a shift in the cultural consciousness toward a more liberal view 
of divorce and separation—toward a view in which the family’s and nation’s welfare is no longer 
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tied to a collection of rigid jurisprudence on domestic relations. This shift is both memorialized 
and shaped by the centuries’ domestic novels. Early-century texts reveal the problem that 
dissolution law, with its idealistic presumptions and gendered biases, poses to the public and 
private good, while later-century texts exhibit a reformative spirit, one that urgently demonstrates 
the need for serious legal change. While such change did not occur until later in England’s 
history, novelists writing at the very end of the long eighteenth century, such as Jane Austen, 
found other ways to advance the cause, including creating heroes and heroines that illustrated the 
ways and means of successful marriage contracting. 
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CODA 
“Legal fictions” are undoubtedly useful for facilitating the law’s development. They 
allow legislatures and courts quietly to adapt existing rules, doctrines, and systems to changing 
conditions within and outside of the law’s institutional borders. As Del Mar argues, “[t]hey are 
one of the [creative] devices via which the law . . . manages to balance flexibility and 
responsiveness with stability and predictability” (“Legal Fictions and Legal Change,” 250). Yet, 
they are also potentially harmful both in their ability to reinforce or legitimate normative values 
and experiences and in their tendency to privilege the general over the specific, the universal 
over the singular. As Gail Hammer has suggested, the device introduces the possibility for 
“irrationality and injustice” in legal decision-making—for the disproportional treatment of 
“specific groups” and, in particular, of “those whose experiences are outside judge’s [and, I 
would argue, legislators’ and practitioners’] experiences” (120). In fact, legal fictions can 
become so integral to the legal and social consciousness that we lose sight of their fictionality, 
and therefore struggle to judge fully their institutional efficacy and their socio-political value, 
both in times of great historical change and in moments of historical continuity.  
Unsurprisingly, several of the legal fictions that informed, or grew out of, eighteenth-
century England’s marriage jurisprudence continue to hold force in the twenty-first century. For 
instance, the principles on which classical liberal contract theory was founded remain 
fundamental to U.S. contract law today, despite the fact that they have little practical reality. As 
Danielle Kie Hart argues, notwithstanding that the law “assumes” otherwise, “[m]any contracts 
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are not entered into voluntarily by rational actors, and the state regularly interferes” (4).186  In 
fact, Hart contends, “[i]mbalances of power, not freedom and consent, form the cornerstones of 
the modern system of contract law” (5). Marital coverture and the fiction of unity on which it 
rests also persist in law, as well as in material culture. Frances Dolan observes that marital unity 
“retains legal resonance in the practice of a wife surrendering her ‘maiden’ name to take up her 
husband’s last name” and in the U.S. doctrine of spousal privilege187; she also argues that it 
shapes our understanding of and response to domestic violence, including our literary and visual 
representations thereof (272-73). Moreover, Claudia Zaher demonstrates the ways in which 
coverture continued in the twentieth century to impact U.S. law’s treatment of marital rape and 
spousal negligence, as well as rules relating to legal bar admissions and corporate anti-nepotism 
(462). She also argues that, although “[c]overture has almost faded from the legal scene [in the 
twenty-first century], . . . remnants of it remain intact”—for example, in “corporate rules against 
marriage between employees,” in divorce economics, and in forfeiture and bankruptcy laws 
(463).188 The presumptions surrounding marital dissolution, such as suppositions about marriage 
as a social good, and assumptions of parental right in child custody matters, likewise have 
maintained a significant legal presence. In fact, only recently (2011) have all American states 
                                                 
186 Lind also analyzes modern contract law as a legal fiction: “[T]he law of contract is premised on agreements with 
mutuality of benefits and burdens, entered into voluntarily and at arm’s length, by rational agents with knowledge 
and understanding of the commitments they are making. Increasingly, this contract ideal is a fiction with no 
purchase in everyday reality” (104). 
 
187 This doctrine limits the government’s ability to compel one spouse to testify against the other and it privileges 
certain communications between husband and wife. 
  
188 With respect to divorce economics, Zaher argues, “[i]t is most often the woman who suffers the greatest 
economic loss upon termination of a marriage, since her contribution to the family’s welfare is not regarded as 
favorably as the husband’s contribution.” With respect to forfeiture and bankruptcy laws, she writes, the “courts 
often seem to follow the old principle that what’s his is his—and what’s hers is his” (463). 
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adopted some form of no-fault divorce, and England still maintains a partial fault system.189 This 
commitment to marital transgression or long-term separation as necessary prerequisites to 
divorce suggests that Anglo-American legal systems have been reluctant to accept Miltonesque 
arguments for “easy divorce.” Moreover, the movement toward gender-neutrality or shared 
parenting in child custody determinations is relatively new, although it does indicate that courts 
and legislatures are interested in revisiting the utility of gendered presumptions (now primarily 
maternal) on parental right.190  
Of course, there have always been, and continue to be, cultural objects that identify and 
seek to alter the legal falsehoods that have captured our historical imagination. As I argue in this 
dissertation, the early domestic novel, by giving voice to the private experiences of women and 
men, of wives and husbands, of parents and children, revealed the many fictions attendant upon 
the eighteenth-century marriage contract—how it was negotiated, how it was lived, and how it 
was dissolved. The novel also sought to transform these fictions, working through a multitude of 
forms and genres to de-fictionalize, revise, or even eradicate entirely the untruths. The degree to 
which these texts affected marriage law’s development is certainly debatable. Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that the novel, as a mass cultural medium interested in reflecting and shaping the 
movement into modernity, contributed to progressive changes in the law of marriage, divorce, 
and child custody.  
                                                 
189 New York was the last American state to adopt no-fault divorce (Stark 31). England still requires either that one 
of the parties to a divorce prove “adultery, behaviour, [or] desertion” or that there is a long-term separation (“two 
years if both parties consent, and five years without consent”) (Fairbairn and Rutherford 3). 
 
190 For a useful discussion of the movement toward a “gender-neutral schema” in U.S. child custody and visitation 
law, see Sen and Tam 42 et passim. For a discussion of the movement toward shared parenting in the UK, see 
Gregory and Milner 594-96. 
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The nineteenth century, after all, saw the rise of social movements that effected legal 
reform by pressing the difference between legal tradition and domestic reality, the latter of which 
novelistic discourse had a hand in unearthing and establishing. Indeed, over the century’s course, 
England’s parliament responded to outside pressures by passing several substantial pieces of 
domestic legislation, including the Marriage Act of 1823, which relaxed the sanctions for failure 
to follow the HMA formation rules (marriages formed outside of these rules were voidable, 
rather than simply void)191; the Married Women’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882, which 
granted married women property rights; the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, which transferred 
jurisdiction for full divorce from Parliament to civil court, as well as codified and minimally 
expanded dissolution grounds; and the Custody of Infants Act of 1839 and the Infant Custody 
Act of 1873, which granted and then expanded mothers’ rights to child custody and visitation.192 
U.S. state law saw similar developments. The first Married Women’s Property Act was passed in 
Arkansas in 1835, with the majority of states following through the middle of the century 
(Chused 1361n.3). Like their English counterparts, these acts “gave property rights to wives free 
of their husbands’ control and in derogation of the common law” (Popkin 108). In addition, 
“[j]udicial divorce was almost universal by 1900” (South Carolina excepted), and it could be 
pursued by both men and women on a variety of grounds, including adultery, cruelty, and 
desertion (Friedman 1501). Moreover, while state legislatures were relatively resistant to 
establishing maternal custody rights, the courts were increasingly willing to award mothers 
                                                 
191 See Probert, “Control Over Marriage,” 445-56. 
 
192 Short overviews of the remainder of these nineteenth-century developments can be found on the following pages 
of UK Parliament’s website: “Marriage: property and children,” “Obtaining a divorce,” “Custody rights and 
domestic violence.” For information about the development of bastardy laws, see “Marriage: legitimacy and 
adoption,” which indicates that the law of child illegitimacy did not encounter major reforms until the twentieth 
century. 
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custody in cases where their care was in the child’s best interests (Mason 49-68). State 
legislatures did, however, take up the issue of bastardy, granting illegitimate children a family 
nexus and inheritance rights.193 And, again, while it is impossible to quantify literary fiction’s 
contributions to these developments, is it impossible to avoid the conclusion that popular novels 
from both the English and American traditions had some influence on the reformers who sought 
progressive change and on the legal professionals who ushered it in.  
A similar dialectic between marriage law, including its fictions, and the nineteenth-
century novel can be observed. Major Victorian novelists, such as Charlotte Brontë, Emily 
Brontë, Charles Dickens, Anthony Trollope, Wilkie Collins, George Eliot, and Thomas Hardy, 
address the contours of courtship, marriage, and divorce to highlight and critique legal 
presumptions about the parties to the marriage contract and about the social “goodness” of 
marriage itself. 194 These authors also treat the painful experience of childhood at the social and 
legal margins, with characters defined in some part by their illegitimacy or wardship. The novel 
of this period, and the realist tradition in which it developed, thus continued to perform the 
cultural work of its predecessors—representing, adjudicating, and modifying some of family 
law’s most controversial presumptions. 
To conclude, the law has often imagined itself as removed from society’s other 
institutions—as immune to their pressures and detached from their quotidian experiences. Yet, 
this perspective is itself a fiction. Those who make, adjudicate, and practice the law are always 
already immersed in the social, economic, political, and cultural conflicts of their time. For the 
                                                 
193 Mason observes that “by the end of the nineteenth century almost every state had passed legislation declaring that 
the child was a member of the mother’s family, with a right to inherit from the mother, the same as a legitimate 
child” (68). 
 
194 There are many excellent critical works on marriage law in Victorian literature. See, for example, Surridge’s 
Bleak Houses and Tromp’s The Private Rod. 
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law to understand itself—its past, present, and future—and to appreciate the circumstances and 
experiences of those over whom it exerts authority, it must engage with discourse produced by 
“external” communities. Literature, as a representative of various realities and a producer of new 
worlds, is the perfect medium for such inquiry. Of course, the same is true for literature. A broad 
view of literary history requires historians and theorists to interact with other disciplines. The 
law, as a powerful contributor to constructions of self and other and as a crucial component to 
the lived experience, is necessarily embedded in most any literary production. An understanding 
of its language, doctrine, and process is, therefore, crucial to historical accounts of literary form, 
style, genre, and content. Yet, the significance of a collaborative approach to legal and literary 
history is not confined to the literary academy or the legal profession; rather, interdisciplinary 
exchange of this sort is crucial for all of us who seek to comprehend and critically evaluate our 
historical memory and who wish to have a hand in the responsible development of our historical 
future.  
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